•  523
    Faultless or Disagreeement
    In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Max Kolbel (eds.), Relative Truth, Oxford University Press. pp. 287. 2008.
    Among the various motivations that may lead to the idea that truth is relative in some non-conventional sense, one is that the idea helps explain how there can be ‘‘ faultless disagreements’’, that is, situations in which a person A judges that p, a person B judges that not-p, but neither A nor B is at fault. The line of argument goes as follows. It seems that there are faultless disagreements. For example, A and B may disagree on culinary matters without either A or B being at fault. But standa…Read more
  •  462
    Quantification and Logical Form
    In Alessandro Torza (ed.), Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and Quantifiers, Springer. pp. 125-140. 2015.
    This paper deals with the logical form of quantified sentences. Its purpose is to elucidate one plausible sense in which quantified sentences can adequately be represented in the language of first-order logic. Section 1 introduces some basic notions drawn from general quantification theory. Section 2 outlines a crucial assumption, namely, that logical form is a matter of truth-conditions. Section 3 shows how the truth-conditions of quantified sentences can be represented in the language of first…Read more
  •  438
    Ockhamism without Thin Red Lines
    Synthese 191 (12): 2633-2652. 2014.
    This paper investigates the logic of Ockhamism, a view according to which future contingents are either true or false. Several attempts have been made to give rigorous shape to this view by defining a suitable formal semantics, but arguably none of them is fully satisfactory. The paper draws attention to some problems that beset such attempts, and suggests that these problems are different symptoms of the same initial confusion, in that they stem from the unjustified assumption that the actual c…Read more
  •  405
    Two Notions of Logical Form
    Journal of Philosophy 113 (12): 617-643. 2016.
    This paper claims that there is no such thing as the correct answer to the question of what is logical form: two significantly different notions of logical form are needed to fulfil two major theoretical roles that pertain respectively to logic and semantics. The first part of the paper outlines the thesis that a unique notion of logical form fulfils both roles, and argues that the alleged best candidate for making it true is unsuited for one of the two roles. The second part spells out a consid…Read more
  •  375
    Counterfactuals as Strict Conditionals
    Disputatio 7 (41): 165-191. 2015.
    This paper defends the thesis that counterfactuals are strict conditionals. Its purpose is to show that there is a coherent view according to which counterfactuals are strict conditionals whose antecedent is stated elliptically. Section 1 introduces the view. Section 2 outlines a response to the main argument against the thesis that counterfactuals are strict conditionals. Section 3 compares the view with a proposal due to Aqvist, which may be regarded as its direct predecessor. Sections 4 and 5…Read more
  •  311
    Vagueness and Quantification
    Journal of Philosophical Logic (5): 1-24. 2015.
    This paper deals with the question of what it is for a quantifier expression to be vague. First it draws a distinction between two senses in which quantifier expressions may be said to be vague, and provides an account of the distinction which rests on independently grounded assumptions. Then it suggests that, if some further assumptions are granted, the difference between the two senses considered can be represented at the formal level. Finally, it outlines some implications of the account prov…Read more
  •  266
    Petitio principii: What's wrong?
    Facta Philosophica 7 (1): 19-34. 2005.
    One of the most common strategies in philosophical dispute is that of accusing the opponent of begging the question, that is, of assuming or presupposing what is to be proved. Thus, it happens quite often that the credibility of a philosophical argument is infected by the suspicion of begging the question. In many cases it is an open question whether the suspicion is grounded, and the answer lurks somewhere in the dark of what the proponent of the argument does not say. This is why it may take y…Read more
  •  216
    Ockhamism and Quantified Modal Logic
    Logique Et Analyse 58 353-370. 2015.
    This paper outlines a formal account of tensed sentences that is consistent with Ockhamism, a view according to which future contingents are either true or false. The account outlined substantively differs from the attempts that have been made so far to provide a formal apparatus for such a view in terms of some expressly modified version of branching time semantics. The system on which it is based is the simplest quantified modal logic.
  •  183
    Saying More (or Less) than One Thing
    In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds, Oxford University Press. 2010.
    In a paper called 'Definiteness and Knowability', Tim Williamson addresses the question whether one must accept that vagueness is an epistemic phenomenon if one adopts classical logic and a disquotational principle for truth. Some have suggested that one must not, hence that classical logic and the disquotational principle may be preserved without endorsing epistemicism. Williamson’s paper, however, finds ‘no plausible way of substantiating that possibility’. Its moral is that ‘either classical …Read more
  •  171
    Counterfactual Fallacies
    Humana Mente 4 (19). 2011.
    A widely accepted claim about counterfactuals is that they differ from strict conditionals, that is, there is no adequate representation of them as sentences of the form   . To justify this claim, Stalnaker and Lewis have argued that some fallacious inferences would turn out valid if counterfactuals were so represented. However, their argument has a flaw, as it rests on a questionable assumption about the relation between surface grammar and logical form. Without that assumption, no conseque…Read more
  •  157
    Modal Predicates
    Australasian Journal of Logic 2 44-69. 2004.
    Despite the wide acceptance of standard modal logic, there has always been a temptation to think that ordinary modal discourse may be correctly analyzed and adequately represented in terms of predicates rather than in terms of operators. The aim of the formal model outlined in this paper is to capture what I take to be the only plausible sense in which ‘possible’ and ‘necessary’ can be treated as predicates. The model is built by enriching the language of standard modal logic with a quantificati…Read more
  •  149
    TxW Epistemic Modality
    Logic and Philosophy of Science 10 3-14. 2012.
    So far, T×W frames have been employed to provide a semantics for a language of tense logic that includes a modal operator that expresses historical necessity. The operator is defined in terms of quantification over possible courses of events that satisfy a certain constraint, namely, that of being alike up to a given point. However, a modal operator can as well be defined without placing that constraint. This paper outlines a T×W logic where an operator of the latter kind is used to express the …Read more
  •  130
    Are there propositions?
    Erkenntnis 58 (3). 2003.
  •  110
    Logical Form and Truth-Conditions
    Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 28 (3): 439-457. 2013.
    This paper outlines a truth-conditional view of logical form, that is, a view according to which logical form is essentially a matter of truth-conditions. The main motivation for the view is a fact that seems crucial to logic. As _§_1 suggests, fundamental logical relations such as entailment or contradiction can formally be explained only if truth-conditions are formally represented.§2 spells out the view. _§_3 dwells on its anity with a conception of logical form that has been defended in the …Read more
  •  89
    Over the past few years, the tree model of time has been widely employed to deal with issues concerning the semantics of tensed discourse. The thought that has motivated its adoption is that the most plausible way to make sense of indeterminism is to conceive of future possibilities as branches that depart from a common trunk, constituted by the past and the present. However, the thought still needs to be further articulated and defended, and several important questions remain open, such as the …Read more
  •  77
    Future Contingents and Aristotle’s Fantasy
    Critica 39 (117): 45-60. 2007.
    This paper deals with the problem of future contingents, and focuses on two classical logical principles, excluded middle and bivalence. One may think that different attitudes are to be adopted towards these two principles in order to solve the problem. According to what seems to be a widely held hypothesis, excluded middle must be accepted while bivalence must be rejected. The paper goes against that line of thought. In the first place, it shows how the rejection of bivalence leads to implausib…Read more
  •  77
    Truth preservation in any context
    American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (2): 191. 2010.
    Many arguments are affected by context sensitivity, because they include sentences that have different truth conditions in different contexts. Therefore, it is natural to think that a general criterion for evaluating arguments must take context sensitivity into account. One way to give substance to that thought is provided by the definition of validity offered by David Kaplan within his theory of indexicals. However, the route indicated by Kaplan is hindered by a problem whose importance is ofte…Read more
  •  67
    Validity and Interpretation
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2): 247-264. 2010.
    This paper claims that there is a plausible sense in which validity is a matter of truth preservation relative to interpretations of the sentences that occur in an argument, although it is not the sense one might have in mind. §1 outlines three independent problems: the first is the paradox of the sorites, the second concerns the fallacy of equivocation, and the third arises in connection with the standard treatment of indexicals. §2 elucidates the claim about validity, while §§3-5 show how the …Read more
  •  59
    Rethinking Bivalence
    Synthese 146 (3): 283-302. 2005.
    Classical logic rests on the assumption that there are two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive truth values. This assumption has always been surrounded by philosophical controversy. Doubts have been raised about its legitimacy, and hence about the legitimacy of classical logic. Usually, the assumption is stated in the form of a general principle, namely the principle that every proposition is either true or false. Then, the philosophical controversy is often framed in terms of the question…Read more
  •  37
    The expressing relation
    Dialectica 56 (3). 2002.
    The paper deals with the question of what it is for a sentence to express a proposition. In the first part of the paper I argue that a certain notion of proposition widely adopted in contemporary philosophy is more theoretically loaded than is commonly assumed. The fact is that some properties are typically assigned to propositions, but no support for the claim that there are things with those properties can be found in the “evidence” from ordinary language. My point is that if we assume about p…Read more
  •  29
    Not Everything is Possible
    Logic Journal of the IGPL 15 (3): 233-237. 2007.
    This paper makes a point about the interpretation of the simplest quantified modal logic, that is, quantified modal logic with a single domain. It is commonly assumed that the domain in question is to be understood as the set of all possibile objects. The point of the paper is that this assumption is misguided.
  •  28
    True in a sense
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1): 141-154. 2006.
    The aim of this paper is to show that in order to make sense of the ascription of truth and falsity to the things we say it is essential to acknowledge a divergence between two basic intuitions. According to one of them it is plausible to talk of what is said as what the speaker has in mind. According to the other it is plausible to talk of what is said as the bearer of truth or falsity. The paper presents three cases in which these two intuitions seem not to coincide, and shows how this lack of…Read more
  •  21
    Logical form has always been a prime concern for philosophers belonging to the analytic tradition. For at least one century, the study of logical form has been widely adopted as a method of investigation, relying on its capacity to reveal the structure of thoughts or the constitution of facts. This book focuses on the very idea of logical form, which is directly relevant to any principled reflection on that method. Its central thesis is that there is no such thing as a correct answer to the ques…Read more
  •  12
    The Expressing Relation
    Dialectica 56 (3): 235-260. 2002.
    The paper deals with the question of what it is for a sentence to express a proposition. In the first part of the paper I argue that a certain notion of proposition widely adopted in contemporary philosophy is more theoretically loaded than is commonly assumed. The fact is that some properties are typically assigned to propositions, but no support for the claim that there are things with those properties can be found in the “evidence” from ordinary language. My point is that if we assume about p…Read more
  •  11
    Proposizioni
    Rivista di Filosofia 93 (1): 3-34. 2002.
  •  11
    Vagueness and Quantification
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (5): 579-602. 2016.
    This paper deals with the question of what it is for a quantifier expression to be vague. First it draws a distinction between two senses in which quantifier expressions may be said to be vague, and provides an account of the distinction which rests on independently grounded assumptions. Then it suggests that, if some further assumptions are granted, the difference between the two senses considered can be represented at the formal level. Finally, it outlines some implications of the account prov…Read more
  •  7
    Perelman in Italia
    Rivista di Filosofia 90 (1): 133-138. 1999.