Alexei Gloukhov

Hannah Arendt’s concept of freedom is exceptional in contemporary political theory. First, it is positive, which puts it into opposition to the both current versions of its negative counterpart, the liberal, and the republican concepts of freedom. In particular, a comparison between Arendt’s and Pettit’s approaches allows establishing some striking points of antagonistic logical mirroring. Based on this, the notion of “schools of thought” is introduced, which plays an essential role in the subsequent discussion of Arendtian realism. Second, although Arendt’s theory of freedom shares features that are common to the major continental thinkers, like Martin Heidegger, Gilles Deleuze, or Alain Badiou, her solution to the problem of freedom aligns her closer to the liberals. Third, I argue that one should consider this logical irregularity as evidence in favor of her political realism, rather than a trivial inconsistency. This realism is the genuinely exceptional part of her legacy, which may guide us eventually, with modifications applied, to a paradigm shift in the current political philosophy. Finally, I present an evaluation of her solution to the problem of freedom, and a brief follow-up to some seemingly-out-of-place Arendtian notions, such as “excellence” and “elite.” Although in the final analysis, her solution seems to be artificial, it opens up a new promising area of research related to the notion of “benevolent excellence.”

The paper deals with the conditions of the possible renewal of the “Constitutio libertatis” project on the basis of the 20th-century experience. The global political conflict, resulted in severe intellectual confrontation, produced the split of philosophy into two isolated movements: the “continental” and the “analytical” movements, each promoting its own logic of thinking. The paper shows the influence of this fundamental philosophical schism on the key versions of the contemporary political philosophy. A new formulation for the main political problem emerges pointing to the mutual untranslatability of the languages of freedom and of justice. The two languages are traceable to the two competing philosophical logics, those of difference and of representation. The notion of “form of life”, used politically by Plato and analyzed logically by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations, is introduced as a conceptual basis for a new political theory that should solve the main political problem. Finally, some basic propositions are discussed, that should be observed in trying to resume the project of the “Constitutio libertatis”. It is shown that the negative definition of the concept of freedom must be abandoned. Freedom has a certain logical form, but it does not logically imply that various forms of life, with their liberties expressed through various logical forms, inevitably come into mutual conflict. The foundation of the “Constitutio libertatis” is based on the autonomous “forms of life” and is justly distributed throughout a complex non-Cartesian texture of political reality