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Caring for Liberalism brings together chapters that explore how liberal political theory, in its many guises, might be modified or transformed to take the fact of dependency on board. In addressing the place of care in liberalism, this collection advances the idea that care ethics can help respond to legitimate criticisms from feminists who argue that liberalism ignores issues of race, class, and ethnicity. The chapters do not simply add care to existing liberal political frameworks; rather, they explore how integrating dependency might leave core components of the traditional liberal philosophical apparatus intact, while transforming other aspects of it. Additionally, the contributors address the design of social and political institutions through which care is given and received, with special attention paid to non-Western care practices. This book will appeal to scholars working on liberalism in philosophy, political science, law, and public policy, and it is a must-read for feminist political philosophers.

Contributing to the debate on the compatibility of feminism and liberalism, I argue that much feminist rejection of liberalism rests on associating the latter with a number of unattractive theses that are not necessary to liberal theory. I develop a feminist liberalism and make the case that Habermas', rather than Rawls', recent work in political theory provides a theoretical basis for such a liberalism. This liberalism is sensitive in the right way to the moral-political relevance of gender difference, especially in the way it places relationships of human dependency characteristic of women's lives in the center of a conception of justice

This paper is a philosophical reconstruction of Elizabeth Fox-Genovese's thinking about women and feminism, and an inquiry into whether there is a conservative form of feminism. The paper argues that Fox-Genovese's endorsement of conventional social forms (like traditional marriage, motherhood, and sexual morality) contrasts strongly with feminism's criticism of these forms, and feminism's claim that they should be transformed. The paper concludes, however, that one need not call Fox-Genovese's thought "feminist" to recognize it as serious advocacy on behalf of women and to include it in discussions about what is good for women