Alfonso Donoso

According to the brain drain argument, there are good reasons for states to limit the exit of their skilled workers (more specifically, healthcare workers), because of the negative impacts this type of migration has for other members of the community from which they migrate. Some theorists criticise this argument as illiberal, while others support it and ground a duty to stay of the skilled workers on rather vague concepts like patriotic virtue, or the legitimate expectations of their state and co-citizens. In this article, on the contrary, we suggest that the liberal conception of states’ legitimate political authority demands, and not just permits, that developing states from which migration of skilled workers occurs set up contractual mechanisms. These mechanisms will ensure that state-funded training in the health sector is provided against a commitment on the part of future professionals to reciprocate with their services for the benefits obtained. If one of the conditions for the state to maintain legitimate political authority is to provide basic services such as healthcare to its subjects (while respecting at the same time their autonomy and freedom), then this is what developing states affected by the brain drain ought to do. What we call the authority-based approach to the brain drain also helps to clarify the obligations that other states have not to interfere with these contractual mechanisms when they exist, and not to profit from their absence. Inspired by FIFA’s legal instruments of training compensation and solidarity mechanism for the transfer of players, we conclude by suggesting a plausible global policy to complement this authority-based approach.

This review provides an overview of the ethics of extinctions with a focus on the Western analytical environmental ethics literature. It thereby gives special attention to the possible philosophical grounds for Michael Soulé’s assertion that the untimely ‘extinction of populations and species is bad’. Illustrating such debates in environmental ethics, the guiding question for this review concerns why – or when – anthropogenic extinctions are bad or wrong, which also includes the question of when that might not be the case (i.e. which extinctions are even desirable). After providing an explanation of the disciplinary perspective taken (section “Introduction”), the concept of extinction and its history within that literature are introduced (section “Understanding extinction”). Then, in section “Why (or when) might anthropogenic extinctions be morally problematic?”, different reasons for why anthropogenic extinctions might be morally problematic are presented based on the loss of species’ value, harm to nonhuman individuals, the loss of valuable biological variety and duties to future generations. This section concludes by also considering cases where anthropogenic extinctions might be justified. Section “How to respond to extinctions?” then addresses a selection of topics concerning risks and de-extinction technologies. Finally, the section on “Extinction studies” introduces other viewpoints on the ethics of extinction from the extinction studies literature, followed by the “Conclusion”.

In environmental ethics, the legal and political representation of non-humans is a widespread aspiration. Its supporters see representative institutions that give voice to non-humans' interests as a promising strategy for responding to the illegitimate worldwide exploitation of non-human beings. In this article I engage critically with those who support this form of representation, and address two issues central to any account concerned with the legal and political representation of non-human living beings: what should be represented? And what are the conditions of such a representation? The answers I provide to these queries count as a first step towards a comprehensive account of the institutional representation of non-human nature.

ABSTRACT In this article I explore whether liberal retributive justice should be conceived of either individualistically or holistically. I critically examine the individualistic account of retributive justice and suggest that the question of retribution – i.e., whether and when punishment of an individual is compatible with just treatment of that individual – must be answered holistically. By resorting to the ideal of sensitive reasons, a model of legitimacy at the basis of our best normative models of democracy, the article argues that in modern liberal democracies, punishment of an offender A for f is compatible with just treatment of A only if punishment of an individual for f can be legitimate in A's and A's fellow citizens' eyes. Only once retributive justice is understood in this holistic fashion the imposition of punishment can be made compatible with just treatment of individuals. RESUMO Neste artigo, exploro se justiça retributiva liberal deve ser concebida ou individualista ou de forma holística. Examino criticamente a conta individualista da justiça retributiva e sugiro que a questão da retribuição – quando a punição de um indivíduo é compatível com o tratamento justo desse indivíduo – deve ser respondida de forma holística. Recorrendo ao ideal de razões sensíveis, um modelo de legitimidade na base dos nossos melhores modelos normativos de democracia, argumento que, nas democracias liberais modernas, a punição de um delinquente A para φ é compatível com o tratamento justo de A só se punição de um indivíduo para φ pode ser legítimo aos olhos de A e seus concidadãos. Uma vez que a justiça retributiva é entendida dessa forma holística, a imposição da pena pode ser compatível com o tratamento justo de indivíduos

The climate crisis has implications for the idea of justice. The paper explores this idea to inquire whether climate change wrongs animals and, if it does, how these wrongs are constitutive of an injustice. The first question is answered in the positive to then propose an answer to the second question through an account of climate injustice articulated as a problem of distribution of ecological space. On that basis, the general conclusion of the paper is that at least some harms suffered by animals are constitutive of climate distributive injustices. They are cases of wrongful appropriation of ecological space, that is, of the benefits that the Earth’s life-support systems and its physical resources provide to sentient animals. These are wrongs against animals that should be condemned, prohibited and redressed.

I revisit the divide between environmental and animal ethics and explore the role that territory—a recently theorized subject in political theory—could play in this dispute. Specifically, I contend that a concept of state territory and territorial rights informed by values shared by environmental and animal ethics would greatly strengthen the case of non-anthropocentric ethics against the pervasive form of anthropocentrism that shapes current state policies and institutions. I propose what I dub an ecological account of territorial sovereignty and contend that a state’s territorial rights are, significantly, a function of its commitment to respecting the value of non-human organisms inhabiting the geographical area over which it claims these rights. I argue that respecting the natural world entails a commitment to the development of state policies and practices that are in line with some central tenets of animal ethics and, at the same time, requires embracing a kind of holistic moral standpoint that conforms to a plausible version of environmental ethics. If successful, my proposal will show how the dispute between animal and environmental ethics could be softened if viewed through the lens of territorial rights, and contribute to an articulation of territorial rights and sovereignty that is sensitive to the environmental challenges we face today.

As an alternative to an instrumentalist view of the natural world in political practices and institutions—a view that conceives of nature as an aggregated of resources to merely serve human interests and needs—this article advances an account of a new politics for a more-than-human world. It proposes a different understanding of the nonhuman within the sphere of the political which both impacts upon the extension of the political community—who should be included in the demos—as well as upon the use and application of traditional political concepts—e.g., sovereignty, representation, legitimacy and authority. It is argued that these theoretical developments characterize a new politics and are, in the light of current environmental challenges, a necessary first step towards a genuine transformation of state policies and practices for our more-than-human political communities.