My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Accept an intermediate view Yes, but in a sense of the notion that lacks some of the features traditionally associated with it.
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Accept: Platonism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Accept: subjective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept: no At least not if the distinction is assumed to be robust enough to do real philosophical work.
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism The question is too unclear to answer
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Accept: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Accept: compatibilism
God: theism and atheism Accept: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Accept: empiricism
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Accept: contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Accept: Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical Accept: classical
Mental content: internalism and externalism Accept: externalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept: moral anti-realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Accept: physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept: non-cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Accept: internalism
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Accept: two boxes
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics There is no fact of the matter
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory The question is too unclear to answer It depends on the theoretical role one is hoping the notion of perceptual experience will play.
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view The question is too unclear to answer
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Accept: Millian
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Accept: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death The question is too unclear to answer
Time: A-theory and B-theory Accept: B-theory
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch There is no fact of the matter
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Accept: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Accept: inconceivable I assume a *de mundo* understanding of conceivability. On a *de representatione* understanding I would have answered 'concievable but not metaphysically possible'.