•  252
    When probabilistic support is inductive
    Philosophy of Science 57 (2): 278-289. 1990.
    This note makes a contribution to the issue raised in a paper by Popper and Miller (1983) in which it was claimed that probabilistic support is purely deductive. Developing R. C. Jeffrey's remarks, a new general approach to the crucial concept of "going beyond" is here proposed. By means of it a quantitative measure of the inductive component of a probabilistic inference is reached. This proposal leads to vindicating the view that typical predictive probabilistic inferences by enumeration and an…Read more
  •  86
    Hume's inductive logic
    Synthese 115 (3): 303-331. 1998.
    This paper presents a new account of Hume’s “probability of causes”. There are two main results attained in this investigation. The first, and perhaps the most significant, is that Hume developed – albeit informally – an essentially sound system of probabilistic inductive logic that turns out to be a powerful forerunner of Carnap’s systems. The Humean set of principles include, along with rules that turn out to be new for us, well known Carnapian principles, such as the axioms of semiregularity,…Read more
  • Probability and the Logic of de Finetti's Trievents
    In Maria Carla Galavotti (ed.), Bruno de Finetti Radical Probabilist, College Publications. pp. 201--242. 2009.
    Today philosophical discussion on indicative conditionals is dominated by the so called Lewis Triviality Results, according to which, tehere is no binary connective '-->' (let alone truth-functional) such that the probability of p --> q equals the probability of q conditionally on p, so that P(p --> q)= P(q|p). This tenet, that suggests that conditonals lack truth-values, has been challenged in 1991 by Goodman et al. who show that using a suitable three-valued logic the above equation may be res…Read more
  • Bruno de Finetti
    Nuova Civiltà Delle Macchine 4 (2): 46-51. 1986.