Alessandra Buccella

According to ‘orthodox’ representationalism, perceptual states possess constitutive veridicality (truth, accuracy, or satisfaction) conditions. Typically, philosophers who deny orthodox representationalism endorse some variety of anti-representationalism. But we argue that these haven’t always been, and needn’t continue to be, the only options. Philosophers including Descartes, Malebranche and Helmholtz appear to have rejected orthodox representationalism while nonetheless endorsing perceptual representations of a fundamentally practical kind not captured by orthodox representationalism. Moreover, we argue that the perceptual science called on by contemporary philosophers to defend orthodox representationalism instead motivates a return to this older view, and we suggest that contemporary philosophers may conceptualize fundamentally practical perceptual representations as _‘de agendo’_ representations, a species of representation that has constitutive appropriateness rather than veridicality conditions.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is a radically transformative technology (or system of technologies) that created new existential possibilities and new standards of well-being in human societies. In this article, I argue that to properly understand the increasingly important role AI plays in our society, we must consider its impacts on social justice. For this reason, I propose to conceptualize AI's transformative role and its socio-political implications through the lens of the theory of social justice known as the Capability Approach. According to the approach, a just society must put its members in a position to acquire and exercise a series of basic capabilities and provide them with the necessary means for these capabilities to be actively realized. Because AI is re-shaping the very definition of some of these basic capabilities, I conclude that AI itself should be considered among the conditions of possession and realization of the capabilities it transforms. In other words, access to AI-in the many forms this access can take-is necessary for social justice.

Alva Noë understands what he calls “perceptual presence” as the experience of whole, voluminous objects being ‘right there’, present for us in their entirety, even though not each and every part of them impinges directly on our senses at any given time. How is it possible that we perceptually experience voluminous objects as voluminous directly and apparently effortlessly, with no need of inferring their three-dimensionality from experience of the part of them that is directly stimulating our sense organs? For Noë, this is the ‘problem of perceptual presence’. In this paper, I integrate Noë’s view by articulating a different view of what perceptual presence at a more basic level amounts to. This new account of perceptual presence which, I believe, can clarify and make an enactive account of presence richer. The view I suggest revolves around the idea, developed especially by Merleau-Ponty and Kelly, that perceptual experience is in an important sense indeterminate. Indeterminacy, I argue, is key if we want to understand perceptual presence and the ‘problem’ Noë solves.