•  43
    Testimony, Understanding, and Art Criticism
    In Christy Mag Uidhir (ed.), Philosophy and Art: New Essays at the Intersection, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
    I present a puzzle – the “puzzle of aesthetic testimony” – along with a solution to it that appeals to the impossibility of testimonial understanding. I'll criticize this solution by defending the possibility of testimonial understanding, including testimonial aesthetic understanding.
  •  5
    Intellectual Loyalty
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3): 326-350. 2016.
  •  55
    The guise of the good and the problem of partiality
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6): 851-872. 2018.
    According to the guise of the good thesis, we desire things under the ‘guise of the good.’ Here I sympathetically articulate a generic formulation of the guise of the good thesis, and addre...
  •  1204
    What is the relationship between the value of sincerity and the value of truth? You might assume that the value of sincerity and the value of truth (more exactly: true belief) are part of an evaluative package, such that they stand or fall together. In this spirit, Bernard Williams (2002) offers an account of the “virtues of truth,” which include sincerity and accuracy. My goal in this paper is to undermine the assumption that the value of sincerity is tied to the value of truth. To this end…Read more
  •  7
    Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century
    International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1): 131-136. 2010.
  •  855
    The problem of multi-peer disagreement concerns the reasonable response to a situation in which you believe P1 … Pn and disagree with a group of ‘epistemic peers’ of yours, who believe ∼P1 … ∼Pn, respectively. However, the problem of multi-peer disagreement is a variant on the preface paradox; because of this the problem poses no challenge to the so-called ‘steadfast view’ in the epistemology of disagreement, on which it is sometimes reasonable to believe P in the face of peer disagreement about…Read more
  • Michael P. Lynch (review)
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (1): 75-79. 2014.
  •  133
    How to defeat belief in the external world
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2). 2006.
    I defend the view that there is a privileged class of propositions – that there is an external world, among other such 'hinge propositions'– that possess a special epistemic status: justified belief in these propositions is not defeated unless one has sufficient reason to believe their negation. Two arguments are given for this conclusion. Finally, three proposals are offered as morals of the preceding story: first, our justification for hinge propositions must be understood as defeatable, secon…Read more
  •  225
    Unrealistic Fictions
    American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1): 33--46. 2011.
    In this paper, we develop an analysis of unrealistic fiction that captures the everyday sense of ‘unrealistic’. On our view, unrealistic fictions are a species of inconsistent fictions, but fictions for which such inconsistency, given the supporting role we claim played by genre, needn’t be a critical defect. We first consider and reject an analysis of unrealistic fiction as fiction that depicts or describes unlikely events; we then develop our own account and make an initial statement of it: un…Read more
  •  114
    The maturation of the Gettier problem
    Philosophical Studies 172 (1): 1-6. 2015.
    Edmund Gettier’s paper “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” first appeared in an issue of Analysis , dated June of 1963, and although it’s tempting to wax hyperbolic when discussing the paper’s importance and influence, it is fair to say that its impact on contemporary philosophy has been substantial and wide-ranging. Epistemology has benefited from 50 years of sincere and rigorous discussion of issues arising from the paper, and Gettier’s conclusion that knowledge is not justified true belief …Read more
  •  551
    A Problem For Relational Theories of Color
    with Edward Wilson Averill and Allan Hazlett
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1): 140-145. 2010.
    We argue that relationalism entails an unacceptable claim about the content of visual experience: that ordinary ‘red’ objects look like they look like they look like they’re red, etc.
  •  839
    In the Phaedrus, Socreates sympathetically describes the ability “to cut up each kind according to its species along its natural joints, and to try not to splinter any part, as a bad butcher might do.” (265e) In contemporary philosophy, Ted Sider (2009, 2011) defends the same idea. As I shall put it, Plato and Sider’s idea is that limning structure is an epistemic goal. My aim in this paper is to articulate and defend this idea. First, I’ll articulate the notion of a structural proposition…Read more
  •  29
    On the special insult of refusing testimony
    Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup1): 37-51. 2017.
    In this paper, I defend the claim, made by G. E. M. Anscombe and J. L. Austin, that you can insult someone by refusing her testimony. I argue that refusing someone’s testimony can manifest doubt about her credibility, which in the relevant cases is offensive to her, given that she presupposed her credibility by telling what she did. I conclude by sketching three applications of my conclusion: to the issue of valuable false belief, to the issue of testimonial injustice, and to the issue of skepti…Read more
  •  4
    In Praise of Reason (review)
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (4). 2013.
  •  583
    Expressivism and Convention-Relativism about Epistemic Discourse
    In A. Fairweather & O. Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue, Cambridge University Press. forthcoming.
    Consider the claim that openmindedness is an epistemic virtue, the claim that true belief is epistemically valuable, and the claim that one epistemically ought to cleave to one’s evidence. These are examples of what I’ll call “ epistemic discourse.” In this paper I’ll propose and defend a view called “convention-relativism about epistemic discourse.” In particular, I’ll argue that convention-relativismis superior to its main rival, expressivism about epistemic discourse. Expressivism and convent…Read more
  •  83
    The Social Value of Non-Deferential Belief
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1): 131-151. 2016.
    We often prefer non-deferential belief to deferential belief. In the last twenty years, epistemology has seen a surge of sympathetic interest in testimony as a source of knowledge. We are urged to abandon ‘epistemic individualism’ and the ideal of the ‘autonomous knower’ in favour of ‘social epistemology’. In this connection, you might think that a preference for non-deferential belief is a manifestation of vicious individualism, egotism, or egoism. I shall call this the selfishness challenge to…Read more
  •  27
    Review of Pylyshyn, Things and Places (review)
    International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4): 544-546. 2008.
  •  4
    Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century: Volume 1: The Dawn of Analysis (review)
    International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1): 131-136. 2010.
  •  1043
    Authenticity and Self‐Knowledge
    Dialectica 67 (2): 157-181. 2013.
    We argue that the value of authenticity does not explain the value of self-knowledge. There are a plurality of species of authenticity; in this paper we consider four species: avoiding pretense (section 2), Frankfurtian wholeheartedness (section 3), existential self-knowledge (section 4), and spontaneity (section 5). Our thesis is that, for each of these species, the value of (that species of) authenticity does not (partially) explain the value of self-knowledge. Moreover, when it comes to spont…Read more
  •  27
    Review: Models, Truth, and Realism (review)
    Philosophical Review 117 (4): 630-633. 2008.
  •  58
    How to defend response moralism
    British Journal of Aesthetics 49 (3): 241-255. 2009.
    Here I defend response moralism, the view that some emotional responses to fi ctions are morally right, and others morally wrong, from the objection that responses to merely fi ctional characters and events cannot be morally evaluated. I defend the view that emotional responses to fi ctions can be morally evaluated only to the extent that said responses are responses to real people and events.
  •  485
    David Lewis maintained that epistemological contextualism (on which the truth-conditions for utterances of “S knows p” change in different contexts depending on the salient “alternative possibilities”) could solve the problem of skepticism as well as the Gettier problem. Contextualist approaches to skepticism have become commonplace, if not orthodox, in epistemology. But not so for contextualist approaches to the Gettier problem: the standard approach to this has been to add an “anti-luck” condi…Read more
  •  59
    The Norm of Belief (review)
    Philosophical Review 124 (2): 272-275. 2015.
  •  147
    Color objectivism and color projectivism
    with Edward Wilson Averill
    Philosophical Psychology 24 (6). 2011.
    Objectivism and projectivism are standardly taken to be incompatible theories of color. Here we argue that this incompatibility is only apparent: objectivism and projectivism, properly articulated so as to deal with basic objections, are in fundamental agreement about the ontology of color and the phenomenology of color perception