Adeniyi Fasoro

This paper explores the new frontier within Kantian scholarship which suggests that Kant places so much special importance on the value of rational nature that the supreme principle of morality and the concept of human dignity are both grounded on it. Advocates of this reading argue that the notion of autonomy and dignity should now be considered as the central claim of Kant’s ethics, rather than the universalisation of maxims. Kant’s ethics are termed as repugnant for they place a high demand on the universalisation of maxims as a universal moral principle. As a result, they argue that there is an urgent need to rescue Kant’s ethics from the controversies surrounding maxims and universalisability, and the best way to rescue his ethics is by “leaving deontology behind”. It must be left behind because the categorical imperative is not needed in order to rescue Kant’s ethics, as deontology is often overrated. Consequently, the highest duties of the human being are to ensure that his fellow human beings enjoy unhindered autonomy and receive the honour that their dignity duly deserves, as well as to look after their welfare and treat them with respect, regardless of their dispositions. I review recent literature to appraise this new frontier within Kantian scholarship. I also explore the works of philosophers, such as Herman, Korsgaard, Wood, Höffe, and, specifically, Hill, on Kant’s conception of human dignity in relation to its conception as autonomy, humanity, and the source of human rights.

As artificial intelligence (AI) integrates across social domains, prevailing technical paradigms often overlook human relational needs vital for cooperative resilience. Alternative pathways consciously supporting dignity and wisdom warrant consideration. Integrating seminal insights from virtue and care ethics, this article delineates the following four cardinal design principles prioritizing communal health: (1) affirming the sanctity of life; (2) nurturing healthy attachment; (3) facilitating communal wholeness; and (4) safeguarding societal resilience. Grounding my analysis in the rich traditions of moral philosophy, I argue that these principles scaffold sustainable innovation trajectories that consciously center shared welfare advancement over detached technical capabilities or efficiency benchmarks alone. Elucidating connections with pioneering initiatives demonstrates fragments of this vision taking embryonic shape, yet pervasive adoption remains largely aspirational to date. Fulfilling dignity-based artificial intelligence demands ongoing collective commitment beyond firms’ profit motives or governance proceduralism. My conclusions urge technology policies and priorities directed toward empowering the vulnerability of people rather than controlling the optimization of systems.

Deepfakes, as hyperrealistic digital fabrications, reveal gaps and uncertainties in existing ontological frameworks. Neither simply images nor realities, deepfakes occupy an ambiguous metaphysical position between concepts such as representation/simulation, human/machine, and real/artificial. Their emergent generation via AI and experiential traction as credible synthetic media underscores limitations in prevailing paradigms reliant on purified binaries and anthropocentric assumptions. Rather than anomalies, deepfakes epitomize the imperative for new ontological cartographies and conceptual vocabularies attuned to increasingly unbounded algorithmic creation. The paper surveys debates about digital objects and theories of representation to contextualize this argument. Deepfakes’ ontological novelty stems from their ambiguous origins, autonomous proliferation, and infiltration of perceivable situations with credible fictions. This destabilizes ontological foundations such as creative intentionality and indexical truth. I conclude deepfakes signal the insufficiency of existing ontology for navigating realities transformed by generative technologies. New paradigms are needed that grapple with their radical metaphysical challenges.

This paper analyses the thorny interpretative puzzle surrounding the connection between humanity and the good will. It discusses this puzzle: if the good will is the only good without qualification, why does Kant claim that humanity is something possessing an absolute value? It explores the answers to this question within Kantian scholarship; answers that emanate from a commitment to the human capacity for freedom and morality and to actual obedience to the moral law. In its final analysis, it endorses Richard Dean’s good will reading as the most reflective of Kant’s ethics. It claims that in order for a person to reach the moral ideal of acting rightly and giving priority to moral law, he must always honour his duties to himself. Accordingly, it argues that before a person can be deemed as an object of respect, he must first respect the right of humanity in his own person.

In the Groundwork, Kant seems to make two paradoxical claims about the source of human dignity. First, he claims that if “rational nature exists as an end in itself” (Kant, 1998, p. 36), it is because “humanity is… dignity, insofar it is capable of morality” (Kant, 1998, p. 42). Second, he claims that although “autonomy is the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature” (Kant, 1998, p. 43), the human being can only have “dignity… insofar he fulfils all his duties” (Kant, 1998, p. 46). This paper argues that neither claim is repugnant because Kant seeks to advance two kinds of dignity. Kant intends to elucidate that the human being possesses a basic ‘entitled dignity’ in virtue of his capacity for morality, but that he needs to become a moral being in order for him to realise his ‘true dignity’. This paper claims that the formal condition under which a person can be worthy of respect is identical with the condition of realising his ‘true dignity’.

I argue that ensuring artificial intelligence (AI) retains alignment with human values over time is critical yet understudied. Most research focuses on static alignment, neglecting crucial retention dynamics enabling stability during learning and autonomy. This paper elucidates limitations constraining provable retention, arguing key gaps include formalizing dynamics, transparency of advanced systems, participatory scaling, and risks of uncontrolled recursive self-improvement. I synthesize technical and ethical perspectives into a conceptual framework grounded in control theory and philosophy to analyze dynamics. I argue priorities should shift towards capability modulation, participatory design, and advanced modeling to verify enduring alignment. Overall, I argue that realizing AI safely aligned throughout its lifetime necessitates translating principles into formal methods, demonstrations, and systems integrating technical and humanistic rigor.

I explore two claims that are often attributed to Kant: first, that conformity with the moral law without freedom lacks intrinsic value in itself, and second, that the moral law is a mere means to preserve and promote our freedom. In this paper, I investigate whether freedom can be intrinsically valuable without adherence to the moral law. I begin with the examination of what it means for freedom to be thought of as "an inner value" and "an end in itself". I suggest that when Kant uses an expression such as "by means of the moral law", he does not mean that the moral law only serves the purpose of preserving and promoting freedom without its own intrinsic value. Indeed, I provide textual evidence that the moral law precedes freedom and must be respected unconditionally because it is a sufficient incentive that is good in itself. I argue that respect for the law is required in order for freedom to be lawful and without it, it would be lawless.