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37Emotions and two senses of simulationPhilosophical Psychology 1-20. forthcoming.Some simulationists have argued that the information obtained during the perceptual process of facial expression (the geometric features) is sufficient for recognition of the emotion intended by that expression. Drawing on evidence from cross-cultural studies, with particular attention to conceptual act theories, I show that both emotion expression and recognition are top-down modulated by expressivity norms, observer-specific internal representations, and expectations. I thus conclude that dire…Read more
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33Why emotion recognition is not simulationalPhilosophical Psychology 30 (6). 2017.According to a dominant interpretation of the simulation hypothesis, in recognizing an emotion we use the same neural processes used in experiencing that emotion. This paper argues that the view is fundamentally misguided. I will examine the simulational arguments for the three basic emotions of fear, disgust, and anger and argue that the simulational account relies strongly on a narrow sense of emotion processing which hardly squares with evidence on how, in fact, emotion recognition is process…Read more
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23The ordinary concept of weakness of willPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1): 123-139. 2019.Recently, a number of experimental philosophers have converged on the position that the ordinary concept of weakness of will does not solely consist in “judgment” or “intention” violation but is more like a cluster concept in which each factor plays contributory roles in the application of the concept. This, however, raises the question as to which factor is more central or plays a more significant role in folk’s understanding of the concept. I contend that the ordinary concept of weakness of wi…Read more
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Centre for Neurophilosophy and Ethics of Neuroscience
PhD, 2017
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Psychology |
Philosophy of Neuroscience |