Question |
Answer |
Comments |
A priori knowledge: yes and no |
Lean toward: no |
|
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism |
Lean toward: nominalism |
|
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective |
Accept: subjective |
|
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no |
Accept: no |
|
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism |
Accept: externalism |
|
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism |
Lean toward: non-skeptical realism |
|
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will |
Lean toward: no free will |
|
God: theism and atheism |
Accept: atheism |
|
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism |
Lean toward: empiricism |
|
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism |
Lean toward: invariantism |
|
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean |
Insufficiently familiar with the issue |
|
Logic: classical and non-classical |
Accept: non-classical |
|
Mental content: internalism and externalism |
Lean toward: externalism |
|
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism |
Lean toward: moral anti-realism |
|
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism |
Insufficiently familiar with the issue |
|
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism |
Lean toward: physicalism |
|
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism |
Accept: non-cognitivism |
|
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism |
Insufficiently familiar with the issue |
|
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes |
Insufficiently familiar with the issue |
|
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics |
Accept more than one |
|
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory |
Lean toward: disjunctivism |
|
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view |
Insufficiently familiar with the issue |
|
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism |
Lean toward: communitarianism |
|
Proper names: Fregean and Millian |
Accept: Millian |
|
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism |
Accept: scientific anti-realism |
|
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death |
Lean toward: survival |
|
Time: A-theory and B-theory |
Insufficiently familiar with the issue |
|
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch |
Lean toward: don't switch |
|
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic |
Accept: deflationary |
|
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible |
Lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possible |
|