•  59
    Descartes on Selfhood, Conscientia, the First Person and Beyond
    In Andrea Strazzoni & Marco Sgarbi (eds.), Reading Descartes: Consciousness, Body, and Reasoning, Firenze University Press. pp. 9-40. 2023.
    I discuss Descartes’ metaphysics of selfhood, and relevant parts of contemporary philosophy regarding the first person. My two main concerns are the controversy that surrounds Descartes’ conception of conscientia, mistranslated as ‘consciousness’, and his conception of selfhood and its essential connection to conscientia. ‘I’-thoughts give rise to the most challenging philosophical questions. An answer to the questions concerning the peculiarities of the first person, self-identification and sel…Read more
  •  19
    First, I offer a solution to the metaphysical problem of the mind–body relation, drawing on the fact of its distinctness in kind. Secondly, I demonstrate how, contrary to what is denied, Descartes’ metaphysical commitments allow for the intellect's clear and distinct conception of the mind–body union. Central to my two-fold defence is a novel account of the metaphysics of Descartes’ Causal Principle: its neutrality, and the unanalysable, fundamental nature of causality. Without the presuppositio…Read more
  •  14
    This re-examination of the cogito is prompted by a substantive question which has not previously been identified: the distinguishability of the I or self. Consequently, its force has not been addre...
  •  26
    Human Rationality: Descartes and Aristotle
    Philosophical Investigations 44 (3): 217-236. 2021.
    Current debates on human rationality are divided between what Matthew Boyle calls the additive and transformative approaches. My concern is not with the current debate, but with Boyle’s alignment of Descartes and Aristotle with the modern approaches, directing his criticisms against the former, and his defence in support of the latter. What motivates my enquiry is whether Boyle’s use of the two philosophers’ theses stands up to scrutiny and consequently whether his alignments are cogent. I focus…Read more
  •  23
    The Will to Reason: Theodicy and Freedom in Descartes
    Philosophical Review 127 (4): 519-523. 2018.
    Review of C.P. Ragland's The Will to Reason Theodicy and Freedom in Descartes.
  •  29
    Self-Consciousness and the Double Immunity
    Philosophy 75 (4): 539-569. 2000.
    It is accepted that first-person thoughts are immune to error through misidentification. I argue that there is also immunity to error through misascription, failure to recognise which has resulted in mistaken claims that first-person thoughts involving the self-ascription of bodily states are, at best, circumstantially immune to error through misidentification relative to ‘I’ and, at worst, subject to error. Central to my thesis is that, first, ‘I’ is immune to error through misidentification ab…Read more
  •  61
    Subjectivity and the First Person
    Philosophical Inquiry 21 (3-4): 1-27. 1999.
  •  115
    Descartes on Freedom, Truth, and Goodness
    Noûs 43 (4): 633-655. 2009.
    Freedom is the least discussed thesis of Descartes' works. Two major issues are: (i) the Fourth Meditation is seen as an unfounded theodicy, an interlude, an interruption to the analytic order; (ii)some passages in Descartes' other works are seen as inconsistent with the Fourth Meditation. First, I argue that Descartes' treatment is philosophical, that freedom underlies his entire philosophical project, defending the indispensability of the Fourth to his metaphysics.I demonstrate that Descartes'…Read more
  •  74
    God, physicalism, and the totality of facts
    Philosophy 82 (4): 515-542. 2007.
    The paper offers a general critique of physicalism and of one variety of nonphysicalism, arguing that such theses are untenable. By distinguishing between the absolute conception of reality and the causal completeness of physics it shows that the 'explanatory gap' is not merely epistemic but metaphysical. It defends the essential subjectivity and unity of consciousness and its inseparability from a self-conscious autonomous rational and moral being. Casting a favourable light on dualism freed fr…Read more
  •  20
    I offer a new understanding of Descartes’ metaphysics, arguing that his primary question is ‘what is real and true?’ – not as we have been accustomed to believe, ‘how can I be certain?’ – an inquiry that requires both reason’s authority and freedom’s autonomy. I argue that without freedom and its internal relation to reason, Descartes’ undertaking would not get off the ground; yet that relation has gone unnoticed by successive studies of his philosophy. I demonstrate that it is only when we gras…Read more
  •  114
    Descartes' dualism: Correcting some misconceptions
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (2): 215-238. 2001.
    Citation: Christofidou, A.. Descartes' Dualism: Correcting Some Misconceptions. Journal of the History of Philosophy 39:2 , 215-238. © Journal of the History of Philosophy. Reprinted with permission of The Johns Hopkins University Press
  •  110
    Descartes' Dualism: Correcting Some Misconceptions
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (2): 215-238. 2001.
    Citation: Christofidou, A.. Descartes' Dualism: Correcting Some Misconceptions. Journal of the History of Philosophy 39:2 , 215-238. © Journal of the History of Philosophy. Reprinted with permission of The Johns Hopkins University Press
  •  128
    Self and self-consciousness: Aristotelian ontology and cartesian duality
    Philosophical Investigations 32 (2): 134-162. 2009.
    The relationship between self-consciousness, Aristotelian ontology, and Cartesian duality is far closer than it has been thought to be. There is no valid inference either from considerations of Aristotle's hylomorphism or from the phenomenological distinction between body and living body, to the undermining of Cartesian dualism. Descartes' conception of the self as both a reasoning and willing being informs his conception of personhood; a person for Descartes is an unanalysable, integrated, self…Read more
  •  2
    Freedom and its internal relation to reason is fundamental to Descartes’ philosophy in general, and to his _Meditations on First Philosophy_ in particular. Without freedom his entire enquiry would not get off the ground, and without understanding the rôle of freedom in his work, we could not understand what motivates key parts of his metaphysics. Yet, not only is freedom a relatively overlooked element, but its internal relation to reason has gone unnoticed by most studies of his philosophy. Sel…Read more
  •  95
    First person: The demand for identification-free self-reference
    Journal of Philosophy 92 (4): 223-234. 1995.
    I defend the thesis that identification-free self-reference is immune to error through mis-identification because even though self-reference and self-identification are distinct, they are not separable. This provides a critique and a reductio of Carol Rovane’s neo-Lockean analysis of ‘I’ in terms of a definite description, since no definite description or proper name can be substituted salva sensu or salva veritate for the singular term ‘I’. Furthermore, I distinguish between self-identificati…Read more
  •  86
    Self-consciousness and the double immunity
    Philosophy 75 (294): 539-570. 2000.
    It is accepted that first-person thoughts are immune to error through misidentification. I argue that there is also immunity to error through misascription, failure to recognise which has resulted in mistaken claims that first-person thoughts involving the self-ascription of bodily states are, at best, circumstantially immune to error through misidentification relative to.
  • The Self and the Objective World
    Skepsis: A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research 10. 1999.
  •  15
    First Person: The Demand for Identification-Free Self-Reference
    Journal of Philosophy 92 (4): 223-234. 1995.
    I defend the thesis that identification-free self-reference is immune to error through mis-identification because even though self-reference and self-identification are distinct, they are not separable. This provides a critique and a reductio of Carol Rovane’s neo-Lockean analysis of ‘I’ in terms of a definite description, since no definite description or proper name can be substituted salva sensu or salva veritate for the singular term ‘I’. Furthermore, I distinguish between self-identificati…Read more