•  11
    Voter incompetence and the legitimacy of representative democracy
    Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. forthcoming.
    Ever since its inception, democracy has been subjected to the objection that ordinary citizens are not fit to rule. I discuss and criticize the most influential contemporary version of this argument, due to Jason Brennan, according to which democracy is illegitimate because voters are incompetent. I accept two core premises of Brennan’s argument – that legitimacy requires competence, and that voters are incompetent (in the sense of competence Brennan accepts) – but reject the conclusion that rep…Read more
  •  36
    Democratic Decision Making and the Psychology of Risk
    Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 12 (1): 51-83. 2017.
    Andreas Christiansen,Bjørn Hallsson | : In many cases, the public want to restrict an activity or technology that they believe to be dangerous, but that scientific experts believe to be safe. There is thus a tension between respecting the preferences of the people and making policy based on our best scientific knowledge. Deciding how to make policy in the light of this tension requires an understanding of why citizens sometimes disagree with the experts on what is risky and what is safe. In this…Read more
  • The chapter discusses the use of machine analogies in biology from an ethical point of view. The chapter identifies a number of “antimachine” views – views that are critical of the use of machine analogies on ethical grounds. Such views typically object to machine analogies either because such analogies understand organisms in mechanistic terms or because they recommend viewing organisms as artifacts. According to antimachine views, understanding organisms mechanistically, or creating biological…Read more
  •  18
    On the Cognitive Argument for Cost-Benefit Analysis
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (2): 217-230. 2018.
    In a number of writings, Cass Sunstein has argued that we should use cost-benefit analysis as our primary approach to risk management, because cost-benefit analysis corrects for the cognitive biases that mar our thinking about risk. The paper critically evaluates this ‘cognitive argument for cost-benefit analysis’ and finds it wanting. Once we make distinctions between different cognitive errors and between different aspects of cost-benefit analysis, it becomes apparent that there are really two…Read more
  •  19
    Democratic Decision Making and the Psychology of Risk
    Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 12 (1): 51-83. 2017.
    Andreas Christiansen,Bjørn Hallsson | : In many cases, the public want to restrict an activity or technology that they believe to be dangerous, but that scientific experts believe to be safe. There is thus a tension between respecting the preferences of the people and making policy based on our best scientific knowledge. Deciding how to make policy in the light of this tension requires an understanding of why citizens sometimes disagree with the experts on what is risky and what is safe. In this…Read more
  •  56
    Does Controversial Science Call For Public Participation? The Case Of Gmo Skepticism
    Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 12 (1): 26-50. 2017.
    Andreas Christiansen,Karin Jonch-Clausen,Klemens Kappel | : Many instances of new and emerging science and technology are controversial. Although a number of people, including scientific experts, welcome these developments, a considerable skepticism exists among members of the public. The use of genetically modified organisms is a case in point. In science policy and in science communication, it is widely assumed that such controversial science and technology require public participation in the …Read more
  •  33
    Rationality, Expected Utility Theory and the Precautionary Principle
    Ethics, Policy and Environment 22 (1): 3-20. 2019.
    A common objection to the precautionary principle is that it is irrational. I argue that this objection goes beyond the often-discussed claim that the principle is incoherent. Instead, I argue, exp...
  •  91
    I discuss the moral significance of artificial life within synthetic biology via a discussion of Douglas, Powell and Savulescu's paper 'Is the creation of artificial life morally significant’. I argue that the definitions of 'artificial life’ and of 'moral significance’ are too narrow. Douglas, Powell and Savulescu's definition of artificial life does not capture all core projects of synthetic biology or the ethical concerns that have been voiced, and their definition of moral significance fails…Read more
  •  49
    Similarity Arguments in the Genetic Modification Debate
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2): 239-255. 2017.
    In the ethical debate on genetic modification, it is common to encounter the claim that some anti-GM argument would also apply an established, ethically accepted technology, and that the anti-GM argument is therefore unsuccessful. The paper discusses whether this argumentative strategy, the Similarity Argument, is sound. It presents a logically valid, generic form of the Similarity Argument and then shows that it is subject to three types of objection: It does not respect the difference between …Read more