•  162
    Moral theory and global population
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (3). 1999.
    Ascertaining the optimum global population raises not just substantive moral problems but also philosophical ones, too. In particular, serious problems arise for utilitarianism. For example, should one attempt to bring about the greatest total happiness or the highest level of average happiness? This article argues that neither approach on its own provides a satisfactory answer, and nor do rights-based or Rawlsian approaches, either. Instead, what is required is a multidimensional approach to mo…Read more
  •  131
    Perhaps the most impressive environmental ethic developed to date in any detail is Robin Attfield's biocentric consequentialism. Indeed, on first study, it appears sufficiently impressive that, before presenting any alternative theoretical approach, one would first need to establish why one should not simply embrace Attfield's. After outlining a seemingly decisive flaw in his theory, and then criticizing his response to it, this article adumbrates a very different theoretical basis for an enviro…Read more
  •  125
    Some groundwork for a multidimensional axiology
    Philosophical Studies 154 (3). 2011.
    By distinguishing between contributory values and overall value, and by arguing that contributory values are variable values insofar as they contribute diminishing marginal overall value, this article helps to establish the superiority of a certain kind of maximizing, value-pluralist axiology over both sufficientarianism and prioritarianism, as well as over all varieties of value-monism, including utilitarianism and pure egalitarianism
  •  113
    Biodiversity and all that jazz
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1): 58-75. 2009.
    This article considers several of the most famous arguments for our being under a moral obligation to preserve species, and finds them all wanting. The most promising argument for preserving all varieties of species might seem to be an aesthetic one. Unfortunately, the suggestion that the moral basis for the preservation of species should be construed as similar to the moral basis for the preservation of a work of art seems to presume (what are now widely regarded as) erroneous conceptualization…Read more
  •  105
    A Defense of Egalitarianism
    Philosophical Studies 131 (2): 269-302. 2006.
    Recently in this journal, Michael Huemer has attempted to refute egalitarianism. His strategy consists in: first, distinguishing between three possible worlds ; second, showing that the first world is equal in value to the second world; third, dividing the second and third worlds into two temporal segments each, then showing that none of the temporal segments possesses greater moral value than any other, thereby demonstrating that the second and third worlds as a whole are equal in value; and fi…Read more
  •  90
    Saving nature and feeding people
    Environmental Ethics 26 (4): 339-360. 2004.
    Holmes Rolston, III has argued that there are times when we should save nature rather than feed people. In arguing thus, Rolston appears tacitly to share a number of assumptions with Garrett Hardin regarding the causes of human overpopulation. Those assumptions are most likely erroneous. Rather than our facing the choice between saving nature or feeding people, we will not save nature unless we feed people
  •  83
    Value-pluralist egalitarianism
    Journal of Philosophy 99 (11): 577-599. 2002.
    No abstract available
  •  82
    Animals, pain and morality
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (1). 2005.
    While it is widely agreed that the infliction upon innocents of needless pain is immoral, many have argued that, even though nonhuman animals act as if they feel pain, there is no reason to think that they actually suffer painful experiences. And if our actions only appear to cause nonhuman animals pain, then such actions are not immoral. On the basis of the claim that certain behavioural responses to organismic harm are maladaptive, whereas the ability to feel pain is itself adaptive, this arti…Read more
  •  65
    The Method in Hobbes' Madness
    Hobbes Studies 12 (1): 72-89. 1999.
    Hobbes appears to subscribe to a form of the resolutive/compositive method not only as the appropriate means for understanding the natural world but also as the correct means for understanding the political world. However, the view that Hobbes adopts this methodology for understanding both 'bodies politic' and 'natural bodies' has been challenged in Tom Sorell's widely praised study of Hobbes' philosophy. In this article, I first rebut Sorell's challenge, and then consider several other objectio…Read more
  •  56
    Animal rights and social relations
    Res Publica 1 (2): 213-220. 1995.
  •  52
    A Solution to the Purported Non-Transitivity of Normative Evaluation
    Journal of Philosophy 112 (1): 23-45. 2015.
    Derek Parfit presents his Mere Addition Paradox in order to demonstrate that it is extremely difficult to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion. And in order to avoid it, Parfit has embraced perfectionism. However, Stuart Rachels and Larry Temkin, taking their lead from Parfit, have concluded, instead, that the Repugnant Conclusion can be avoided by denying the axiom of transitivity with respect to the all-things-considered-better-than relation. But this seems to present a major challenge to how we eva…Read more
  •  51
    The quest for an egalitarian metric
    Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 7 (1): 94-113. 2004.
    For two decades, egalitarian analytical philosophers have sought to identify the metric to be employed in order to ascertain whether any distribution is equal or not. This essay provides a review of the seminal contributions to this debate by Amartya Sen, Ronald Dworkin, Richard Arneson and G.A. Cohen.
  •  50
    Can We Harm Furture People?
    Environmental Values 10 (4): 429-454. 2001.
    It appears to have been established that it is not possible for us to harm distant future generations by failing to adopt long-range welfare policies which would conserve resources or limit pollution. By exploring a number of possible worlds, the present article shows, first, that the argument appears to be at least as telling against Aristotelian, rights-based and Rawlsian approaches as it seems to be against utilitarianism, but second, and most importantly, that it only holds if we fail to vie…Read more
  •  49
    A Distinction within Egalitarianism
    Journal of Philosophy 108 (10): 535-554. 2011.
  •  48
    A radical green political theory (edited book)
    Routledge. 1999.
    This volume analyzes authoritarian, reformist, Marxist and anarchist approaches to the environmental problem, exposing the relationships between environmental crises, economic structures and the role of the state.
  •  34
    Towards a Multidimensional, Environmentalist Ethic
    Environmental Values 20 (3): 347-374. 2011.
    There has been a process of moral extensionism within environmental ethics from anthropocentrism, through zoocentrism, to ecocentrism. This article maps key elements of that process, and concludes that each of these ethical positions fails as a fully adequate, environmentalist ethic, and does so because of an implicit assumption that is common within normative theory. This notwithstanding, each position may well contribute a value. The problem that then arises is how to trade off those values ag…Read more
  •  33
    Simplifying "Inequality"
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 30 (1): 88-100. 2001.
    No abstract available.
  •  32
    Environmental Culture (review)
    Environmental Ethics 26 (3): 323-326. 2004.
  •  28
    Distributive justice and enviromental sustainability
    Heythrop Journal 41 (4). 2000.
    Andrew Dobson has outlined three conceptions of environmental sustainability: the ‘critical natural capital’ conception; the ‘irreversibility’ conception; and the ‘natural value’ conception. He has also attempted to map out the various ‘dimensions of social justice’– his purpose in so doing being to analyze the ‘encounter’ of each conception of environmental sustainability with the points on his map. Not surprisingly, Dobson concludes that as one moves from the ‘critical natural capital’ concept…Read more
  •  25
    Saving Nature and Feeding People
    Environmental Ethics 26 (4): 339-360. 2004.
    Holmes Rolston, III has argued that there are times when we should save nature rather than feed people. In arguing thus, Rolston appears tacitly to share a number of assumptions with Garrett Hardin regarding the causes of human overpopulation. Those assumptions are most likely erroneous. Rather than our facing the choice between saving nature or feeding people, we will not save nature unless we feed people.
  •  22
    Humean Nature
    Environmental Values 9 (1): 3-37. 2000.
    It has been argued that there is an irreconcilable difference between those advocating animal liberation or animal rights, on the one hand, and those preferring a wider environmental ethic, which includes concern for non-sentient life-forms and species preservation, on the other. In contrast, I argue that it is possible to provide foundations for both seemingly environmentalist positions by exploring some of the potential of a 'collective-projectivist' reading of Hume – one that seems more consi…Read more
  •  22
    Value-Pluralist Egalitarianism
    Journal of Philosophy 99 (11): 577. 2002.
    No abstract available.
  •  15
    On Harming Others: A Response to Partridge
    Environmental Values 11 (1): 87-96. 2002.
    Response to Ernest Partridge's paper 'The Future - For Better or Worse' in this issue of Environmental Values
  •  11
    XIII*—Moral Theory and Global Population
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1): 289-314. 1999.
    Alan Carter; XIII*—Moral Theory and Global Population, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 99, Issue 1, 1 June 1999, Pages 289–314, https://doi.org/
  •  11
    Environmental Culture (review)
    Environmental Ethics 26 (3): 323-326. 2004.
  •  8
    Some Theoretical Foundations for Radical Green Politics
    Environmental Values 13 (3). 2004.
    On the basis of our apparent obligations to future generations, it would seem that we are morally obliged to reduce the risk our environmentally destructive behaviour poses for their well-being. But if, rather than choosing to destroy the environment, we are in fact driven to do so, then any obligation to reduce our environmental impact requires an understanding of the mechanism driving our behaviour. This article argues that the State-Primacy Theory provides a plausible explanation for the natu…Read more
  •  7