Agnieszka Jaworska

A being has moral standing if it or its interests matter intrinsically, to at least some degree, in the moral assessment of actions and events. For instance, animals can be said to have moral standing if, other things being equal, it is morally bad to intentionally cause their suffering. This essay focuses on a special kind of moral standing, what I will call “full moral standing” (FMS), associated with persons. In contrast to the var- ious accounts of what ultimately grounds FMS in use in the philosophical literature, I will propose that the emotional capacity to care is a sufficient condition of an individual’s FMS as a person. In developing this account, I will appeal to a set of intuitions not previously mined for this purpose: those generated by conflicts of interests between different life phases of a single individual.

In his work on internality, identification, and caring, Harry Frankfurt attempts to delineate the organization of agency peculiar to human beings, while avoiding the traditional overintellectualized emphasis on the human capacity to reason about action. The focal point of Frankfurt’s alternative picture is our capacity to make our own motivation the object of reflection. Building upon the observation that marginal agents (such as young children and Alzheimer’s patients) are capable of caring, I show that neither caring nor internality need to depend on the phenomena of reflectiveness. I develop alternative interlocking accounts of caring and internality that are independent of both reflectiveness and evaluation, but that can still do justice to the central role of carings in the organization of agency characteristic of human persons.

Why does a baby who is otherwise cognitively similar to an animal such as a dog nevertheless have a higher moral status? We explain the difference in moral status as follows: the baby can, while a dog cannot, participate as a rearee in what we call “person-rearing relationships,” which can transform metaphysically and evaluatively the baby’s activities. The capacity to engage in these transformed activities has the same type of value as the very capacities (i.e., intellectual or emotional sophistication) that explain unimpaired adult humans’ high moral status. We attempt to extend this account to individuals with severe cognitive impairments

This chapter focuses on moral personhood understood in terms of the notion of moral status. An entity is said to have moral status only if it or its interest matters morally for its own sake. Nonutilitarians tend to think of moral status in terms of entitlements and protections that can conflict with, and sometimes override, doing what would maximize the good and minimize the bad. If moral status comes in degrees, and if there is a status of the highest degree (i.e., full moral status), then moral persons are those with full moral status. After giving a more precise account of it, we assess different views of what it takes to qualify for full moral status (some of which appeal to metaphysical notions of person). We also briefly discuss how metaphysical notions of personhood are put to moral use in utilitarian moral theorizing that eschews the notion of moral personhood.

Broadly speaking, an entity has moral status if and only if it or its interest matters morally for its own sake. Some philosophers, who think of moral status in terms of duties and rights owed to an entity, allow that moral status can come in degrees, with only some beings having status of the highest degree – that is, full moral status (FMS). We critically review the competing accounts of what qualifies one for FMS. Some accounts demand cognitive sophistication, which excludes many children, while others are inclusive of children but fail by (a) putting children morally on a par with most animals (experiencing subject of a life), (b) invoking criteria of dubious moral relevance (potentiality, membership in a biological species), or (c) not securing impartial moral status (special relationships). We end with our own account, which attempts to rectify such problems, addressing specifically the moral status of children.

The central theme of Byrne’s book is the fundamental moral standing of people who are mentally handicapped. Most ethical theories and ordinary moral practice deem it uncontroversial that we owe special concern and respect to ordinary adult human beings; this concern and respect is the locus of most widely recognized moral obligations. Yet many theoretical approaches to ethics explicitly or implicitly call into question whether the same ethical treatment ought to be extended to the mentally handicapped. In seeking and providing explanation for the ethical status we accord human beings, ethical theories point to valuable traits of humans—their rational capacities, reflective self- awareness, capacity for autonomy, the richness of experience these capacities make possible, and so on—traits that mentally handicapped individuals typically possess only in a truncated form, or lack altogether. Byrne’s goal is to rebut this widely accepted theoretical approach and to develop an alternative justification of the special ethical status of humans, one that applies in equal measure to all members of our species, including the mentally handicapped.

According to Gawande, Lazaroff “chose badly.” Gawande suggests that physicians may be permitted to intervene in choices of this kind. What makes the temptation to intervene paternalistically in this and similar cases especially strong is that the patient’s choice contradicts his professed values. Paternalism appears less problematic in such cases because, in contradicting his values, the patient seems to sidestep his own autonomy. This chapter addresses the dangers of overextending this interpretation. I argue that it is not so easy to judge when a person is not genuinely exercising autonomy, and that choosing contrary to one’s own values does not necessarily amount to sidestepping one’s autonomy. The key insight is to recognize the importance of the attitude of caring as an integral part of some expressions of autonomy. This will allow us to develop an alternative picture of minimal autonomy, according to which it is possible to choose against one’s values while genuinely exercising autonomy. For practical purposes, in medicine and elsewhere, this means that, in cases like Lazaroff’s, those tempted toward paternalism must exercise particular caution before they deem a choice to be disen- gaged from autonomy: even if a choice contradicts the person’s own values, it might be rooted in caring, and then, despite initial appearances to the contrary, it may still command the highest level of protection against paternalism.

What constitutes an appropriate justification of a given value? Can our deepest values be justified at all? These questions define my project. ;I reconstruct the perspective from which seeking justifications of value makes most sense--the "value crisis," modelled on the life of the idle hero of Goncharov's novel, Oblomov--and posit it as the standpoint from which the adequacy of practical reasons and justifications can be reliably adjudicated. ;Chapter One explores Kantian theory of value. On Christine Korsgaard's reading, this theory defends one ultimate value--"humanity" or the capacity of practical reason--by claiming that this value is presupposed in valuing anything at all. I distinguish three versions of this theory, arguing that only one meets Oblomov's scrutiny. This version traces justification of value to the agent's "conception of practical identity," and further, to the agent's "humanity," understood as his nature as a being committed to some such conception. ;Chapter Two confirms the central role of identity in justifications of value. I examine Derek Parfit's commonly accepted taxonomy of conceptions of well-being, exposing the drawbacks of each. I use these criticisms to formulate a set of requirements for a more plausible conception. An identity-based conception meets these requirements and emerges as a superior but neglected conception of well-being. ;But what exactly is one's identity? In Chapter Three I examine the views of several contemporary philosophers whose work suggests that identity plays a key role in guiding rational actions , and conclude that one's identity must be understood in terms of one's normative commitments. ;With identity so understood, the claim that value is justified in terms of identity implies that there is no substantive justification beyond the agent's normative commitments. Can nothing more be said? In Chapter Four I argue that a particular normative commitment can still be justifiably criticized; for instance, on account of the agent's self-deception, ideological delusion, or lack of experience. Furthermore, the agent can be justifiably confident in the value of having contingent normative commitments: even in a value crisis he would value valuing and could not honestly reject the need for such commitments