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1077Moral Hedging and Responding to ReasonsPacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3): 765-789. 2019.In this paper, I argue that the fetishism objection to moral hedging fails. The objection rests on a reasons-responsiveness account of moral worth, according to which an action has moral worth only if the agent is responsive to moral reasons. However, by adopting a plausible theory of non-ideal moral reasons, one can endorse a reasons-responsiveness account of moral worth while maintaining that moral hedging is sometimes an appropriate response to moral uncertainty. Thus, the theory of moral wor…Read more
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765Non-ideal prescriptions for the morally uncertainPhilosophical Studies 179 (4): 1039-1064. 2021.Morally speaking, what should one do when one is morally uncertain? Call this the Moral Uncertainty Question. In this paper, I argue that a non-ideal moral theory provides the best answer to the Moral Uncertainty Question. I begin by arguing for a strong ought-implies-can principle---morally ought implies agentially can---and use that principle to clarify the structure of a compelling non-ideal moral theory. I then describe the ways in which one's moral uncertainty affects one's moral prescripti…Read more
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617Particularism Doesn’t FlattenJournal of Moral Philosophy 13 (3): 339-362. 2016.Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge object that moral particularism ‘flattens the moral landscape’, that is, that particularism treats reasons of different kinds as if they were reasons of the same kind. This objection is misguided in two respects. First, particularists need not say that every feature can be a moral reason. Second, even if particularists were committed to saying that every feature can be a moral reason, they would still not be committed to the view that every feature can have direc…Read more
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534Moral Uncertainty and Value ComparisonIn Russ Shafer Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 13, . pp. 161-183. 2018.Several philosophers have recently argued that decision-theoretic frameworks for rational choice under risk fail to provide prescriptions for choice in cases of moral uncertainty. They conclude that there are no rational norms that are “sensitive” to a decision-maker's moral uncertainty. But in this paper, I argue that one sometimes has a rational obligation to take one's moral uncertainty into account in the course of moral deliberation. I first provide positive motivation for the view that one…Read more
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503Dispensing with the Subjective Moral 'Ought'In Mark C. Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 11. 2022.There are cases in which, intuitively, an agent’s action is both morally right in one sense, and morally wrong in another sense. Such cases (along with other intuitions about blameless wrongdoing and action-guidance) support distinguishing between the objective moral ‘ought’ and the subjective moral ‘ought.’ This chapter argues against drawing this distinction, on the grounds that the prescriptions delivered by an adequate objective moral theory must be sensitive to the mental states of agents. …Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Moral Uncertainty |
Moral Reasoning and Motivation |
Moral Responsibility |
Moral Epistemology |
Meta-Ethics |