• Articulating the a priori-a posteriori distinction
    In Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy, Oxford University Press Uk. 2013.
  •  7
    The Leading Proposals
    In A Priori Justification, Oxford University Press Usa. 2003.
    This chapter provides a taxonomy of widely endorsed conditions on a priori justification. The conditions fall into two broad categories: epistemic, which includes defeasibility, strength, and source conditions; and nonepistemic, which involves the concepts of analyticity or necessity. Two major claims are argued: nonepistemic conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for a priori justification, and if a theory imposes epistemic conditions on the a priori that differ from those it imposes o…Read more
  •  8
    Toward a Resolution
    In A Priori Justification, Oxford University Press Usa. 2003.
    This chapter contends that proponents of the a priori face two major challenges: articulating the experiential/nonexperiential distinction, and providing supporting evidence for the claim that there are nonexperiential sources of justification. It is argued that the most promising approaches to addressing both challenges involve empirical investigation. With respect to the first, “experience” should be viewed as a natural kind term whose extension is fixed by certain paradigms. The underlying na…Read more
  •  7
    A Priori Knowledge and Necessary Truth
    In A Priori Justification, Oxford University Press Usa. 2003.
    The two questions have dominated traditional discussions of a priori knowledge: What is its relationship to necessary truth? What is its relationship to analytic truth? Answering them is not necessary to answer the two primary epistemological questions about a priori knowledge: What is it? Does it exist? This chapter argues that the prominence of questions about the relationship between the a priori and the necessary derives from two traditional views: the rationalist conception of a priori know…Read more
  •  5
    The Opposing Arguments
    In A Priori Justification, Oxford University Press Usa. 2003.
    The leading arguments against the existence of a priori knowledge are addressed. The opposing arguments fall into three broad categories: conceptual arguments, which offer an analysis of the concept of a priori knowledge and allege that no cases of knowledge satisfy the conditions in the analysis; radical empiricist arguments, which offer radical empiricist accounts of knowledge of propositions alleged to be knowable only a priori; and incompatibility arguments, which maintain that a priori know…Read more
  •  4
    The Supporting Arguments
    In A Priori Justification, Oxford University Press Usa. 2003.
    The leading arguments supporting the existence of a priori knowledge fall into three broad categories: conceptual arguments, which offer an analysis of the concept of a priori knowledge and maintain that some knowledge satisfies the conditions in the analysis; criterial arguments, which identify criteria of the a priori, such as necessity, certainty, and irrefutability, and maintain that some knowledge satisfies the criteria; and deficiency arguments, which allege that radical empiricist theorie…Read more
  •  7
    Two Conceptions of A Priori Justification
    In A Priori Justification, Oxford University Press Usa. 2003.
    This chapter examines two conceptions of a priori justification: S’s belief that p is justified a priori if and only if S’s belief that p is nonexperientially justified; and S’s belief that p is justified a priori if and only if S’s belief that p is nonexperientially justified and cannot be defeated by experience. Two criteria are introduced to evaluate them: continuity with historical precedent, and coherence with generally accepted concepts and principles in the theory of knowledge. It is argu…Read more
  •  8
    A Priori Knowledge and Analytic Truth
    In A Priori Justification, Oxford University Press Usa. 2003.
    This chapter addresses two questions: Is there synthetic a priori knowledge? Is the analytic/synthetic distinction cogent? The epistemic significance of the first derives from the assumption that synthetic a priori knowledge raises difficult explanatory problems that are circumvented by analytic a priori knowledge. The epistemic significance of the second derives from the assumption that if the analytic/synthetic distinction is not cogent, then the cogency of the a priori/a posteriori distinctio…Read more
  •  6
    Introduction
    In A Priori Justification, Oxford University Press Usa. 2003.
    This chapter provides a taxonomy of widely endorsed conditions on a priori justification. The conditions fall into two broad categories: epistemic, which includes defeasibility, strength, and source conditions; and nonepistemic, which involves the concepts of analyticity or necessity. Two major claims are argued: nonepistemic conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for a priori justification, and if a theory imposes epistemic conditions on the a priori that differ from those it imposes o…Read more
  •  8
    Fallible A Priori Justification
    In A Priori Justification, Oxford University Press Usa. 2003.
    This chapter articulates the requirements of fallible a priori justification. It distinguishes two senses of fallibility: c-fallibility, justification that does not guarantee truth; and p-fallibility, justification that is defeasible. It argues that although these senses are logically independent of one another, there are some significant relations between them mediated by the concepts of self-revision, overriding defeater, and undermining defeater. It is shown that several alternative fallibili…Read more
  •  14
    A Priori Knowledge
    In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Oup Usa. 2002.
    In “A Priori Knowledge,” Albert Casullo asks whether there is a priori knowledge. He ultimately defines a priori knowledge as true belief with a priori justification, where a belief is a priori justified if it is nonexperientially justified. Armed with this definition, Casullo evaluates several traditional arguments for and against the existence of a priori knowledge. He concludes that the traditional arguments reach an impasse by arguing on a priori grounds that the opposite position is deficie…Read more
  •  57
    In defense of pure reason
    Philosophical Review 109 (1): 103-107. 2000.
    This book is an important contribution to the contemporary epistemological literature. It is the only available book-length treatment of epistemological issues associated with the a priori. Moreover, it provides the most comprehensive articulation and defense of traditional rationalism. The book is tightly organized, crisply argued, and sets the standard against which competing accounts must be measured.
  • Modality and a priori knowledge
    In Otávio Bueno & Scott A. Shalkowski (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Modality, Routledge. 2018.
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    Is Knowledge of Essence the Basis of Modal Knowledge?
    Res Philosophica 97 (4): 593-609. 2020.
    E. J. Lowe offers an account of modal knowledge that involves two primary theses. First, the basis of modal knowledge is essential knowledge, and the source of essential knowledge is grasp of essence. Second, all empirical knowledge ultimately depends on some modal knowledge. This article assesses Lowe’s account and defends four conclusions. First, there is a tension in Lowe’s account of grasp of essence; it wavers between an undemanding version, which holds that grasp of essence requires no mor…Read more
  •  61
    Modal Empiricism: What is the Problem
    Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6. 2019.
    Kant contends that necessity is a criterion of the a priori—that is, that all knowledge of necessary propositions is a priori. This contention, together with two others that Kant took to be evident—we know some mathematical propositions and such propositions are necessary—leads directly to the conclusion that some knowledge is a priori. Although many contemporary philosophers endorse Kant’s criterion, supporting arguments are hard to come by. Gordon Barnes provides one of the few examples. My pu…Read more
  •  528
    Essence and Explanation
    Metaphysics 2 (1): 88-96. 2020.
    In Necessary Beings, Bob Hale addresses two questions: What is the source of necessity? What is the source of our knowledge of it? He offers novel responses to them in terms of the metaphysical notion of nature or, more familiarly, essence. In this paper, I address Hale’s response to the first question. My assessment is negative. I argue that his essentialist explanation of the source of necessity suffers from three significant shortcomings. First, Hale’s leading example of an essentialist expla…Read more
  •  511
    Christopher Hill contends that the metaphysical modalities can be reductively explained in terms of the subjunctive conditional and that this reductive explanation yields two tests for determining the metaphysical modality of a proposition. He goes on to argue that his reductive account of the metaphysical modalities in conjunction with his account of modal knowledge underwrites the further conclusion that conceivability does not provide a reliable test for metaphysical possibility. I argue (1) …Read more
  •  19
    Essays on a Priori Knowledge and Justification (edited book)
    Oup Usa. 2014.
    The past twenty-five years have seen a major renewal of interest in the topic of a priori knowledge. In the sixteen essays collected here, which span this entire period, philosopher Albert Casullo documents the complex set of issues motivating the renewed interest, identifies the central epistemological questions, and provides the leading ideas of a unified response to them.
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    On the Relationship between A Priori and Necessary Statements
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (2): 283-287. 1979.
    Edward Erwin has recently argued against the thesis that the concepts a priori truth’ and ‘necessary truth’ are extensionally equivalent. This thesis consists of two logically independent claims: all a priori truths are necessary; and all necessary truths are a priori. Erwin leaves the first claim unchallenged and elects to devote his efforts exclusively to undermining the second. The brunt of his attack on the second claim rests on alleged unclarities in the concept of an a priori truth. He att…Read more
  •  7
    Knowledge and the Elimination of Truth
    Philosophie Et Culture: Actes du XVIIe Congrès Mondial de Philosophie 2 849-853. 1988.
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    Unexemplified universals and possible worlds
    Philosophical Studies 40 (2). 1981.
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    Epistemic Overdetermination and A Priori Justification
    Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1): 41-58. 2005.
    Radical empiricism is the view that experience is the only source of knowledge. Hence, radical empiricism denies the existence of a priori knowledge. Its most famous proponents are John Stuart Mill and W. V. Quine. Although both reject a priori knowledge, they offer different empiricist accounts of the knowledge alleged by their opponents to be a priori. My primary concern in this paper is not with the cogency of their positive accounts. My focus is their arguments against a priori knowledge. My…Read more
  •  71
    Testimony and A Priori Knowledge
    Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4 (3): 322-334. 2007.
    Tyler Burge offers a theory of testimony that allows for the possibility of both testimonial a priori warrant and testimonial a priori knowledge. I uncover a tension in his account of the relationship between the two, and locate its source in the analogy that Burge draws between testimonial warrant and preservative memory. I contend that this analogy should be rejected, and offer a revision of Burge's theory that eliminates the tension. I conclude by assessing the impact of the revised theory on…Read more
  •  104
    Timothy Williamson offers a reductive account of modal knowledge in terms of knowledge of counterfactual conditionals. The account is developed in a broader context of defending two more general theses regarding the subject matter and methodology of philosophy. My primary focus in this paper is Williamson’s account of modal knowledge. I argue (1) that his account of modal knowledge does not support his more general theses regarding the subject matter and methodology of philosophy; (2) that the t…Read more
  •  95
    Particulars, substrata, and the identity of indiscernibles
    Philosophy of Science 49 (4): 591-603. 1982.
    This paper examines the view that ordinary particulars are complexes of universals. Russell's attempt to develop such a theory is articulated and defended against some common misinterpretations and unfounded criticisms in Section I. The next two sections address an argument which is standardly cited as the primary problem confronting the theory: (1) it is committed to the necessary truth of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles; (2) the principle is not necessarily true. It is argued i…Read more
  •  52
    Analyticity and the A Priori
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 18 (sup1): 113-150. 1992.
    The analytic/synthetic distinction has played a central role in discussions of a priori knowledge throughout the twentieth century. One of the primary reasons for the prominence of this distinction is the widespread influence of the tradition of logical empiricism which endorsed the following principles: All analytic propositions are knowable a prioriand All propositions knowable a priori are analytic.Hence, proponents of the a priori often argue in support of the contention that the proposition…Read more
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    Necessity, Certainty, and the A Priori
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1): 43-66. 1988.
    Empiricist theories of knowledge are attractive for they offer the prospect of a unitary theory of knowledge based on relatively well understood physiological and cognitive processes. Mathematical knowledge, however, has been a traditional stumbling block for such theories. There are three primary features of mathematical knowledge which have led epistemologists to the conclusion that it cannot be accommodated within an empiricist framework: 1) mathematical propositions appear to be immune from …Read more
  •  114
    Is Empiricism Coherent?
    The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5 61-74. 2000.
    In recent years empiricism has come under attack. Some argue that the view is incoherent and conclude, on that basis, that some knowledge is a priori. Whatever the merits of such arguments against empiricism, they cannot be parlayed into an argument in support of the a priori unless the latter is not open to those arguments. My primary contention is that the a priori is open to the arguments offered against empiricism. Hence, they do not advance the case for the a priori. I go on to offer an alt…Read more