Aïcha Messina

Après les guerres du siècle dernier qui ont remis en cause l'idée de progrès, devant les formes multiples des guerres actuelles, peut-on encore penser la paix aujourd'hui? A l'encontre des idées conservatrices de la paix où cette dernière, conçue comme ordre et stabilité, a souvent été le corrélat des Etats policiers, la pensée de la paix, telle que l'élabore Levinas, relève d'une critique de l'autoritarisme politique et permet d'élaborer un nouveau concept de liberté affranchi de la tutelle des Etats. La paix n'est pas ici une idée abstraite mais porte le sujet hors de toutes les formes de confort moral ou de conformisme politique. C'est à un Levinas neuf que nous avons ici à faire : tout en dialoguant avec la tradition moderne et contemporaine de la philosophie politique, il nous montre que la paix est une forme d'insubordination qui aspire à "désembourgeoiser la révolution". Une lecture intranquille de Levinas.

ABSTRACT This article aims to analyze the problem of violence, as tackled by Derrida in his dialogue with Levinas. It is asked in particular how it is possible to think critically about violence if we assume that violence constitutes us. In order to do this, it dwells on the diference that Derrida establishes between criticism and deconstruction and on his analysis of the relationship between violence and silence. One of the main theses of this article is that what allows a critique of violence refers to what Derrida calls “trace”, that is, a silence that inhabits language and that does not refer to a previous meaning. In addition, this article focuses on the critic Derrida addresses to Levinas in “Violence and metaphysic”. It shows that far from fitting this critique, Levinas’s analysis of the relation between language and silence implies a radicalization of Derrida’s thesis on what he calls the “worst violence”.

Resumen El artículo se propone mostrar cómo, en El can de Kant, la filosofía llega a ser cuestionada por la literatura, y qué tipo de operación crítica o deconstructiva esta última posibilita. Muestra en particular que los problemas de la imaginación y del tiempo en Kant están enfocados a partir de la experiencia de la memoria y de la traducción en Borges. Finalmente, se sugiere que, mientras la imaginación posibilita la conformación de objetos, y por ende la posibilidad de tener a un perro, la literatura abre a otras formas de territorialidad, de relaciones y de asunción del cuerpo.This article aims to show how in Kant’s Dog philosophy can be questioned by literature, and what kind of critical or deconstructive operation the later enables. In particular, it shows that the problem of imagination and time in Kant are focused on the experience of memory and translation in Borges. Finally, the article suggests that while imagination enables the conformation of objects, and therefore the possibility of having a dog, the literature opens to other forms of territorialities, of relationships, and of assumption of the body.

Resumen El artículo muestra la relación estructural entre el testimonio y el juicio estético, y cómo la mentira estructural se implica irreductiblemente como la posibilidad de la verdad. Se explica la necesaria imposibilidad del testimonio como condición de su posibilidad, argumento anticipado por J. L. Borges: “No hay una sola hermosa palabra, con la excepción dudosa de testigo, que no sea una abstracción”. La argumentación se apoya en la teoría husserliana del syncategorema y en los deícticos ; asimismo, se toma de I. Kant el papel de la imaginación y los efectos del “como si”.This essay demonstrates the structural relationship between testimony and aesthetic judgment. The implications of this discovery are several, the most important being the relationship between the lie and truth, implicating that lie indicates the irreducible possibility of truth. The essay explains the necessary impossibility of the testimony as a condition of its possibility, an argument anticipated in Jorge Luis Borges’ beautiful phrase, “There is not a single beautiful word, with the dubious exception of witness, that is not an abstraction”. The argument is based on Husserl’s theory of the syncategorem and on deictic words ; as well, it takes from Kant, the role of the imagination and the effects of the “as if”.

Cet article se propose d’analyser l’enjeu de la critique qu’élabore Nancy au sujet du problème du christianisme chez Blanchot. Nous nous proposons de montrer que, s’il y a une convergence entre les pensées de Blanchot et de Nancy autour de la question du christianisme, leur divergence se concentre en fait sur la question du monde et sur le problème de sa fin. Tandis que la finitude est, chez l’un et chez l’autre, un opérateur de déconstruction du christianisme, elle définit aussi deux rapports au monde quasiment opposés. Toutefois, on montre aussi que tout en étant opposés, ces points de vue sur le monde sont indissociables.

RÉSUMÉ Cet article analyse le problème de la souffrance dans l'œuvre de Lévinas à la lumière de la critique nietzschéenne de la compassion. Il s'agit dans un premier temps de montrer que, bien que la description que fait Lévinas de la souffrance éthique soit similaire à l'idée nietzschéenne de la souffrance tragique ou inutile, les premiers écrits de Lévinas se concentrent aussi sur les dangers politiques qui resultent de la conception nietzschéenne du corps et de sa vision tragique de la souffrance. Dans un second temps, cet article se propose de montrer que la souffrance éthique telle que la décrit Lévinas ne correspond pas à la façon dont Nietzsche décrit la compassion comme étant une forme de nihilisme. Il soutient au contraire l'idée que la souffrance éthique chez Lévinas permet d'aller plus loin dans la conception qu'a Nietzsche de l'amitié et de la vie ABSTRACT This article analyses the problem of suffering in Lévinas's work in the light of Nietzsche's critic of compassion. It argues, in a first step, that although Lévinas's description of ethical suffering is similar to Nietzsche's description of suffering as tragic or useless, Lévinas's first writings also focus on the political dangers associated with Nietzsche's conception of the body and of a purely tragic conception of suffering. In a second step, this article shows that the question of ethical suffering, such as Lévinas describes it, does not match Nietzsche's conception of compassion as being a form of nihilism, but, on the contrary, allows for the radicalization of some of Nietzsche's views on friendship and of life.

The thoughts of apocalypse can either be intense and demanding, or lead to the risk of abandoning the present to a state of inertia and impotence. The apocalypse can be, in fact, the moment of the Last Judgment. In this case, justice is related to the revelation of truth. But the apocalypse can also be the revelation of the end of any truth, i.e. the revelation that the history doesn’t have any meaning, that the end is as endless as it is hopeless. This article takes up “the apocalypse of Blanchot.” It shows that by thinking that the apocalypse has always already occurred, history is not what leads to an end, but is rather the responsibility to an endless end. In that sense, for Blanchot, history is not the redemption of contingency as eternity; rather, what must be historicized is the eternity of the end.

The thoughts of apocalypse can either be intense and demanding, or lead to the risk of abandoning the present to a state of inertia and impotence. The apocalypse can be, in fact, the moment of the Last Judgment. In this case, justice is related to the revelation of truth. But the apocalypse can also be the revelation of the end of any truth, i.e. the revelation that the history doesn’t have any meaning, that the end is as endless as it is hopeless. This article takes up “the apocalypse of Blanchot.” It shows that by thinking that the apocalypse has always already occurred, history is not what leads to an end, but is rather the responsibility to an endless end. In that sense, for Blanchot, history is not the redemption of contingency as eternity; rather, what must be historicized is the eternity of the end.

Cuando E. Lévinas afirma que la paz es "el acontecimiento inicial del encuentro" y que es un "primer lenguaje", se podría creer que suspende su actitud crítica en beneficio de una ingenua confianza en el ser humano, olvidando así la violencia sin límites de las relaciones humanas. Todo cambia, sin embargo, cuando se comprende que ese "acontecimiento primero" proviene de lo anárquico, que no se fija y no permite entonces ninguna especie de conciliación. Se analiza cómo Lévinas renueva, después de la La Paz perpetua de Kant, el sentido de la palabra paz. Se pregunta qué actitud crítica permite pensar la paz sin remitirse a las ilusiones de la moral, y qué peso tiene una paz que no se encarna en instituciones. It could be possible to think that when E. Lévinas states that peace is "the first event of the encounter" and that it is a "first language", he gives up his critical attitude in favor of a naive faith in human beings, thus forgetting the unlimited violence that characterizes human relations. Everything changes, however, when one understands that the "first event" arises from anarchy, that it is not fixed, and that it allows for no conciliation. The article analyzes how, after Kant's Perpetual Peace, Lévinas provides a renovated meaning of peace. Likewise, it inquires into the critical attitude that makes it possible to think peace without falling into the illusions of morality, and what significance would a peace not actualized in institutions might have