Amy Seymour

Standard practice in philosophy of religion is to evaluate certain theological positions with respect to how well they comport with desirable philosophical positions and vice versa. Objections to skeptical theism generally posit that the position requires an unacceptable level of skepticism. Compatibility with the doctrine of the resurrection is used in an attempt to break ties in the debate between dualists and materialists about human persons. And so forth. In this chapter, I undertake such a discussion regarding theories of time and the nature of the atonement. One’s views about the metaphysics of time can be used to help clarify one’s views about the nature of atonement, and vice versa. To this end, I discuss the current advantages and disadvantages presentism and eternalism have with respect to atonement theory and provide direction for future conversation.

Bailey (2021) offers a clever argument for the compatibility of determinism and moral responsibility based on the nature of intrinsic intentions. The argument is mistaken on two counts. First, it is invalid. Second, even setting that first point aside, the argument proves too much: we would be blameworthy in paradigm cases of non-blameworthiness. I conclude that we cannot reason from intentions to responsibility solely from the “inside out”—our possessing a blameworthy intention cannot tell us whether this intention is also blameworthy in deterministic worlds.