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731Foreknowledge and Free WillOrganon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (1): 55-57. 2012.We contend that since what is true cannot be false, foreknowledge is transparently incompatible with free will. We argue that what is crucial to the conflict is the role of truth in foreknowledge and that the identity of the one who foreknows is irrelevant
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709Can It Be that Tully=Cicero?Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2): 149-150. 2017.We show, that given two fundamental theses of Kripke, no statement of the form ‘‘a=b’ is necessarily true’, is true, if ‘a’ and ‘b’ are distinct rigid designators.
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202The Hidden FutureSymposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (1): 9-10. 2018.We argue that the part of the future which is up to us is in principle unknowable.
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183The core of the consequence argumentDialectica 57 (4): 423-429. 2003.We suggest that the classical version of the consequence argument contending that freedom and determinism are incompatible subtly misstates the core intuition, which is that if a true conditional and a true antecedent are jointly beyond our control, then so is the consequent. We show however that the improved version no less than the classical implies fatalism.Interestingly, the reasoning, that yields fatalism, undermines a direct argument for the soundness of the improved version. But if fatali…Read more
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75An Anomaly in the D–N Model of ExplanationBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (3): 365-367. 1989.It is argued that the constraints placed on the non-law premisses of a D–N explanation are irrelevant to their function and will not salvage the deductive requirement from triviality.
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58Arithmetic and Logic Incompleteness: the LinkThe Reasoner 2 (3): 6. 2008.We show how second order logic incompleteness follows from incompleteness of arithmetic, as proved by Gödel
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46Necessity of identity and Tarski's T‐schemaPhilosophical Investigations 46 (2): 264-265. 2022.Philosophical Investigations, EarlyView.
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45The Force of TruthPhilosophical Investigations 34 (4): 393-395. 2011.The theme of the paper is that what is true cannot be false and conversely. This position was anticipated by Aristotle in De Interpretatione and by G. H. von Wright. The latter calls it “a truth of the logic of relative modalities.”Aristotle has been taken to task by Susan Haack and others for arguing fallaciously from the Principle of Bivalence, that every statement is either true or false, to fatalism. The implication holds, but we show that it is unreasonable to assume that Aristotle grounded…Read more
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42On Changing the PastOrganon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (3): 377-378. 2013.
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32On the cannot of infallibilitySophia 44 (1): 125-127. 2005.We content that a very seductive argument for theological fatalism fails. In the course of our discussion we point out that theological fatalism is incompatible with the existence of a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and infallible. We end by suggesting that ‘possible’ formalized as ‘◊’ is to be understood as ‘can or could have been’ and not simply as ‘can’. The argument we discuss conflates the two.
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31A note on theological fatalism1Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (2): 143-147. 2007.We contend that a very seductive argument for theological fatalism fails. In the course of our discussion we point out that theological fatalism is incompatible with the existence of a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and infallible. We suggest that ‘possible’ formalized as ‘◊’ is to be understood as ‘can or could have been’ and not simply as ‘can’. The argument we discuss conflates the two. We end by rounding out, hope-fully, some left over corners of serious concern to the theist
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30A Purported Theorem of Epistemic LogicTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 16 (1): 105-106. 1996.
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28Isomorphism Between C1 and C2Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 18 (13-15): 237-240. 1972.
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28‘On the necessity of identity and Tarski's T‐schema’—A response to Davood HosseiniPhilosophical Investigations 47 (2): 270-271. 2024.Philosophical Investigations, EarlyView.
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28The Core of the Consequence ArgumentDialectica 57 (4): 423-429. 2003.We suggest that the classical version of the consequence argument contending that freedom and determinism are incompatible subtly misstates the core intuition, which is that if a true conditional and a true antecedent are jointly beyond our control, then so is the consequent. We show however that the improved version no less than the classical implies fatalism.Interestingly, the reasoning, that yields fatalism, undermines a direct argument for the soundness of the improved version. But if fatali…Read more
Ramat Gan, Tel Aviv District, Israel
Areas of Specialization
| Metaphysics |
Areas of Interest
| Metaphysics and Epistemology |
| Logic and Philosophy of Logic |