•  27
    How there Could be Reasons for Affective Attitudes
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (3-4): 667-680. 2020.
    Barry Maguire has recently argued that the nature of normative support for affective attitudes like fear and admiration differs fundamentally from that of reasons. These arguments appear to raise new and serious challenges for the popular ‘reasons-first’ view according to which normative support of any kind comes from reasons. In this paper, I show how proponents of the reasons-first view can meet these challenges. They can do so, I argue, if they can successfully meet some other well-known chal…Read more
  •  21
    Promises, obligation, and reliance
    Wiley: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. forthcoming.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
  •  4
    Promises, obligation, and reliance
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. forthcoming.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.