Vanderbilt University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2004
Johnson City, Tennessee, United States of America
  •  208
    Practical Conflicts
    Philosophical Review 116 (4): 654-656. 2007.
    This volume contains contributions on different aspects of practical conflicts by: Peter Baumann Monika Betzler Ruth Chang Jon Elster Barbara Guckes Christine M. Korsgaard Isaac Levi Alfred R. Mele Joseph Raz Henry S. Richardson Peter Schaber J. David Velleman Nicholas White.
  •  31
    Moral rationalism and psychopathy: Affective responses to reason
    Philosophical Psychology 30 (7): 855-877. 2017.
    Evidence suggests that psychopaths’ notoriously immoral behavior is due to affective rather than rational deficits. This evidence could be taken to show that, contrary to moral rationalism, moral norms are not norms of reason. Rationalists could reply either that psychopaths’ behavior is in fact primarily due to rational deficits or that affects are involved in responding to rational norms. Drawing on the work of Antonio Damasio and colleagues, I argue the latter is the better defense of moral r…Read more
  •  794
    Rational Epistemic Akrasia
    American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2): 113-24. 2012.
    Epistemic akrasia arises when one holds a belief even though one judges it to be irrational or unjustified. While there is some debate about whether epistemic akrasia is possible, this paper will assume for the sake of argument that it is in order to consider whether it can be rational. The paper will show that it can. More precisely, cases can arise in which both the belief one judges to be irrational and one’s judgment of it are epistemically rational in the sense that both are supported by…Read more
  •  113
    Explaining the Value of Truth
    American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2): 105-115. 2009.
    Truth is a value in that sense that a belief is good (or successful, or correct) just in case it is true. But it does not follow that truth is a good-making property, nor does it follow that the nature of truth explains its value. Instead, this paper argues that the nature of belief explains its value.
  •  636
    The Enkratic Requirement
    European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2): 320-333. 2013.
    : Agents are enkratic when they intend to do what they believe they should. That rationality requires you to be enkratic is uncontroversial, yet you may be enkratic in a way that does not exhibit any rationality on your part. Thus, what I call the enkratic requirement demands that you be enkratic in the right way. In particular, I will argue that it demands that you base your belief about what you should do and your intention to do it on the same considerations. The idea is that, if you base you…Read more