University of Wisconsin, Madison
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2017
Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics
  •  1127
    On Believing the Error Theory
    Journal of Philosophy 111 (11): 631-640. 2014.
    In his recent article entitled ‘Can We Believe the Error Theory?’ Bart Streumer argues that it is impossible (for anyone, anywhere) to believe the error theory. This might sound like a problem for the error theory, but Streumer argues that it is not. He argues that the un-believability of the error theory offers a way for error theorists to respond to several objections commonly made against the view. In this paper, we respond to Streumer’s arguments. In particular, in sections 2-4, we offer sev…Read more
  •  162
    Internalism, Ideal Advisors and the Conditional Fallacy
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2): 1-7. 2015.
    In her recent article, ‘Internalism About Reasons: Sad But True?,’ Kate Manne offers a brilliant defense of a novel version of internalism about normative reasons. But I will argue that this defense is not successful. After explaining the nature of Manne’s internalism, I offer two counterexamples to it, thereby showing that her argument in its favor goes wrong somewhere. I then identify the false premise in her argument. In brief, I suggest that Manne’s ‘practice-based approach’ to practical…Read more
  •  20
    Oliver D. Crisp: Approaching the Atonement: The Reconciling Work of Christ (review)
    Faith and Philosophy 38 (2): 283-288. 2021.
    This paper considers two objections which can be levelled against Leibniz’s account of divine love. The first is that he cannot allow that divine love is gracious because he is committed to the view that love is properly proportioned to the perfection perceived in the beloved; the second is that God is cruel to those who are damned and so cannot be said to love all. I argue that Leibniz has the resources to rebut—or at least blunt—each of these objections.