-
158Bohmian dispositionsSynthese 192 (10): 3203-3228. 2015.This paper argues for a broadly dispositionalist approach to the ontology of Bohmian mechanics . It first distinguishes the ‘minimal’ and the ‘causal’ versions of Bohm’s theory, and then briefly reviews some of the claims advanced on behalf of the ‘causal’ version by its proponents. A number of ontological or interpretive accounts of the wave function in BM are then addressed in detail, including configuration space, multi-field, nomological, and dispositional approaches. The main objection to e…Read more
-
37Review of R.I.G Hughes, The Theoretical Practices of Physics: Philosophical Essays (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (12). 2010.
-
49Probability (review)Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 26 (1): 99-103. 2011.
-
371Fictions, inference and realismIn John Woods (ed.), Fictions and Models: New Essays, Philosophia Verlag. 2010.Abstract: It is often assumed without argument that fictionalism in the philosophy of science contradicts scientific realism. This paper is a critical analysis of this assumption. The kind of fictionalism that is at present discussed in philosophy of science is characterised, and distinguished from fictionalism in other areas. A distinction is then drawn between forms of fictional representation, and two competing accounts of fiction in science are discussed. I then outline explicitly what I tak…Read more
-
22Hacking KuhnRevista de Filosofía (Madrid) 28 (2): 261-284. 2003.Thomas Kuhn’s work, particularly his famous book Structure of Scientific Revolutions, is often interpreted as a failed attempt to defend four radical thesis about science: epistemic pessimism, semantic relativism, methodological irrationalism and metaphysical idealism. In this paper I argue that such interpretation depends essentially on a false model of scientific knowledge, according to which the objects of scientific belief are always explanatory scientific theories, which are in turn empiric…Read more
-
60Review. Quantum state diffusion. I PercivalBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (3): 527-530. 2000.
-
48Theories, models, and representationsIn L. Magnani, N. J. Nersessian & P. Thagard (eds.), Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery, Kluwer/plenum. pp. 75--83. 1999.I argue against an account of scientific representation suggested by the semantic, or structuralist, conception of scientific theories. Proponents of this conception often employ the term “model” to refer to bare “structures”, which naturally leads them to attempt to characterize the relation between models and reality as a purely structural one. I argue instead that scientific models are typically “representations”, in the pragmatist sense of the term: they are inherently intended for specific …Read more
-
140It is still a matter of controversy whether the Principle of the Common Cause (PCC) can be used as a basis for sound causal inference. It is thus to be expected that its application to quantum mechanics should be a correspondingly controversial issue. Indeed the early 90’s saw a flurry of papers addressing just this issue in connection with the EPR correlations. Yet, that debate does not seem to have caught up with the most recent literature on causal inference generally, which has moved on to c…Read more
-
485Scientific representation: Against similarity and isomorphismInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (3): 225-244. 2003.I argue against theories that attempt to reduce scientific representation to similarity or isomorphism. These reductive theories aim to radically naturalize the notion of representation, since they treat scientist's purposes and intentions as non-essential to representation. I distinguish between the means and the constituents of representation, and I argue that similarity and isomorphism are common but not universal means of representation. I then present four other arguments to show that simil…Read more
-
308Quantum propensitiesStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (2): 418-438. 2007.This paper reviews four attempts throughout the history of quantum mechanics to explicitly employ dispositional notions in order to solve the quantum paradoxes, namely: Margenau's latencies, Heisenberg's potentialities, Maxwell's propensitons, and the recent selective propensities interpretation of quantum mechanics. Difficulties and challenges are raised for all of them, and it is concluded that the selective propensities approach nicely encompasses the virtues of its predecessors. Finally, som…Read more
-
102On quantum propensities: Two arguments revisitedErkenntnis 61 (1): 1-16. 2004.Peter Milne and Neal Grossman have argued against Popper's propensity interpretation of quantum mechanics, by appeal to the two-slit experiment and to the distinction between mixtures and superpositions, respectively. In this paper I show that a different propensity interpretation successfully meets their objections. According to this interpretation, the possession of a quantum propensity by a quantum system is independent of the experimental set-ups designed to test it, even though its manifest…Read more
-
59Fictions, Conditionals, and Stellar AstrophysicsInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (3): 235-252. 2013.This article argues in favour of an inferential role for fictions in scientific modelling. The argument proceeds by means of a detailed case study, namely models of the internal structure of stars in stellar astrophysics. The main assumptions in such models are described, and it is argued that they are best understood as useful fictions. The role that conditionals play in these models is explained, and it is argued that fictional assumptions play an important role as either background or anteced…Read more
-
853Theories: Tools versus modelsStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 39 (1): 62-81. 2008.In “The Toolbox of Science” (1995) together with Towfic Shomar we advocated a form of instrumentalism about scientific theories. We separately developed this view further in a number of subsequent works. Steven French, James Ladyman, Otavio Bueno and Newton Da Costa (FLBD) have since written at least eight papers and a book criticising our work. Here we defend ourselves. First we explain what we mean in denying that models derive from theory – and why their failure to do so should be lamented. S…Read more
-
102The ample modelling mindStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1): 213-217. 2012.
-
25Contextos de descubrimiento causalRevista de Filosofía (Madrid) 37 (1): 27-36. 2012.Se distinguen dos acepciones del término “contexto de descubrimiento”: La acepción tradicional, que lo contrasta con el contexto de la justificación, y otra, más reciente, que lo relaciona con la metodología de inferencia causal. Curiosamente, el propio Reichenbach suscribió la segunda acepción, y no es coincidencia que su aportación al desarrollo del campo del descubrimiento causal haya sido capital. Se defiende la vigencia de esta metodología en todas las ciencias empíricas, incluidas las cien…Read more
-
111Propensities and PragmatismJournal of Philosophy 110 (2): 61-92. 2013.: This paper outlines a genuinely pragmatist conception of propensity, and defends it against common objections to the propensity interpretation of probability, prominently Humphreys’ paradox. The paper reviews the paradox and identifies one of its key assumptions, the identity thesis, according to which propensities are probabilities. The identity thesis is also involved in empiricist propensity interpretations deriving from Popper’s influential original proposal, and makes such interpretations…Read more
-
143Probabilities, Causes and Propensities in PhysicsSpringer. 2010.Table of Contents: Preface.- 1. Introduction; Mauricio Suárez.- PART I: PROBABILITIES.- 2. Probability and time symmetry in classical Markov processes; Guido Bacciagaluppi.- 3. Probability assignments and the principle of indifference: An examination of two eliminative strategies; Sorin Bangu.- 4. Why typicality does not explain the approach to equilibrium; Roman Frigg; PART II: CAUSES.- 5. From metaphysics to physics and back: The example of causation; Federico Laudisa.- 6. On explanation in re…Read more
-
-
London School of EconomicsDepartment of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific MethodAssociate Researcher
Madrid, Madrid, Spain
Areas of Specialization
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Areas of Interest
8 more