Abbas Yazdani

The undeniable success of neuroscience in explaining human mental states, which in the past were explained in terms of supernatural concepts, has led many modern-day scientists and philosophers to advocate physicalist methods in explaining human nature. According to this view, science, by recognizing the physiological structures of man, especially the brain and its functions, will finally be able to explain human nature with all its features through mere physical concepts. The most important challenge to this view has always been the question of consciousness, or in its traditional sense, how the mind and body relate. However, contemporary scientists try to explain the phenomenon of consciousness through the physical sciences by presenting new scientific theories and concepts about the mechanisms of the brain and its relation to mental states. The purpose of this article is to show that phenomenal awareness is the most important challenge to the theory of materialism. Examining the concept of consciousness and dividing it into two parts, "perceptual consciousness" and "phenomenal consciousness", we have argued that scientific theories at best provide only an explanation of perceptual consciousness, while challenging The main science of the natural sciences is the explanation of phenomenal consciousness. But phenomenal consciousness is beyond the reach of the physical sciences because of the inherent nature of mentality, unless it recognizes first-person perspective science.

Critical analysis of Karl Barth’s opposition to natural theology shows that it is demonstrably based on a narrow understanding of natural theology and is mostly shaped through his reaction to the misuse of theological concepts during the heydays of Hitler’s rule over Germany. In his increasing opposition to natural theology in its various implications and forms, Barth seems to have been basing his arguments on ontological, epistemological, biblical and practical grounds as he leaned heavily on revelation as the sole basis of all that pertains to the formation of faith and dogma. By engaging Barth in the aforementioned areas, it will be shown that Barth’s arguments fall short of consistency in that they contain false designations of natural theology by focusing on a limited and out-dated version of it, an inherent vicious circularity, a highly selective interpretation of respective biblical texts as well as a fallacy of relevance. It will be argued that the concept of revealed theology is not necessarily opposed to a constructive approach to natural theology, which seeks to appreciate the manifest glory of God in creation as an unfolding secret observed and understood through the rational faculties within the human mind.

One of the most popular accounts of the teleological argument for the existence of God is the analogical account that is the center of Hume’s knocker criticisms. Since Hume’s age, many theist scholars have attempted to propose convincing responses. Motahari is one of the rigorous thinkers who tackled the challenges which Hume posed. The purpose of this paper is to address Hume’s criticisms and assess Motahari’s rejoinders to them. It will be argued that Motahari’s responses do not seem successful. Although Motahari has tried to refute Hume’s criticisms in some of his works, he implicitly endorsed Hume’s assessment of the analogical account of the teleological argument in other works, and came ultimately close to the Hume’s view. As Hume believed that the argument from design is not a successful philosophical argument to prove God’s existence that the theist contend, Motahari also admits at the end that this argument alone cannot prove God’s existence and emphasizes that the argument from design cannot prove God of Abraham’s religions, that is a person with necessary being, who is immaterial and eternal, is omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good, and the creator of the universe. Motahari ultimately believed in deficiency of the argument from design too, and assessed it as an argument with limited functions for God’s existence.