•  81
    In “Radical Interpretation” (1974), David Lewis asked: by what constraints, and to what extent, do the non-intentional, physical facts about Karl determine the intentional facts about him? There are two popular approaches: the reductive externalist program and the phenomenal intentionality program. I argue against both approaches. Then I sketch an alternative multistage account incorporating ideas from both camps. If we start with Karl's conscious experiences, we can appeal to Lewisian ideas to …Read more
  •  18
    The Arationality of Perception: Comments on Susanna Siegel
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3): 755-763. 2020.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
  •  60
    This is a chapter from my forthcoming book Perception (Routledge). I explain the physical state view of sensory experience (Papineau, McLaughlin, others). I criticize an argument against it based on the "transparency observation". Then I develop two alternative arguments against it. The first is a Leibniz's Law argument based on the essentially externally directed character of some experiences. The second concerns "brains in vats". Finally I consider a recent response due to David Papineau, whic…Read more
  •  155
    I argue for three claims. First, there is a strong argument for identity physicalism (Lewis, Sider, Dorr) over dualism. It does achieve the physicalist dream of a maximally simple and uniform view of reality. However, there are also strong arguments against identity physicalism concerning the special nature of conscious experiences. Second, although nonidentity "ground" physicalism (Campbell, Johnston, Schaffer) is a possible fallback position, there is no reason to prefer to property dualism. I…Read more
  •  185
    The puzzle of the laws of appearance
    Philosophical Issues 30 (1): 257-272. 2020.
    In this paper I will present a puzzle about visual appearance. There are certain necessary constraints on how things can visually appear. The puzzle is about how to explain them. I have no satisfying solution. My main thesis is simply that the puzzle is a puzzle. I will develop the puzzle as it arises for representationalism about experience because it is currently the most popular theory of experience and I think it is along the right lines. However, everyone faces a form of the puzzle, includi…Read more
  •  219
    Many favor representationalism about color experience. To a first approximation, this view holds that experiencing is like believing. In particular, like believing, experiencing is a matter of representing the world to be a certain way. Once you view color experience along these lines, you face a big question: do our color experiences represent the world as it really is? For instance, suppose you see a tomato. Representationalists claim that having an experience with this sensory character is ne…Read more
  •  105
    In this chapter, Pautz raises a puzzle about spatial experience for phenomenal internalists like Ned Block. If an accidental, lifelong brain-in-the-void (BIV) should have all the same experiences as you, it would have an experience as of items having various shapes, and be able to acquire concepts of those shapes, despite being cut off from real things with the shapes. Internalists cannot explain this by saying that BIV is presented with Peacocke-style visual field regions having various shapes,…Read more
  •  220
    Consciousness and Coincidence: Comments on Chalmers
    Journal of Consciousness Studies (5-6): 143-155. 2020.
    In “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, David Chalmers briefly raises a problem about how the connection between consciousness and our verbal and other behavior appears “lucky”. I raise a counterexample to Chalmers’s formulation of the problem. Then I develop an alternative formulation. Finally, I consider some responses, including illusionism about consciousness.
  •  405
    Naive Realism and the Science of Consciousness
    Analytic Philosophy. forthcoming.
    I begin by describing what I call simple naïve realism. Then I describe relevant empirical results. Next, I develop two new empirical arguments against simple naive realism. Then I briefly look at two new, more complex forms of naïve realism: one due to Keith Allen and the other due to Heather Logue and Ori Beck. I argue that they are not satisfactory retreats for naive realists. The right course is to reject naive realism altogether. My stalking horse is contemporary naive realism but there is …Read more
  •  180
    The Real Trouble for Armchair Arguments Against Phenomenal Externalism
    In Mark Sprevak & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind, Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 153-181. 2014.
    I criticize some armchair arguments against phenomenal externalism due to Block, Hawthorne, Kriegel, Levine, Shoemaker and others. I conclude by discussing an overlooked armchair argument: the argument from phenomenal localism.
  •  113
    Have Byrne & Hilbert answered Hardin's challenge?
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1): 44-45. 2003.
    I argue that Byrne & Hilbert have not answered Hardin's objection to physicalism about color concerning the unitary-binary structure of the colors for two reasons. First, their account of unitary-binary structure seems unsatisfactory. Second, pace B&H, there are no physicalistically acceptable candidates to be the hue-magnitudes. I conclude with a question about the justification of physicalism about color.
  •  580
    What Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness?
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (1-2): 1-2. 2019.
    I raise a series of basic question about what the integrated information theory of consciousness comes to.
  •  47
    Perhaps more than any other philosopher of mind, Ned Block synthesizes philosophical and scientific approaches to the mind; he is unique in moving back and forth across this divide, doing so with creativity and intensity. Over the course of his career, Block has made groundbreaking contributions to our understanding of intelligence, representation, and consciousness. Blockheads! (the title refers to Block's imaginary counterexample to the Turing test—and to the Block-enthusiast contributors) off…Read more
  •  1322
    Representationalism about Consciousness
    In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
    Discusses recent work on representationalism, including: the case for a representationalist theory of consciousness, which explains consciousness in terms of content; rivals such as neurobiological type-type identity theory (Papineau, McLaughlin) and naive realism (Allen, Campbell, Brewer); John Campbell and David Papineau's recent objections to representationalism; the problem of the "laws of appearance"; externalist vs internalist versions of representationalism; the relation between represent…Read more
  •  69
    Review of Langsam The Wonder of Consciousness (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 3. 2014.
  •  79
    Comments on an early version of Johnston's "The Problem with the Content View" (in Berit Brogaard ed. *Does Perception Have Content?*, 2014) delivered at a workshop on perception at NYU in 2010.
  •  91
    Discussion of Bill Brewer's “Perceptual Experience and Empirical Reason”
    with Bill Brewer, David de Bruijn, Chris Hill, Raja Rosenhagen, Miloš Vuletić, and Wayne Wu
    Analytic Philosophy 59 (1): 19-32. 2018.
    What is the role of conscious experience in the epistemology of perceptual knowledge: how should we characterise what is going on in seeing that o is F in order to illuminate the contribution of seeing o to their status as cases of knowing that o is F? My proposal is that seeing o involves conscious acquaintance with o itself, the concrete worldly source of the truth that o is F, in a way that may make it evident to the subject that o is an instance of ‘x is F’ as she understands this, and hence…Read more
  •  760
    The significance argument for the irreducibility of consciousness
    Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1): 349-407. 2017.
    The Significance Argument (SA) for the irreducibility of consciousness is based on a series of new puzzle-cases that I call multiple candidate cases. In these cases, there is a multiplicity of physical-functional properties or relations that are candidates to be identified with the sensible qualities and our consciousness of them, where those candidates are not significantly different. I will argue that these cases show that reductive materialists cannot accommodate the various ways in which con…Read more
  •  115
    Does it matter whether we perceptually represent tomato-hood?
  •  46
    The Perceptual Representation of Objects and Natural Kinds: Comments on Speaks
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2): 470-477. 2017.
  •  433
    I develop a new argument against Russellian Monism about consciousness.
  •  208
    I raise some objections to the theory presented in *Outside Color*.
  •  982
    It's not clear what integrated information theorists (Koch, Tononi) are saying. And their view lacks the resources to explain even very rudimentary facts about experiences.
  •  90
    Consciousness * by Christopher hill
    Analysis 71 (2): 393-397. 2011.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
  •  141
    These are some responses to an early version of Johnston's paper "The Personite Problem" (now published in Nous).