•  406
    The Problem of Perception
    Harvard University Press. 2002.
    The Problem of Perception offers two arguments against direct realism--one concerning illusion, and one concerning hallucination--that no current theory of ...
  •  321
    Translucent experiences
    Philosophical Studies 140 (2): 197--212. 2008.
    This paper considers the claim that perceptual experience is “transparent”, in the sense that nothing other than the apparent public objects of perception are available to introspection by the subject of such experience. I revive and strengthen the objection that blurred vision constitutes an insuperable objection to the claim, and counter recent responses to the general objection. Finally the bearing of this issue on representationalist accounts of the mind is considered.
  •  306
    Disjunctivism and illusion
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2): 384-410. 2010.
  •  255
    Husserl and externalism
    Synthese 160 (3): 313-333. 2008.
    It is argued that Husserl was an “externalist” in at least one sense. For it is argued that Husserl held that genuinely perceptual experiences—that is to say, experiences that are of some real object in the world—differ intrinsically, essentially and as a kind from any hallucinatory experiences. There is, therefore, no neutral “content” that such perceptual experiences share with hallucinations, differing from them only over whether some additional non-psychological condition holds or not. In sh…Read more
  •  212
    In defence of direct realism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2): 411-424. 2006.
    In her careful consideration of my book, The Problem of Perception, Susanna Siegel highlights what she takes to be a number of shortcomings in the work. First, she suggests that a sense-datum theorist has two options—what she calls the “complex sense-data option” and the “two-factor option”—that survive the argument of my book unscathed. I consider these two options in the first two sections of this reply. Secondly, she criticizes my suggestion that there are three and only three basic and indep…Read more
  •  129
    Natural kind terms: A neo-Lockean theory
    European Journal of Philosophy 13 (1). 2005.
  •  89
    Descartes and the Late Scholastics
    Mind 111 (442): 360-363. 2002.
  •  6
    Natural Kind Terms: A Neo‐Lockean Theory
    European Journal of Philosophy 13 (1): 70-88. 2005.
  •  3
    In Defence of Direct Realism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2): 411-424. 2007.
    In her careful consideration of my book, The Problem of Perception (henceforth, PP), Susanna Siegel highlights what she takes to be a number of shortcomings in the work. First, she suggests that a sense‐datum theorist has two options–what she calls the “complex sense‐data option” and the “two‐factor option”–that survive the argument of my book unscathed. I consider these two options in the first two sections of this reply. Secondly, she criticizes my suggestion that there are three and only thre…Read more
  •  3
    Edmund Husserl
    In John Shand (ed.), Central Works of Philosophy, Volume 4: The Twentieth Century: Moore to Popper, Mcgill-queen's University Press. pp. 38-53. 2006.