•  84
    Two Meanings of ‘Attribute’ in Spinoza
    Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 98 (1): 55-88. 2016.
    I argue that there are two meanings of ‘attribute’ for Spinoza. It can refer to 1) an essential feature of substance, or 2) a perception by the infinite intellect of such a feature. I put this forth as a reading of Spinoza’s definition of ‘attribute’ (E1d4), which is notoriously framed in terms of the perceptions of the intellect. The primary benefit of this reading is that it provides a uniquely powerful and much-needed answer to the puzzle of how the mentalistic character of E1d4 is consist…Read more
  •  80
    The Nature and Scope of Spinoza's "One and the Same" Relation
    Res Philosophica 94 (4): 535-554. 2017.
    I argue that we should rethink the nature and scope of Spinoza’s “one and the same” relation. Contrary to the standard reading, the nature of this relation is not identity but a union, and its scope includes all idea-object pairs, even God and the idea of God. A crucial reason we should adopt this dual picture is that the idea of God must be one and the same as something found when Nature is conceived under each of the other attributes. If “one and the same” is interpreted as a relation of ident…Read more
  •  1
    Monism and Number: A Case Study in the Development of Spinoza's Philosophy
    History of Philosophy Quarterly 34 (3): 213-230. 2017.
    In Ep. 50, Spinoza argues at length that “someone who calls God one or unique does not have a true idea of God, or is speaking improperly about him.” This text is striking, given the declarations in many writings, including the Ethics, that God is the one, unique substance. While recent commentators have attempted to render Ep. 50 consistent with the rest of Spinoza’s corpus, I instead argue that Spinoza’s stance on God’s oneness evolved over the course of his career. This evolution, which in fa…Read more