•  78
    Situationism, Subjunctive Hypocrisy and Standing to Blame
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.
    A number of philosophers have that argued subjects who act wrongly in the situationist psychology experiments are morally responsible for their actions, and therefore blameworthy. In this paper, I argue that though the obedient subjects in Milgram’s obedience to authority experiments are blameworthy, it is inappropriate for most of us to blame them. This is because most of us lack the standing to blame these subjects since we would have acted in the same manner they did. On Todd’s (2019) recent …Read more
  •  75
    Responsibility for Testimonial Injustice
    Philosophical Studies 178 (2). 2021.
    In this paper, I examine whether agents who commit testimonial injustice are morally responsible for their wrongdoing, given that they are ignorant of their wrongdoing. Fricker (2007) argues that agents whose social setting lacks the concepts or reasons necessary for them to correct for testimonial injustice are excused. I argue that agents whose social settings have these concepts or reasons available are also typically excused, because they lack the capacity to recognise those concepts or reas…Read more
  •  73
    Hypocrisy, Standing to Blame and Second‐Personal Authority
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (4): 603-627. 2020.
    This paper identifies why hypocrites lack the standing to blame others for certain wrongs. I first examine previous analyses of 'standing', and note these attempts all centre around the idea of entitlement. I then argue that thinking of standing to blame as a purely moral entitlement faces numerous problems. By examining how the concept of standing is used in other contexts, I argue that we should think of standing to blame in partly metaphysical terms. That is, we should think of it as a status…Read more
  •  54
    What Do We Want From A Theory of Epistemic Blame?
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1-15. forthcoming.
    This paper identifies a number of questions that any plausible theory of epistemic blame ought to answer. What is epistemic blame? When is someone an appropriate target of epistemic blame? And what justifies engaging in epistemic blame? I argue that a number of problems arise when we try to answer these questions by using existing conceptions of moral blame. I then consider and reject Brown’s [2020] belief-desire model of epistemic blame. Finally, I argue that an agency-cultivation model of mora…Read more
  •  30
    Blame in the Aftermath of Excused Wrongdoing
    Public Affairs Quarterly 34 (2): 142-168. 2020.
    Control accounts of moral responsibility argue that agents must possess certain capacities in order to be blameworthy for wrongdoing. This is sometimes thought to be revisionary, because reflection on our moral practices reveals that we often blame many agents who lack these capacities. This paper argues that Control accounts of moral responsibility are not too revisionary, nor too permissive, because they can still demand quite a lot from excused wrongdoers. Excused wrongdoers can acquire dutie…Read more
  •  20
    Philosophy’s Undergraduate Gender Gaps and Early Interventions
    Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6 707-741. 2019.
    Researchers have found that philosophy’s gender gap gradually increases as students progress from first year, to majoring and into graduate school. By analysing enrolments in philosophy units at Australian universities from 2005 to 2017, I argue that early interventions are likely to be more effective than typically assumed. My findings are consistent with previous data, but improve on previous analyses in a few ways. First, this paper quantifies women’s risk of leaving philosophy relative to me…Read more
  •  19
    Smilansky notes that wrongdoers seem to lack any entitlement to complain about being treated in the ways that they have treated others. However, it also seems impermissible to treat agents in certain ways, and this impermissibility would give wrongdoers who are themselves wronged grounds for complaint. This article solves this apparent paradox by arguing that what is at issue is not the right simply to make complaints, but the right to have one's demands respected. Agents must accept the authori…Read more
  •  3
    Situationism, Capacities and Culpability
    Philosophical Studies. forthcoming.
    The situationist experiments demonstrate that most people's behaviour is influenced by environmental factors much more than we expect, and that ordinary people can be led to behave very immorally. A number of philosophers have investigated whether these experiments demonstrate that subjects' responsibility-relevant capacities are impeded. This paper considers how, in practice, we can assess when agents have a reduced capacity to avoid wrongdoing. It critiques some previously offered strategies i…Read more