
98The Logic of Hyperlogic. Part B: Extensions and RestrictionsReview of Symbolic Logic 128. forthcoming.This is the second part of a twopart series on the logic of hyperlogic, a formal system for regimenting metalogical claims in the object language (even within embedded environments). Part A provided a minimal logic for hyperlogic that is sound and complete over the class of all models. In this part, we extend these completeness results to stronger logics that are sound and complete over restricted classes of models. We also investigate the logic of hyperlogic when the language is enriched with …Read more

158What Topic Continuity Problem?Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.A common objection to the very idea of conceptual engineering is the topic continuity problem: whenever one tries to “reengineer” a concept, one only shifts attention away from one concept to another. Put diﬀerently, there is no such thing as conceptual revision: there’s only conceptual replacement. Here, I show that topic continuity is compatible with conceptual replacement. Whether the topic is preserved in an act of conceptual replacement simply depends on what is being replaced (a conceptual…Read more

348The Logic of Hyperlogic. Part A: FoundationsReview of Symbolic Logic 127. forthcoming.Hyperlogic is a hyperintensional system designed to regiment metalogical claims (e.g., "Intuitionistic logic is correct" or "The law of excluded middle holds") into the object language, including within embedded environments such as attitude reports and counterfactuals. This paper is the first of a twopart series exploring the logic of hyperlogic. This part presents a minimal logic of hyperlogic and proves its completeness. It consists of two interdefined axiomatic systems: one for classical co…Read more

92A supplemental document for "The Logic of Hyperlogic. Part A: Foundations".

196What Can You Say? Measuring the Expressive Power of LanguagesDissertation, University of California, Berkeley. 2018.There are many different ways to talk about the world. Some ways of talking are more expressive than others—that is, they enable us to say more things about the world. But what exactly does this mean? When is one language able to express more about the world than another? In my dissertation, I systematically investigate different ways of answering this question and develop a formal theory of expressive power, translation, and notational variance. In doing so, I show how these investigations help…Read more

513CounterpossiblesPhilosophy Compass 16 (11). 2021.A counterpossible is a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. Counterpossibles present a puzzle for standard theories of counterfactuals, which predict that all counterpossibles are semantically vacuous. Moreover, counterpossibles play an important role in many debates within metaphysics and epistemology, including debates over grounding, causation, modality, mathematics, science, and even God. In this article, we will explore various positions on counterpossibles as well as their potenti…Read more

242Logic talkSynthese 199 (56): 1366113688. 2021.Sentences about logic are often used to show that certain embedding expressions are hyperintensional. Yet it is not clear how to regiment “logic talk” in the object language so that it can be compositionally embedded under such expressions. In this paper, I develop a formal system called hyperlogic that is designed to do just that. I provide a hyperintensional semantics for hyperlogic that doesn’t appeal to logically impossible worlds, as traditionally understood, but instead uses a shiftable pa…Read more

462Does Chance Undermine Would?Mind 131 (523): 747785. 2021.Counterfactual scepticism holds that most ordinary counterfactuals are false. The main argument for this view appeals to a ‘chance undermines would’ principle: if ψ would have some chance of not obtaining had ϕ obtained, then ϕ □→ ψ is false. This principle seems to follow from two fairly weak principles, namely, that ‘chance ensures could’ and that ϕ □→ ψ and ϕ ⋄→ ¬ ψ clash. Despite their initial plausibility, I show that these principles are independently problematic: given some modest closure…Read more

414The Dynamics of Argumentative DiscourseJournal of Philosophical Logic 51 (2): 413456. 2022.Arguments have always played a central role within logic and philosophy. But little attention has been paid to arguments as a distinctive kind of discourse, with its own semantics and pragmatics. The goal of this essay is to study the mechanisms by means of which we make arguments in discourse, starting from the semantics of argument connectives such as `therefore'. While some proposals have been made in the literature, they fail to account for the distinctive anaphoric behavior of `therefore', …Read more

193Comparing conventionsSemantics and Linguistic Theory 30 294313. 2020.We offer a novel account of metalinguistic comparatives, such as 'Al is more wise than clever'. On our view, metalinguistic comparatives express comparative commitments to conventions. Thus, 'Al is more wise than clever' expresses that the speaker has a stronger commitment to a convention on which Al is wise than to a convention on which she is clever. This view avoids problems facing previous approaches to metalinguistic comparatives. It also fits within a broader framework—independently motiva…Read more

810Counterlogicals as CounterconventionalsJournal of Philosophical Logic 50 (4): 673704. 2021.We develop and defend a new approach to counterlogicals. Nonvacuous counterlogicals, we argue, fall within a broader class of counterfactuals known as counterconventionals. Existing semantics for counterconventionals, 459–482 ) and, 1–27 ) allow counterfactuals to shift the interpretation of predicates and relations. We extend these theories to counterlogicals by allowing counterfactuals to shift the interpretation of logical vocabulary. This yields an elegant semantics for counterlogicals that…Read more

35A TwoDimensional Logic for Two Paradoxes of Deontic ModalityReview of Symbolic Logic 15 (4): 9911022. 2022.In this paper, we axiomatize the deontic logic in Fusco (2015), which uses a Stalnakerinspired account of diagonal acceptance and a twodimensional account of disjunction to treat Ross’s Paradox and the Puzzle of Free Choice Permission. On this account, disjunctioninvolving validities are a priori rather than necessary. We show how to axiomatize twodimensional disjunction so that the introduction/elimination rules for boolean disjunction can be viewed as onedimensional projections of more ge…Read more

840A TwoDimensional Logic for Two Paradoxes of Deontic ModalityReview of Symbolic Logic. forthcoming.In this paper, we axiomatize the deontic logic in Fusco 2015, which uses a Stalnakerinspired account of diagonal acceptance and a twodimensional account of disjunction to treat Ross’s Paradox and the Puzzle of Free Choice Permission. On this account, disjunctioninvolving validities are a priori rather than necessary. We show how to axiomatize twodimensional disjunction so that the introduction/elimination rules for boolean disjunction can be viewed as onedimensional projections of more gene…Read more

345The Problem of Crossworld PredicationJournal of Philosophical Logic 45 (6): 697742. 2016.While standard firstorder modal logic is quite powerful, it cannot express even very simple sentences like “I could have been taller than I actually am” or “Everyone could have been smarter than they actually are”. These are examples of crossworld predication, whereby objects in one world are related to objects in another world. Extending firstorder modal logic to allow for crossworld predication in a motivated way has proven to be notoriously difficult. In this paper, I argue that the stand…Read more

360On the expressive power of firstorder modal logic with twodimensional operatorsSynthese 195 (10): 43734417. 2018.Many authors have noted that there are types of English modal sentences cannot be formalized in the language of basic firstorder modal logic. Some widely discussed examples include “There could have been things other than there actually are” and “Everyone who is actually rich could have been poor.” In response to this lack of expressive power, many authors have discussed extensions of firstorder modal logic with twodimensional operators. But claims about the relative expressive power of these…Read more

344On the Concept of a Notational VariantIn Alexandru Baltag, Jeremy Seligman & Tomoyuki Yamada (eds.), Logic, Rationality, and Interaction (LORI 2017, Sapporo, Japan), . pp. 284298. 2017.In the study of modal and nonclassical logics, translations have frequently been employed as a way of measuring the inferential capabilities of a logic. It is sometimes claimed that two logics are “notational variants” if they are translationally equivalent. However, we will show that this cannot be quite right, since firstorder logic and propositional logic are translationally equivalent. Others have claimed that for two logics to be notational variants, they must at least be compositionally i…Read more

821Against Conventional WisdomPhilosophers' Imprint 20 (22): 127. 2020.Conventional wisdom has it that truth is always evaluated using our actual linguistic conventions, even when considering counterfactual scenarios in which different conventions are adopted. This principle has been invoked in a number of philosophical arguments, including Kripke’s defense of the necessity of identity and Lewy’s objection to modal conventionalism. But it is false. It fails in the presence of what Einheuser (2006) calls cmonsters, or conventionshifting expressions (on analogy wit…Read more

195Hyperlogic: A System for Talking about LogicsProceedings for the 22nd Amsterdam Colloquium. 2019.Sentences about logic are often used to show that certain embedding expressions, including attitude verbs, conditionals, and epistemic modals, are hyperintensional. Yet it not clear how to regiment “logic talk” in the object language so that it can be compositionally embedded under such expressions. This paper does two things. First, it argues against a standard account of logic talk, viz., the impossible worlds semantics. It is shown that this semantics does not easily extend to a language with…Read more

1256On the Substitution of Identicals in Counterfactual ReasoningNoûs 54 (3): 600631. 2020.It is widely held that counterfactuals, unlike attitude ascriptions, preserve the referential transparency of their constituents, i.e., that counterfactuals validate the substitution of identicals when their constituents do. The only putative counterexamples in the literature come from counterpossibles, i.e., counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. Advocates of counterpossibilism, i.e., the view that counterpossibles are not all vacuous, argue that counterpossibles can generate referential …Read more

694CounteridenticalsThe Philosophical Review 127 (3): 323369. 2018.A counteridentical is a counterfactual with an identity statement in the antecedent. While counteridenticals generally seem nontrivial, most semantic theories for counterfactuals, when combined with the necessity of identity and distinctness, attribute vacuous truth conditions to such counterfactuals. In light of this, one could try to save the orthodox theories either by appealing to pragmatics or by denying that the antecedents of alleged counteridenticals really contain identity claims. Or o…Read more
Ithaca, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Logic and Philosophy of Logic 
Metaphysics 
Philosophy of Language 
Areas of Interest
2 more
Logic and Philosophy of Logic 
Metaphysics 
Philosophy of Language 
Epistemology 
M&E, Misc 
Metaphilosophy 
Philosophy of Probability 