• Arizona State University
    Philosophy - School of Historical, Philosophical, and Religious Studies
    Barrett’s Honors College
    Associate Teaching Professor
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2014
Tempe, Arizona, United States
Areas of Specialization
Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  22
    Legal Rules, Legal Reasoning, and Nonmonotonic Logic
    Dissertation, University of Michigan. 2015.
    This dissertation develops, justifies, and examines the jurisprudential implications of a non-monotonic theory of common law legal reasoning. Legal rules seem to have exceptions but identifying all of them is difficult. This hinders attempts to formalize legal rules using classical logics. Non-monotonic logics allow defeasible inference, permitting rules that hold generally but can be defeated in the presence of exceptions. This ameliorates the problem of characterizing all exceptions to a rule,…Read more
  •  16
    ABSTRACTLegal reasoning is commonly thought of as being based on either rules or analogies. More specifically, there is ongoing debate regarding whether precedential reasoning is best characterized as rule-based or analogical. This article continues that work by comparing recent and representative approaches from each camp, namely, Stevens's analogical model and the “rule-based” model of Horty and Rigoni. In the course of the comparison improvements on each approach are suggested and the improve…Read more
  •  8
    Toward representing interpretation in factor-based models of precedent
    Artificial Intelligence and Law. forthcoming.
    This article discusses the desirability and feasibility of modeling precedents with multiple interpretations within factor-based models of precedential constraint. The main idea is that allowing multiple reasonable interpretations of cases and modeling precedential constraint as a function of what all reasonable interpretations compel may be advantageous. The article explains the potential benefits of extending the models in this way with a focus on incorporating a theory of vertical precedent i…Read more
  •  24
    Representing dimensions within the reason model of precedent
    Artificial Intelligence and Law 26 (1): 1-22. 2018.
    This paper gives an account of dimensions in the reason model found in Horty : 1–33, 2011), Horty and Bench-Capon and Rigoni :133–160, 2015. doi: 10.1007/s10506-015-9166-x). The account is constructed with the purpose of rectifying problems with the approach to incorporating dimensions in Horty, namely, the problems arising from the collapse of the distinction between the reason model and the result model on that approach. Examination of the newly constructed theory revealed that the importance …Read more
  •  49
    Common-law judicial reasoning and analogy
    Legal Theory 20 (2): 133-156. 2014.
    Proponents of strict rule-based theories of judicial reasoning in common-law systems have offered a number of criticisms of analogical alternatives. I explain these criticisms and show that at best they apply equally well to rule-based theories. Further, I show how the analogical theories explain a feature of judicial common-law reasoningthat rule-based theories ignore. Finally, I show that reason-based, analogical theories of common-law judicial reasoning, such as those offered by John Horty an…Read more
  •  38
    An improved factor based approach to precedential constraint
    Artificial Intelligence and Law 23 (2): 133-160. 2015.
    In this article I argue for rule-based, non-monotonic theories of common law judicial reasoning and improve upon one such theory offered by Horty and Bench-Capon. The improvements reveal some of the interconnections between formal theories of judicial reasoning and traditional issues within jurisprudence regarding the notions of the ratio decidendi and obiter dicta. Though I do not purport to resolve the long-standing jurisprudential issues here, it is beneficial for theorists both of legal phil…Read more