• On Fred Feldman’s Physicalistic Objections Against Saul Kripke’s Dualistic Arguments
    Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 25 (4): 79-108. 2023.
    Physicalist Philosophers of the mind in the 20th century put forward a long list of various theories in defense of a materialistic explanation of the mind and mental events and states. Identity theories were only a part of this list. Saul Kripke, by proposing several arguments, challenged the identity theories and the physicalist philosophers of the mind. In this article, I will examine separately Kripke’s criticisms on the person-body identity and the token-token identity. I will analyze and cr…Read more
  •  25
    Objective Representation and Non-Physical Entities
    Essays in Philosophy 23 (1): 60-82. 2022.
    What can we learn about the existence of non-physical entities from close inquiry into special kinds of experiences? Contemporary analytic philosophy has sometimes studied mystic experiences as evidence for the existence of such entities. The article is organized as follows: first, I discuss several distinctions that seem to me to play substantive roles in philosophizing about such experiences. I will then offer and criticize two arguments that support the significance of the experiences. The ar…Read more
  •  17
  •  14
    Gertler has proposed a new problem concerning the criterion for the distinction between internalism and externalism about the mental content, in an attempt to show that the technical terms, “internalism,” and “externalism,” are seriously vague. The idea behind Gertler’s argument is that any criterion for such a distinction has to appeal to the notion of “intrinsic to the thinker” while this concept is, for her, descriptively and normatively vague and problematic. In this paper, I will first intr…Read more
  •  147
    There are many new philosophical queries about the moral status and rights of artificial intelligences; questions such as whether such entities can be considered as morally responsible entities and as having special rights. Recently, the contemporary philosophy of mind philosopher, Eric Schwitzgebel, has tried to defend the possibility of equal rights of AIs and human beings (in an imaginary future), by designing a new argument (2015). In this paper, after an introduction, the author reviews and…Read more
  •  39
    Modest Dualism and Individuation of Mind
    Metaphysica 22 (1): 63-74. 2021.
    A persistent tradition in metaphysics of mind insists that there is a substantial difference between mind and body. Avicenna’s numerous arguments, for a millennium, have encouraged the view that minds are essentially immaterial substances. In the first part, I redesign and offer five versions of such arguments and then I criticize them. First argument (indivisibility) would be vulnerable in terms of two counterexamples. Second argument (universals) confuses existence with location. Third argumen…Read more