Andrej Ule

In diesem Essay analysiert der Autor Wittgensteins Kritik an einigen Annahmen, die für einen Großteil der Kognitionswissenschaft von zentraler Bedeutung sind. Diese umfassen die Konzepte von komputationalen Prozessen im Gehirn, die mentale Zustände und Prozesse hervorbringen, die algorythmische Informationsprozessierung im Gehirn , das Gehirn als Maschine, den psychophysischen Parallelismus, die Denkmaschine sowie die Konfusion der Regel, die dem Benehmen folgt im Einklang mit dieser Regel. Nach des Autors Meinung haben die Theoretiker der Kognitionswissenschaft Wittgensteins Kritik noch immer nicht ernsthaft erörtert, so dass sie, was verwundern mag, häufig die Frage „Wie funktioniert das?“ mit der Frage „Was macht das?“ verwechseln. Doch ihr „verhängnisvollster“ Fehler besteht in der Verwechslung interner komputationaler Prozesse, die im Gehirn stattfinden mit sozialbegründeten, alltäglichen Kriterien des Erkennens und der Klassifizierung des Inhalts und des Wissens vom Inhalt mentaler Zustände

I discuss Gödel's cosmological proposals that seemingly allow time-loops and time-travel, and particularly Gödel's thesis that the objectivity of time-lapse is not guaranteed a priory but depends on the physical conditions in a cosmos. We could not 'define' a uniform world time-line regarding the mean state of motion of matter but some relative and partial time lapses which would appear as simultaneous for other observers. I believe that consciousness may posses many time-modalities, and the 'annihilation' of lapse of time is one of them. It could be that already the momentary recollection of the past events in our mind might indicate such a possibility. However it is an open question what this possibility means for the physical reality, or for the 'cosmos itself'?

I analyze some classical solutions of the skeptical argument and some of their week points (especially the contextualist solution). First I have proposed some possible improvement of the contextualist solution (the introduction of the explicit-implicit belief and knowledge distinction beside the differences in the relevance of some counter-factual alternatives). However, this solution does not block too fast jumps of the everyday context (where empirical knowledge is possible) into skeptical context (where empirical knowledge is impossible). Then I analyze some formal analogies between some modal arguments on the contingency of empirical facts (and the world as whole) and the skeptical arguments against empirical knowledge. I try to show that the skeptical conclusion “Empirical knowledge does not exist” is logically coherent with the thesis that they are empirical facts and that we have true belief on them. In order to do that without contradictions I have to accept a non-classical definition of knowledge: S knows that p:= S is not justified to allow that non-p. Knowledge and justified allowance function here as some pseudo-theoretical concepts which allow only some partial and conditional definitions by some “empirical” terms and logical conditions.

In this essay I analyse Wittgenstein’s criticism of several assumptions that are crucial for a large part of cognitive science. These involve the concepts of computational processes in the brain which cause mental states and processes, the algorithmic processing of information in the brain , the brain as a machine, psychophysical parallelism, the thinking machine, as well as the confusion of rule following with behaviour in accordance with the rule. In my opinion, the theorists of cognitive science have not yet seriously considered Wittgenstein’s criticism so they, quite surprisingly, frequently confuse the question “how does it work?” with “what does it do?” But their most “deleterious” mistake is their confusion of the internal computational processes taking place in the brain with socially-based, everyday criteria of recognition and classification of, and knowledge about, the content of mental states

Članak tematizira ulogu kompleksnog mišljenja u razvoju znanstvene spoznaje i mišljenja općenito. Po Vigotskom, kompleksno mišljenje je početna faza u ontogenezi, pa i filogenezi, ljudskog mišljenja i ono je u tom slijedu predpojmovno. Prema istom autoru, ono ima svoju unutarnju genezu koja započinje asocijativnim kompleksima, a završava pseudopojmovima. Kompleksno mišljenje je po svojoj bitifluidno, neograničeno i omogućuje prenošenje značenja. Smatramo da kompleksno mišljenje dolazi do izraza prije svega u uporabi metafora i analogija. Metafore i analogije imaju važnu eksplanatornu i ponekad čak heurističku ulogu u znanstvenom mišljenju. Kompleksno mišljenje dolazi do izražaja na svim razinama i etapama razvoja znanstvenog mišljenja. Metafore mogu biti dijelom kompleksnog mišljenja kao dominantnog načina mišljenja ili u pojmovnoj strukturi kao pomoćni elementi objašnjenja. Analogije predstavljaju izvjesno strukturiranje kompleksnog i pojmovnogmišljenja.Članak tematizira ulogu kompleksnog mišljenja u razvoju znanstvene spoznaje i mišljenja općenito. Po Vigotskom, kompleksno mišljenje je početna faza u ontogenezi, pa i filogenezi, ljudskog mišljenja i ono je u tom slijedu predpojmovno. Prema istom autoru, ono ima svoju unutarnju genezu koja započinje asocijativnim kompleksima, a završava pseudopojmovima. Kompleksno mišljenje je po svojoj bitifluidno, neograničeno i omogućuje prenošenje značenja. Smatramo da kompleksno mišljenje dolazi do izraza prije svega u uporabi metafora i analogija. Metafore i analogije imaju važnu eksplanatornu i ponekad čak heurističku ulogu u znanstvenom mišljenju. Kompleksno mišljenje dolazi do izražaja na svim razinama i etapama razvoja znanstvenog mišljenja. Metafore mogu biti dijelom kompleksnog mišljenja kao dominantnog načina mišljenja ili u pojmovnoj strukturi kao pomoćni elementi objašnjenja. Analogije predstavljaju izvjesno strukturiranje kompleksnog i pojmovnogmišljenja.

The paper is on the role of complex thought in the development of thought and scientific knowledge. According to Vigotsky, the complex thought is the first phase in the ontogenesis and phylogenesis of human thought. It is in this sense pre-conceptual. Also, according to Vigotsky, the complex thought has its internal genesis which begins with associative complexes and ends in pseudo-concepts. Complex also an explanatory role in scientific thought. Complex thought ppears on all levels and stages of the development of scientific knowledge. Metaphors may appear in the complex thought as a dominant mode of thought or in the conceptual structure as the auxiliary in the explanation. Analogies present a certain structuration of the complex thought, which contributes to the creation of conceptual structure. The place of analogy is thus between a complex thought and conceptual thought.

Der Autor setzt sich mit Gödels kosmologischem Ansatz auseinander, der scheinbar Zeitschleifen und Zeitreisen erlaubt, sowie insbesondere mit seiner These, dass die Objektivität des Zeitablaufs nicht a priori gegeben ist, sondern von physikalischen Bedingungen im All abhängt. Wir könnten keine einheitliche Weltzeitlinie in Bezug zum mittleren Bewegungsstatus der Dinge „definieren”, sondern nur einige relative und partielle Zeitabläufe, die den Betrachtern als gleichzeitig verlaufend vorkommen würden. Der Autor hinterfragt die Möglichkeit verschiedener „Zeitwahrnehmungen“ für denselben Betrachter: einmal da, wo der Zeitverlauf eine gewöhnliche „Bewegung” wäre und die Vergangenheit der Gegenwart vorausgeht , und wiederum dort, wo dieser Verlauf gewissermaßen simultan wäre. Er vertritt die Meinung, dass das Bewusstsein viele Zeitmodalitäten besitzen kann und dass die „Annihilierung des Zeitablaufs” eine davon wäre. Vielleicht deutet gerade die momentane Besinnung auf vergangene Ereignisse in unserem Geist auf diese Möglichkeit hin. Allerdings bleibt die Frage offen, was diese Möglichkeit für die physikalische Realität oder für den „Kosmos selbst” bedeutet

Raspravljamo o ulozi predpojmovnog kompleksnog mišljenja u znanstvenoj spoznaji i razvoju znanosti. Kompleksno mišljenje sa svom heterogenošću i imaginacijom omogućuje održavanje pojmovne strukture i reorganizaciju cjelokupnih teorijskih mreža, ali to “naplaćuje” latentnim prisustvom protuslovlja i nekonzistentnosti.Članak se nastavlja na našu analizu odnosa između kompleksnog i pojmovnog mišljenja u Aristotelovoj Fizici. Ako je kod Aristotela središnji kompleks pojam “mjesta”, kod Galileija je osnovni kompleks zbirka gibanja-stanja. Galilei još nema izrađenu potpunu pojmovnu strukturu mehanike pa možemo reći da je njegova teorijska osnova uronjena u kompleksnu razinu, ali se oslanja na matematičku strukturu i eksperiment i time uspijeva formirati jednu stabilnu teorijsku organizaciju. Time dobiva osnovu za novu teorijsku sistematizaciju i za formiranje pojmovne strukture kakva je Newtonova. Možemo u izvjesnom smislu reći da je time kompleksno mišljenje u znanosti bilo podignuto na višu razinu i dovedeno u pred-paradigmično razdoblje.We discuss the role of the pre-conceptual complex thought in scientificknowledge and in the development of science. The heterogeneity and imagination of complex thought enables the preservation of the conceptual structure and helps reshape entire theoretical nets, however, its downside is reflected in its latent contradiction and inconsistency. This paper is a continuation of our analysis of the relationship between complex and conceptual thought in Aristotle’s Physics. If Aristotle’s central complex is the notion of “place”, then Galileo’s basic complex is the notion of “ movement”. Since Galileo didn’t have an elaborated conceptual structure of mechanics, we can say that his theoretical basis is “steeped” in the level of complex thought, yet it relies on the mathematical structure and experiment, thereby creating a stable theoretical organization which serves as a basis for the new theoretical systematization and for the shaping of a conceptual structure as Newton’s. Thus, we may claim that, in a certain way, this change raised complex thought in science to a higher level, and brought it to a pre-paradigmatic period

Wittgenstein betont ständig den kategorialen Unterschied zwischen dem Willen und dem Wunsch. Der Wunsch gehört zur kausalen, empirischen Vorgängern der Handlung, der Wille aber gehört zur Handlung selbst als sein logisch interner Aspekt, der die Handlungen als ein Tun darstellt, das nur im Kontext von Sprachspielen und anderen Handlungen "existiert". In den Tagebüchern und im Tractatus wird der Wille auch als der Träger des Ethischen bestimmt, später wird ethische Aspekt des Willens (bzw. der willentlichen Handlung) weniger betont, obwohl implizit anwesend. Der Willensaspekt der Handlung drückt sich durch verschiedene intentionalen Zustände aus, die sich grammatisch-intern mit den Gründen der Handlungen verbinden, der Wunsch dagegen stellt ein empirisches Phänomen dar. Die Wünsche, die dabei auch auftreten können, können zwar Ursachen oder Gründe der Handlung sein, doch nur in der Verbindung mit den darauffolgenden willkürlichen Handlungen, nicht per se.

In this paper I present and discuss the main objections of France Veber (1890- 1975) against mathematical logic in general and the work of Mihael Marki (1864-1939), the first modern logician in Slovenia, in particular. Marki tried to develop an algebra of logic in the spirit of Boole and Schröder, and thereby to provide an axiomatic system of syllogistics with the least number of axioms. Veber's general objection to this project was that it tries to represent the essential qualitative properties of judgements and inferences in quantitative (extensional) terms. Veber also criticized the subject-predicate analysis of judgements and eventually rejected the whole idea of logic as being a calculus, with judgements being treated like equations and inferences like operations in a calculus. Although much in this criticism - which is in certain respects similar to Husserl's reservations about a complete "mathematisation" of logic - is unfounded and misguided, the attack on the idea of logic being essentially a calculus is still interesting and relevant today. This idea is a symptom of a philosophical "desease" resulting from a one-sided "diet", as Wittgenstein put it. Thus one can agree with Veber to the extent that logic has to take into account the meaning of sentences, not just their symbolic form, and that it is therefore an "art" which can never be fully formalized, requiring much more "understanding" than usually thought.

Modern science is so much specialised that it seems utopic to try to follow it all at once. This new book is aimed at crossing the gap between specialists and a common understanding of 'modern science'. It would seem desirable that all educated people would know something from the humanities, literature, art but also the newest developments of natural sciences. One aim of this book is to point out the main messages of certain scientific fields, and what is really new and beyond the average educational level, in order to broaden our horizons. Therefore, at the end of the chapters each scientific field possible future contributions and and ethical concerns, if any, are elaborated.

Dans cet essai, j’analyse la critique que Wittgestein fait d’un certain nombre de thèses qui sont cruciales pour une grande partie de la science cognitive. Il s’agit notamment des concepts de processus computationnels dans le cerveau qui causent des états mentaux, du traitement algorithmique des informations dans le cerveau , du cerveau comme machine, du parallélisme psychophysique, de la machine pensante, ainsi que de la confusion du fait de suivre des règles avec le comportement qui est en conformité avec ces règles. À mon avis, les théoriciens de la science cognitive n’ont pas encore examiné sérieusement la critique de Wittgenstein, de sorte que, chose étonnante, ils confondent souvent la question «comment cela fonctionne ?» avec la question «qu’est-ce que cela fait-il ?». Mais leur erreur «capitale», c’est de confondre les processus computationnels internes se déroulant dans le cerveau avec les critères quotidiens, socialement basés, de reconnaissance, de classifications et de connaissance des contenus des états mentaux

Raspravljamo o ulozi predpojmovnog kompleksnog mišljenja u znanstvenoj spoznaji i razvoju znanosti. Kompleksno mišljenje sa svom heterogenošću i imaginacijom omogućuje pojmovne strukture i reorganizaciju cjelokupnih teorijskih mreža, ali to 'naplaćuje' latentnim prisustvom protislovja i nekonzistentnosti. Galilei još nema izrađenu potpunu pojmovnu shemu mehanike, pa možemo reći da je njegove teorijska osnova uronjena u kompleksnu razinu, ali se oslanja na matematičku strukturu i eksperiment i time uspjeva formirati jednu stabilnu teorijsku organizaciju. Možemo u izvesnom smislu reći da je time kompleksno mišljenje u znanosti bilo podignuto na višu razinu i dovedeno u pred-paradigmatično razdoblje.

The main purpose of this book is to investigate, from the philosophical point of view, the concept of mind in some quickly developing fields of contemporary science, from physics and cosmology to biology and cognitive science. New scientific investigations have brought many empirical results that help to explain natural phenomena from quantum states to human thinking, yet the question of the nature of the mind itself is still open. In this book, the authors discuss several philosophical problems raised or reformulated by recent scientific discoveries. The authors use an interdisciplinary and holistic approach that bridges the gap between scientific and humanistic pictures of the mind.

V svojem prispevku bom zajel le del problematike, ki je zajeta v problemskem polju razprav o razumu in nerazumu, racionalnosti in neracionalnosti. Razum ni dejstvo, ki bi obstajalo, niti ni obča potenca, ki bi jo bilo treba le uporabiti, marveč je možen le kot način bivanja ljudi v spletu zgodovinskih okoliščin, ki spodbujajo srečevanje in povezovanje dveh temeljnih potreb ljudi: potrebe po sproščanju racionalnosti diskurzov iz omejenih in enodimenzionalnih »otokov racionalnosti« ter potrebe po emancipaciji demokratskih družbenih odnosov iz prav tako omejenih in popačenih »otokov emancipacije«.

The book presents the most relevant theories of truth (correspondence, semantic, deflational, pragmaticist, coherentist, constructivist, evidential), with the emphasis of analytical approaches. The author develops a version of the realist correspondence concept of truth while distinguishing various criteria of truth. He is skeptical in regard of any, complete or certain truth but he does not accept epistemic skepticism either, but argues for a moderate realism where objective orientation towards truth suffices as catching (ever) more truth than falsity

T. Kuhn opposes in his articles on history of science the union of the philosophy and history of science. He is defending an interdisciplinary dialog between both sciences. A given problem would be explained there from the point of view od the philosophy of science and of the history of science but not by a unified point of view. However, Kuhn gave with his theory of scientific revolutions the basis for a new science: the theory of the development of science. This science unifies even the analysis of the historical development of science with the rational reconstruction of the development of science.

In this book, I will discuss three main topics: the roots and aims of scientific knowledge, scientific knowledge in society, and science and values I understand scientific knowledge as being a planned and continuous production of the general and common knowledge of scientific communities. I begin my discussion with a brief analysis of the main differences between sciences, on the one hand, and everyday experience, philosophies, religions, and ideologies, on the other. I define the concept of science as a set of family resemblances (in Wittgenstein's sense). The sciences can be distinguished along three lines, in terms of the difference between empirical and non-empirical sciences, differences in degrees of theoretical and methodological structure among individual sciences and scientific disciplines. Scientific knowledge is based upon some grounds, paradigmatic knowledge bases. Scientific knowledge is founded on a unified paradigmatic knowledge base. The latter includes fundamental theories, basic facts, generally accepted empirical regularities (laws), scientific research methods, scientific explanations, and established relations to other sciences. Scientific knowledge in general is defined well in classical terms by the definition that knowledge is a true and rationally-justified belief. In this connection, scientific truth is relative, depending on the given paradigmatic knowledge base and on the precision and accessibility of the measurements and observations involved. In the book's first part, I consider the production and testing of scientific hypotheses, scientific explanations, the structure of scientific theories, and the problem of scientific realism. I consider explanation an integral part of a wider nexus of heuristic and theoretical activities in science like giving reasons, understanding, clarification, and founding. Continuous production of scientific explanations is a necessary condition for the systematic reproduction of scientific knowledge. Accordingly, it does not suffice to describe them in terms of the logical structure of the arguments on which they are based, but rather, scientific explanations ought to be given complete with an epistemic and pragmatic context of the explanation. I consider especially deductive-nomological, inductive-statistical, dispositional, teleological-functional, and genetic explanations. I emphasize the ever-increasing importance of explanations by analogy and by model. Orthogonal to these distinctions lies the distinction between causal and epistemic explanation. Epistemic explanations relate scientific discoveries to epistemic progress, and causal explanations are these epistemic explanations that relate scientific discoveries to reality too. Causal explanations inform us that certain changes occur in the world as agents of other changes, or rather, that certain changes are real consequences of other changes. Thus, by having explanations of causes, we can intervene in the world to induce by design certain changes in some course of phenomena. I consider scientific theories as logically and epistemically ordered wholeness of scientific knowledge in a realm of research that enables us to construct useful models of reality. After the discussion of different 'statement' views on theories and different interpretations of the theory-experience relation, I introduce the 'model' theoretical (non-statement) views on theories, especially the structural theory of science. The model views on theories transcend the realism-antirealism dualism by introducing models between theory and reality. Therefore, the question of scientific realism is not merely whether and, if so, which element(s), of scientific theories represent reality, but rather which conditions suffice to infer from a theory that one of its models truly expresses reality. In other words, under which conditions do models of a theory represent models of reality? Generally, models are just as much images of reality in a theory as they are images of a theory in reality. The actual problem of scientific realism doesn't originate in the observable-unobservable distinction (even if this distinction is otherwise theoretically loaded), but rather in ontological quandaries, of the sort especially encountered in modern physical theories such as quantum mechanics, relativity theory, and cosmological theories, although they are known to arise in other sciences as well. Scientific theories may be real, even if they describe nothing about the world. However, such theories can be given this status only if their formal, mathematical postulates exhibit some formal homology between reality and mathematical forms. The very fact that it is possible to describe reality with the help of mathematics even in cases, where every (representational, conceptual) language and thought fall short, would indicate that even mathematics itself is, in some sense, a part of reality, although 'outside' of the empirical world. It follows we have to distinguish the non-empirical reality and the empirical world. Formal objectivity and non-arbitrariness of theories do not emerge from either our language or thoughts, or from the world of facts, causes, and effects, but rather from non-empirical reality, which frames the world as some kind of objective transcendental condition for the possibility of the existence of the world, thoughts, and language. In the second part of the book, I consider the incorporation of scientific work and scientific knowledge into modern society and its relations to values and ethics. Production of scientific knowledge goes on as a parallel distributed process of a special kind of social (shared) cognition. The central part of this cognition is the presentation of parts of the world by scientific (theoretical) models which are warranted by the shared and public practice of justification, and in reflective acting in the world as it would. I consider various formal concepts of collective propositional knowledge (distributed, mutual, common knowledge). Scientific knowledge is an achievement to be ascribed to a scientific community or, indirectly, to all those who apply or expand it, rather than to individuals per se. It presents the continuous and partially planned production of non-trivial common knowledge of the research communities in modern societies. However, besides common knowledge, shared dispositional knowledge (knowledge how of scientific teams) and shared knowledge by acquiring (knowledge of fundamental similarities and differences in scientific teams) are parts of the real body of scientific knowledge. Scientific common knowledge implies the projection into idealized universal knowledge of all real or potentially rational and well-informed individuals. The respect of scientific knowledge thus presents the norm of rationality. Science as the intensively shared and socially distributed kind of cognition enters into modern society as a special kind of work (general work), as a productive force (social invention drive), and as a form of capital (human, social, cultural, informational, etc.). However any of these categories can adequately represent the socio-economical role of science in modern societies, and we are still waiting for a more adequate general concept that would theoretically cover the 'scientification' of modern societies. My thesis is that the most important general effect of scientification is (and will be) the growth of social processes that structurally resemble parallel distributed shared social cognition of science, and not so much the rise of the use of scientific knowledge and scientifically based information in all kinds of production. Scientification of modern societies inevitably includes a much stronger need for moral and social responsibility of scientists for their work and its effects in their local society and the global world. This need comes in contradiction with the quite large accepted idea (and even the 'norm') on value-free research. I discuss to some degree different arguments for the absence of non-epistemic values and ethical reasoning from science and find them non-convincing. The sound idea of value-free research lies in the need for the absence of categorical value statements from scientific explanations and theoretical deductions. Values and ethical judgment have, and sometimes they even have to play an important role in another part of research and its application in science or outside it. Not the value-loudness of research is a danger for science but its blind, non-reflective use. It leads to the ideologization and politicization of science. A similar danger lies in the purely value-neutrality of research. It leads to the instrumentalization of science to the technical or bureaucratic means for 'any' aims.

I analyze Wittgenstein’s criticism of several assumptions that are crucial for a large part of cognitive science. These involve the concepts of computational processes in the brain which cause mental states and processes, the algorithmic processing of information in the brain (neural system), the brain as a machine, psycho physical parallelism, the thinking machine, as well as the confusion of rule following with behavior in accordance with the rule. In my opinion, the theorists of cognitive science have not yet seriously considered Wittgenstein’s criticism so they, quite surprisingly, frequently confuse the question “how does it work?” with “what does it do?” But their most “deleterious” mistake is their confusion of the internal computational (or parallel) processes taking place in the brain (which possibly cause mental states) with socially-based, everyday criteria of recognition and classification of, and knowledge about, the content of mental states.

We have to distinguish between the scientific revolution which was bound on the work of Copernicus and the cultural-ideological changes that have accompanied and framed this revolution. The "Copernican" revolution was in the beginning a constituent of cultural and ideological changes at the end of Renaissance but it became a scientific revolution only with Galilei and Kepler. This was the first scientific revolution which inagurated the internal dynamics of the scientific development. A necessary condition of that revolution was the incorporation of a consistent physical dynamics into astronomy. This happened with the formulation of Kepler's laws and the Galilei's postulates of relative movements, the law of inertia and of free fall, which are valid for all physical cosmos.

The Carssirer's conceptions of aprioricity, especially of synthetic a priori principles in exact sciences, is analysed. I consider his 'Marburg's' period, first of all his paper on Kant and modern mathematics. Cassirer defends the thesis on invariance principles as the modern variant of synthetic principles a priori. I analyze his arguments on the existence of apriori principles of science and compare his concept of aprioricity with holistic accounts of theories, 'semantic view of theories' and structural realism.

In the article are presented the main philosophical explanations of the application of mathematics on the real world (Plato, Aristotle, rationalists, empiricists, Kant, Frege, Husserl, Carnap etc.). They indicate some typical triangular structure of relationships where the mathematical structures somehow correspond to the forms of reality, and thus are possible though something third what bound them. The attempts to solve the question of the application of mathematics by the dispensability of mathematics (e.g. Field) do not success because they do not explain the big success of mathematics in science. However they call our attention to the meaning of transpositions of some empirical contents on the level of theirs mathematical representations. That is neither an abstraction nor an idealisation but is the mapping from the empirical into a formal language. The opposite attempts to identify mathematics and the fundamental structure of reality also do not explain the success of mathematics because of the obvious ontological differences between the mathematical and the real objects. I return finally to Plato and show how he denies the reduction of numbers to some sets. We have to distinguish the idea of numbers and the various aspects of it, for example the cardinal and the ordinal numbers. According to this platonic insight only the idea of numbers exists. Its aspects are only some partial reflections of this idea in our mathematical theories and in the application of mathematics.

I analyze Wittgenstein’s criticism of several assumptions that are crucial for a large part of cognitive science. These involve the concepts of computational processes in the brain which cause mental states and processes, the algorithmic processing of information in the brain (neural system), the brain as a machine, psycho physical parallelism, the thinking machine, as well as the confusion of rule following with behavior in accordance with the rule. In my opinion, the theorists of cognitive science have not yet seriously considered Wittgenstein’s criticism so they, quite surprisingly, frequently confuse the question “how does it work?” with “what does it do?” But their most “deleterious” mistake is their confusion of the internal computational (or parallel) processes taking place in the brain (which possibly cause mental states) with socially-based, everyday criteria of recognition and classification of, and knowledge about, the content of mental states.