Andrew Chignell

For Kant, knowledge involves certainty. If “certainty” requires that the grounds for a given propositional attitude guarantee its truth, then this is an infallibilist view of epistemic justification. Such a view says you can’t have epistemic justification for an attitude unless the attitude is also true. Here I want to defend an alternative fallibilist interpretation. Even if a subject has grounds that would be sufficient for knowledge if the proposition were true, the proposition might not be true. And so there is sometimes still rational room for doubt. The goal of this paper is to present four different models of what “certainty” amounts to, for Kant, each of which is compatible with fallibilism.

Kant’s “primacy of the practical” doctrine says that we can form morally justified commitments regarding what exists, even in the absence of sufficient epistemic grounds. In this paper I critically examine three different varieties of Kant’s “moral proof” that can be found in the critical works. My claim is that the third variety—the “moral-psychological argument” based in the need to sustain moral hope and avoid demoralization—has some intriguing advantages over the other two. It starts with a premise that more clearly coheres with Kant’s mature account of moral motivation, and it invokes plausible empirical-psychological theses to motivate a commitment to the full-blown classical deity—the result Kant clearly wanted. From the point of view of its structure, I think this third variety of moral argument also has the most by way of contemporary interest.

Most accounts of Kant's epistemology focus narrowly on cognition and knowledge . Kant himself, however, thought that there are many other important species of assent : opinion, persuasion, conviction, belief, acceptance, and assent to the deliverances of common sense. ;My goal in this dissertation is to isolate and motivate the principles of rational acceptability which, for Kant, govern each of these kinds of assent, instead of focusing merely on cognition and knowledge. Some of the principles apply in the context of everyday assent-formation; others apply in more specific contexts . ;The project is worthwhile for at least two reasons. First, it highlights issues that are both neglected in the literature and yet crucial for understanding Kant's famous claims about the nature and limits of our epistemic access to appearances and things-in-themselves. ;Second, it lays out Kant's sophisticated and largely plausible account of our intellectual obligations and of the various roles that "subjective" considerations play in our practices of assent-formation. Kant charts a viable middle course between the epistemic abstemiousness of Cliffordian evidentialists and the epistemic excess of Jamesian pragmatists. ;I begin with an overview of Kant's pre-critical epistemology, and then provide a broad survey of the ethics of assent in the critical period, noting in particular the way Kant allows for exceptions to his First Principle---the principle that it is rational to assent to proposition only on the basis of sufficient objective grounds. Having sketched the whole picture, I turn to the principles governing knowledge and use a new account of Kant's concepts of objective and subjective justification to solve a perennial interpretive problem regarding the nature of our epistemic access to material objects. I go on to examine Kant's theory of belief ; my central claim there is that Kant is much more liberal regarding belief about things-in-themselves that is based on theoretical grounds than most commentators think. Finally, I consider a number of objections to my "Liberal" interpretation of Kant's ethics of assent, and conclude with a meditation on Kant's view of enlightenment

Kant says that it can be rational to accept propositions on the basis of non-epistemic or broadly practical considerations, even if those propositions include “transcendental ideas” of supersensible objects. He also worries, however, about how such ideas (of freedom, the soul, noumenal grounds, God, the kingdom of ends, and things-in-themselves generally) acquire genuine positive content in the absence of an appropriate connection to intuitional experience. How can we be sure that the ideas are not empty “thought-entities (Gedankendinge)”—that is, speculative fancies that do not and perhaps even cannot have referents in reality? In this paper I argue for an account of the fundamental problem here (i.e. that it is based in a concern about whether or not the objects of such ideas are "really possible" in Kant's technical sense). I then critically evaluate Kant's three proposed solutions to the problem. The third one involves an appeal to the complicated doctrine of "symbolization" that becomes prominent in Kant's later works.