Anderson De Paula De Paula Borges

My purpose in this essay is to make some remarks about the Digression of the Theaetetus. I shall argue that one central aim of the Digression is to show that there is a conflict between two ways of life: the life of the philosopher and the life of people get involved in politics. In the first part of this paper I make some considerations on the relationship between the Prologue and the trial of Socrates. In the second part I examine the moral of the Digression from the perspective of Socrates‟ account of Protagoras‟ epistemology.

My purpose in this essay is to make some remarks about the Digression of the Theaetetus. I shall argue that one central aim of the Digression is to show that there is a conflict between two ways of life: the life of the philosopher and the life of people get involved in politics. In the first part of this paper I make some considerations on the relationship between the Prologue and the trial of Socrates. In the second part I examine the moral of the Digression from the perspective of Socrates‟ account of Protagoras‟ epistemology.

My purpose in this essay is to make some remarks about the Digression of the Theaetetus. I shall argue that one central aim of the Digression is to show that there is a conflict between two ways of life: the life of the philosopher and the life of people get involved in politics. In the first part of this paper I make some considerations on the relationship between the Prologue and the trial of Socrates. In the second part I examine the moral of the Digression from the perspective of Socrates‟ account of Protagoras‟ epistemology.

The aim of this paper is to make a brief discussion about three aspects that characterize the Socrates's Dream in the Theaetetus . First, I comment the function of the Dream in the context of the third definition of knowledge. Them I move on the text and examine some questions concerning the notion of logos in 201 d -202 c . In the last section I discuss the problem of perception of the stoicheia . At this point I refuse the thesis, defended by some interpreters, that Plato puts the stoicheia in the same perceptual condition of the sensibles as they are described in the Theaetetus 184-6. &nbsp

The goal of this paper is to examine the cognitive limits of aisthêsis in 184-6 of Plato’s Theaetetus. The options are: aisthêsis as ‘bare sensation’ and aisthêsis as ‘perceptual judgment’. I argue that Plato ignores the tension between these two alternatives because he is describing the whole process of perception as containing both. My focus is the text at 184-5, but first I make some preliminary comments, from a synoptic perspective, about what Plato is doing in the context of the argument. After that, I move on the text, offering translations and interpretations of the relevant parts. I also discuss some of Cornford and Cooper’s ideas about Theaetetus 184-6.