• The Second Person in Dialogue
    Philosophy International Journal 6 (S1): 1-8. 2023.
    I first present a conception of the relata involved in the dialogic relation. I and thou are persons endowed with a first-person perspective and concepts through which they can represent themselves as distinct of anyone or anything else. Then I briefly discuss the epistemology and metaphysics of persons as agents. I adopt a realist view against any epistemological projects denying (or feigning to deny) the existence of the second person. Then I expose the complementary view of the secondperson p…Read more
  •  8
    Artefacts: the big picture in broad terms
    Filosofia Unisinos 22 (1): 40-47. 2021.
    My aim in this programmatic paper is to explore the relationship among three important notions: intentionality, disposition and artefact. There wouldn’t be artefacts without what I call “intentional work,” a sustained activity directed to the production of some good. I first present contextualism as a method. Then I use it to delimit the problematic concept ARTEFACT, with the intention to apply it to repertoires of mental dispositions that affect directly our personal identity. The unavoidable b…Read more
  •  19
    Actualism and Fictional Characters
    Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 20 (1): 61-80. 2016.
    In what follows, I present only part of a program that consists in developing a version of actualism as an adequate framework for the metaphysics of intentionality. I will try to accommodate in that framework suggestions found in Kripke’s works and some positions developed by Amie Thomasson. What should we change if we accept “fictional entities” in the domain of the actual world? Actualism is the thesis that everything that exists belongs to the domain of the actual world and that there are no …Read more
  •  23
    Intentionality and Continuity of Experience
    Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 21 (2): 235-249. 2017.
    My aim is to provide an analysis of cognitive experience from the point of view of philosophy of mind, by identifying and describing different components or features present in it. But different things are called ‘experience’ and some are more complex than other. I will first examine different uses of the word ‘experience’ to clear the way and to avoid cases of circularity. Then I try to restrict the investigation and introduce the mode and content of experience, and take BonJour’s suggestion of…Read more
  •  15
    Mente e “mente”
    Revista de Filosofia Aurora 22 (30): 13. 2010.
  •  80
    Fallibilism, Demonstrative Thoughts and Russellian Propositions
    Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 5 (1-2): 43-54. 2001.
    Russellian or singular propositions are very useful in semantics to specify "what has been said" by a literal and serious utterance of a sentence containing a proper name, an indexical or a demonstrative, or for modeling demonstrative thoughts. I3ased on an example given by S. Guttenplan, I construct a case showing that if our only option for modeling demonstrative thoughts is a singular proposition à la Russell, we run the risk of admitting infallible empirical (existential) beliefs. I defend t…Read more
  •  11
    Davidson's Externalism and Swampman's Troublesome Biography
    Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 9 (1-2). 2005.
    After the seminal works of Putnam (1975), Burge (1979), and Kripke (1982), the next important contribution to externalism is certainly Davidson’s (mainly 1987, 1988, 1989, 2001). By criticizing the posi-tions of these philosophers, Davidson elaborated his own brand of exter-nalism. We shall first present some features of Davidson’s externalism (the importance of historical-causal connections for the foundation of language and thought, for the explanation of how language can be learned, and how a…Read more
  •  61
    Quine on Logic, Propositional Attitudes, and the Unity of Knowledge
    Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 7 (1-2): 131-145. 2003.
    I shall examine Quine’s conception of logic, of propositional attitudes, and of the unity of knowledge in order to show that there are some tensions in Quine’s system. I first propose a conception of the use or application of logic, stating that logic strictly speaking applies to intentional phenomena or to things that presuppose the existence of intentional phenomena. Then, I consider briefly Quine’s philosophy of logic and discuss some issues. In Quine’s philosophy, logic stays at the very cen…Read more
  • From the mystery to the problem of consciousness
    Revue Internationale de Philosophie 55 (216): 269-275. 2001.
  •  15
    Pourquoi le Grundgedanke (T. 4.0312) de Wittgenstein est si "fondamental"?
    Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 2 (2): 183-204. 1998.
    La pensée fondamentale de Wittgenstein affirme que les constantes logiques ne représentent pas, ne fonctionnent pas sémantiquement comme des noms. En apparence truiviale, cette pensée, nous le montrerons, à des ramifications étonnantes dans la philosophie du premier wittgenstein, en ce qui concerne partmulzer sa conception de la logique. Notre but est d'interpréter l'aphorisme en question (T 4.0312) en montrant comment il se rapporte aux thèses et théories les plus importantes du Tractatus, et c…Read more
  •  11
    “Ce qui est dit”: Trois figures historiques
    Manuscrito 29 (2): 499-524. 2006.
    Je présente d’abord quelques notions de base de la sémantique philosophique, en particulier celles de signification linguistique, compré-hension linguistique, conditions de vérité, et “ce qui est dit”. La signi-fication linguistique ne doit pas être confondue avec “ce qui est dit” par l’énonciation littérale d’une phrase en contexte, cette dernière notion, centrale dans le contextualisme actuel, pouvant être reconstruite comme sémantique ou pragmatique selon le rôle que l’on fait jouer à la noti…Read more
  •  29
    Operações sociais da mente
    Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 55 (2): 108-125. 2010.
    Thomas Reid introduced the notion of social operation of mind in the theory of mind and language. Hhis friend James Gregory developed this notion and gave it a meaningful role in classical Uuniversal Grammar, especially in the General Theory of the Mmoods of Vverbs. Bbefore Reid and Gregory, the classical Philosophical Grammar presupposes, inter alia, that the mind is self-contained; in other words, that mental contents and operations are all independent from the natural and social environment. …Read more
  • Guy Bouchard, Le Procès de la métaphore Reviewed by
    Philosophy in Review 5 (6): 240-242. 1985.
  • Benoît de Cornulier, Effets de sens (review)
    Philosophy in Review 7 95-98. 1987.
  • Pourquoi le Grundgedanke de Wittgenstein est si “Fondamental”?
    Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 2 (2). 1998.
    La pensée fondamentale de Wittgenstein affirme que les constantes logiques ne représentent pas, ne fonctionnent pas sémantiquement comme des noms. En apparence triviale, cette pensée, nous le montrerons, à des ramifications étonnantes dans la philosophie du premier Wittgenstein, en particulier en ce qui concerne sa conception de la logique. Notre but est d'interpréter l'aphorisme en question en montrant comment il se rapporte aux thèses et théories les plus importantes du Tractatus, et comment i…Read more
  •  12
    Meanings, actions and agreements
    Manuscrito 32 (1): 249-282. 2009.
    The aim of this paper is to show that the plasticity of sense, the fact that tokens of the same type frequently express different Sinne, does not constitute a threat to human linguistic communication. The first part presents the phenomenon. I try to make clear that the appropriate notion of meaning for natural languages is not the one developed in logical semantics; meanings in natural languages are not fixed once and for all, stable. Consequently, What Is Said by an utterance is not something d…Read more
  •  56
    After the seminal works of Putnam (1975), Burge (1979), and Kripke (1982), the next important contribution to externalism is certainly Davidson’s (mainly 1987, 1988, 1989, 2001). By criticizing the positions of these philosophers, Davidson elaborated his own brand of externalism. We shall first present some features of Davidson’s externalism (the importance of historical-causal connections for the foundation of language and thought, for the explanation of how language can be learned, and how att…Read more
  • Preface
    Manuscrito 29 (2): 315-317. 2006.
  •  14
    C'est dans leur théorie générale des modes verbaux que les grammairiens philosophes classiques ont essayé de rendre compte de ce que nous appelons aujourd'hui les « aspects illocutoires de la signification », et de formuler les principes d'une sémantique des énoncés non déclaratifs. Je voudrais montrer, dans cette étude, ce qui fait l'originalité de la position adoptée par les grammairiens philosophes dans le cadre de leur théorie « idéationnelle » du langage : tout en reconnaissant la nécessité…Read more
  • Guy Bouchard, Le Procès de la métaphore (review)
    Philosophy in Review 5 240-242. 1985.
    Sur la définition de la métaphore et sur son rôle, un débat majeur a opposé Jacques Derrida et Paul Ricoeur. Cet ouvrage enregistre les plaidoiries du pseudo-apôtre de la métaphore "morte" et du champion de la métaphore métaphoriquement vive. Il les met en perspective en citant à comparaître les théoriciens du trope de la ressemblance depuis Aristote jusqu'à Searle, depuis la poétique et la rhétoriques anciennes jusqu'à la pragmatique contemporaine. Ce procès de la métaphore dissout l'opposition…Read more
  •  15
    Os demonstrativos foram considerados tradicionalmente como expressões referenciais. É o que encontramos na história da filosofia desde o início da tradição gramatical ocidental que sempre tratou os demonstrativos como pronomes. A maior provocação no livro de King consiste precisamente em romper com essa tradição ao apresentar os demonstrativos complexos (“esta mesa”, “aquele homem” etc.) como termos quantificados (e, portanto, termos não-referenciais). King apóia seu tratamento sobre exemplos es…Read more
  •  59
    Leclerc-Andre_Spontaneous-linguistic-understanding