•  7
    According to ‘orthodox’ representationalism, perceptual states possess constitutive veridicality (truth, accuracy, or satisfaction) conditions. Typically, philosophers who deny orthodox representationalism endorse some variety of anti-representationalism. But we argue that these haven’t always been, and needn’t continue to be, the only options. Philosophers including Descartes, Malebranche and Helmholtz appear to have rejected orthodox representationalism while nonetheless endorsing perceptual r…Read more
  •  35
    'AI for all' is a matter of social justice
    AI and Ethics 2 1-10. 2022.
    Artificial intelligence (AI) is a radically transformative technology (or system of technologies) that created new existential possibilities and new standards of well-being in human societies. In this article, I argue that to properly understand the increasingly important role AI plays in our society, we must consider its impacts on social justice. For this reason, I propose to conceptualize AI's transformative role and its socio-political implications through the lens of the theory of social ju…Read more
  •  98
    Phenomenology: What’s AI got to do with it?
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 22 (3): 621-636. 2023.
    Nowadays, philosophers and scientists tend to agree that, even though human and artificial intelligence work quite differently, they can still illuminate aspects of each other, and knowledge in one domain can inspire progress in the other. For instance, the notion of “artificial” or “synthetic” phenomenology has been gaining some traction in recent AI research. In this paper, we ask the question: what (if anything) is the use of thinking about phenomenology in the context of AI, and in particula…Read more
  •  13
    Perceptual science and the nature of perception
    Theoria 37 (2): 149-162. 2022.
    Can philosophical theories of perception defer to perceptual science when fixing their ontological commitments regarding the objects of perception? Or in other words, can perceptual science inform us about the nature of perception? Many contemporary mainstream philosophers of perception answer affirmatively. However, in this essay I provide two arguments against this idea. On the one hand, I will argue that perceptual science is not committed to certain assumptions, relevant for determining perc…Read more
  •  34
    Reconsidering perceptual constancy
    Philosophical Psychology 35 (7): 1057-1071. 2022.
    The world shows some degree of invariance, and we perceive this invariance despite a lot of variation generated locally by our movements, changes in illumination, and the way in which our sense organs react to stimulation. Generally, philosophy and psychology each explain our perception of invariance through the notion of ‘perceptual constancy’. According to the traditional definition, perceptual constancies are capacities to perceive the objective (i.e., perceiver- and context-independent) loca…Read more
  •  31
    The problem of perceptual invariance
    Synthese 199 (5-6): 13883-13905. 2021.
    It is a familiar experience to perceive a material object as maintaining a stable shape even though it projects differently shaped images on our retina as we move with respect to it, or as maintaining a stable color throughout changes in the way the object is illuminated. We also perceive sounds as maintaining constant timbre and loudness when the context and the spatial relations between us and the sound source change over time. But where does this perceptual invariance ‘come from’? What is it …Read more
  •  160
    Why do some people become WNBA champions or Olympic gold medalists and others do not? What is ‘special’ about those very few incredibly skilled athletes, and why do they, in particular, get to be special? In this paper, I attempt to make sense of the relationship that there is, in the case of sports champions, between so-called ‘talent’, i.e. natural predisposition for particular physical activities and high-pressure competition, and practice/training. I will articulate what I take to be the ‘m…Read more
  •  38
    Enactivism and the “problem” of perceptual presence
    Synthese 198 (Suppl 1): 159-173. 2020.
    Alva Noë understands what he calls “perceptual presence” as the experience of whole, voluminous objects being ‘right there’, present for us in their entirety, even though not each and every part of them impinges directly on our senses at any given time. How is it possible that we perceptually experience voluminous objects as voluminous directly and apparently effortlessly, with no need of inferring their three-dimensionality from experience of the part of them that is directly stimulating our se…Read more
  •  4
    Suoni
    Aphex 9 83-111. 2014.
  •  321
    Naturalizing Qualia
    Phenomenology and Mind 12. 2017.
  •  16
    Music and Emotion: the Dispositional or Arousal theory
    Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Analitica Junior 3 (1): 19-36. 2012.
    One of the ways of analysing the relationship between music and emotions in through musical expressiveness. As the theory I discuss in this paper puts it, expressiveness in a particular kind of music's secondary quality or, to use the term which gives the theory its name, a _disposition_ of music to arouse a certain emotional response in listeners. The most accurate version of the dispositional theory is provided by Derek Matravers in his book _Art and Emotion_ and in other papers: what I will t…Read more