Alireza Sayadmansour

This paper considers the ethics of educational technology in terms of whether or not selected media and methods are beneficial to the teacher and student, or whether other motives and criteria determine the selection. Communications media have proven themselves to be powerful and efficient tools, used like ?dynamite? for getting the most out of a ?quarry?, but the vast scope of their applicability and flexibility may notoriously neglect the unprecedented risks to the user of current online methods ? as one of the areas in which ethical issues arise. Having mentioned en passant any potential benefits of all communications media, their harmful potential is also noted, and, based on this introductory notification, ethical responsibilities of all parties involved in educational media have been examined. The authors? main objective is to centralise the concept of the ?uncritical mass? representing the educationally uninformed general public whose selections of communication technologies can lead to their adoption as educational tools regardless of their educational value

There is a robust tendency within the contemporary feminist mainstream to argue against and ultimately reject the so-called ‘dualising or dualist philosophy’ since it is the supportive paradigm background for any gender discrimination originated from the hegemonic sovereignty of masculinity over femininity. In this paper, having dived deeper into the feminist critical depiction of the logical binarist foundation on which the dualising philosophy is said to be well-grounded, I will proceed to portray and examine a sequence of doctrines that feminist philosophers have developed to shed light on the fact that the hegemonic sovereignty of masculinity over femininity has been theoretically initiated from the logical disjunction 'p or not p' to masculinity essentialism. Finally, I will end by pointing to a tension between underlying assumptions of the feminist sequentialist approach and what feminists themselves claim to adhere to as the highest ideal: non-naturalising gender differences.

Articulating his philosophical aims, Nietzsche has exploited animal similes and metaphors. It should be noted that he has not stepped on this style with the mere intention of splurge or embellishing his work with tropes but, instead, has reflected upon 'animality' or 'being animal' of human being. However, he considers the animality of humankind as different from the Aristotelian notion of 'rational animal'. Based on the notion of animality in its biological sense, he puts forward a project through which human existence can be linked to Nature. Furthermore, on the basis of the notion of 'animality' borrowed from Nature, he tries to re-define humanity and also restitute its true authentic meaning that is, to naturalise its correlative values. Explaining animality and specifying its place within the Nietzschean system of thought, this paper aims to set forth the animality of humankind in a different way.

Received: 01/02/2018 | Accepted: 09/04/2019 In his Being and Time, Heidegger does not illustrate Dasein’s embodiment but he postpones his illustration for some time in the future, namely in his Zollikon Seminars. In the seminars, Heidegger provides his clearest elucidation for this primordial fact that Dasein’s embodiment is openness to the world; Dasein’s existence extends beyond and over its physical body thereby construing and analysing the world from an existential standpoint. He puts forward the title “bodying forth” for this primordial fact. Dissimilarly, Levinas, by adopting his peculiar ethical approach, criticises the Heideggerian Dasein: Heideggerian Dasein is sufficiently not human. Levinas lays stress upon the fact that the subject’s face-to-face encounter with the Other can be taken from the perspective of embodied reality. A novel wisdom of the body will be constituted in the context of the I’s ethical relationship with the Other and the I’s widely open receptivity to fulfilling the Other’s demands and needs. In this paper, having made an investigation into the subject’s embodiment in both philosophers’ different phenomenologies, a serious scrutiny will be given to the Levinasian critique of Dasein as it is insufficiently constituted “from flesh-and-blood

Emmanuel Levinas, adopting his peculiar phenomenological approach, views the I's responsibility for the Other as the sole foundation of being ethical, and summons humanity to be aware of its infinite and immediate responsibility. Ethical responsibility can be understood here as every I's receptivity and solicitude towards the Other or those whose presence makes the I's transcendence possible. Responsibility accurately implies the I's passivity from the Other's demand and address. Unlike the subject which exists within Western philosophical tradition, Levinas's ethical subject is not active, automatized and hegemonic! The hegemonic I has always striven to subjugate the Other under a universal and rational totality. Hence, there arises a struggle between the familiar and the non-familiar. To resolve the strong node of this hostility, for Levinas, is to have the I innately passivatized of the Other. He holds that the passive response to the Other's demand constitutes the sensitivity of human existence. The I's ethical responsibility for the Other discloses a subject's passive structure that has always recognized itself through the profound and active consciousness. In this paper, by exploiting some unique metaphors like "substitution" and "hostage" –which imply the exaggerative aspect of passivity-, Levinas's path to gloss a novel ethical subject will be sketched out.