•  9
    In this article, I explore how Schopenhauer's theory of aesthetic experience—independently of his theory of arts—accommodates the possibility of contemplation. The standard reading of his aesthetics is that contemplation becomes possible because of a certain “surplus” of intellect and facilitating external occasions. I argue, however, that the “essential imperfections” of intellect and Schopenhauer's overall metaphysics are inconsistent with the very idea of will‐less cognition and, hence, of a …Read more
  •  3
    The Foundations of Schopenhauer’s Critical Metaphysics
    Philosophical Anthropology 4 (2): 117-151. 2018.
  •  19
    Schopenhauer is widely held to accommodate no positive aesthetic pleasure. While this may be the case in his mature oeuvre overall, where he insists on the negative character of all gratification, I reconstruct two early accounts of such pleasure in his manuscripts, both of which are a direct result of Schopenhauer’s engagement with Kant’s first and third Critiques. To do so, I analyze his so-called metaphysics of the ‘better consciousness’ and his transition from it to the metaphysics of will (…Read more
  •  18
    The ‘Platonic Ideas’ in Schopenhauer’s metaphysics are appearances. On the other hand, as the immediate objecthood of the will, they are the essences of species and the only object of true aesthetic cognition, which leads beyond mere appearance. To explain this apparent incongruence, I offer an analysis of Schopenhauer’s early metaphysics, and its transformation into the metaphysics of will, fleshing out the several and divergent concepts of ‘idea’. Specifically, first, as part of his religious …Read more
  • Philosophie als Wissenschaft. Wissenschaftsbegriffe in den philosophischen Systemen des Deutschen Idealismus. (edited book)
    with Nora Schleich, Simone Cavallini, Erik Eschmann, Yukiko Hayashi-Baeken, and Nina Lott
    Olms. 2021.
  •  4
    On point-duration networks for temporal reasoning
    with I. Navarrete, R. Wetprasit, and R. Marin
    Artificial Intelligence 140 (1-2): 39-70. 2002.