Andrew Hollingsworth

One of the foundational concepts for Wolfhart Pannenberg’s theological anthropology is his notion of ‘openness to the world.’ Openness to the world, according to Pannenberg, is essential to human identity in that one’s identity is established in their openness to the world, to the other, and, ultimately, to God. I aim to bring Pannenberg’s openness to the world into dialogue with the concept of the sensus divinitatis as articulated by John Calvin and further developed by Alvin Plantinga. The question driving this paper is whether or not Pannenberg’s openness to the world can rightly be understood as the sensus divinitatis, and, if so, what might be some benefits of it. I conclude that Pannenberg’s understanding of openness to the world is a fruitful way of understanding the sensus divinitatis and a fruitful way of arguing for and explaining humanity’s innate knowledge of God.

In this article, I attempt to solve a problem in Wolfhart Pannenberg’s eschatology, which is best understood as a retroactive ontology. Pannenberg argues that the future exerts a retroactive causal and determinative power over the present, though he also claims that said future does not yet concretely exist. The problem can be posed thus: How does a non-concrete future hold retroactive power over the concrete present? I argue that the doctrines of middle knowledge and supercomprehension formulated by the Spanish Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina, provide an adequate solution to this problem while still preserving both the retroactive power of the nonconcrete future as well as genuine human libertarian free choice.

In several recent publications, Craig A. Carter argues that classical theism is the only model of God that can consistently affirm the Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. He claims that because competing models of God deny true transcendence of God they cannot affirm creatio ex nihilo. We argue that Carter’s claim is false and that his argument is both unclear and fallacious. We further argue that creatio ex nihilo is consistent with other models of God, and we argue this by demonstrating the coherence between the doctrine and two competing models of God: neoclassical theism and open theism.

I argue that the classical doctrine of the eternal processions (CDEP) is inconsistent with the doctrine of creation ex nihilo (DCEN). More specifically, I argue that the metaphysical entailments of each doctrine are inconsistent with one another. According to the CDEP, God must be atemporal and immutable to avoid entailing some sort of ontological subordination obtaining between the Son and Spirit to the Father. On classical understandings of immutability, and thus atemporality, God experiences no change whatsoever, be that change intrinsic or extrinsic. According to the DCEN, there is a state of affairs in which God exists without the universe, and there exists a state of affairs in which God exists with the universe, entailing – at minimum that God extrinsically changes. As a result, the CDEP and the DCEN are inconsistent with one another and cannot both be affirmed within the same coherent theological system. One of the two, or both, should be rejected.

Social trinitarians are divided on whether the doctrine of the eternal relations of origin (DERO) should be maintained. In this paper, I focus on what social trinitarianism (ST) must affirm and cannot affirm by way of the divine attributes in order to maintain the DERO. First, I offer my own proposal for a mere ST before turning to the DERO, as the ST term currently suffers many uses and definitions. Second, I turn my attention to ST and the divine attributes. The DERO requires one to affirm other divine attributes of God, such as divine atemporality, divine immutability, and divine impassability. If the social trinitarian desires to maintain the DERO, then they have to maintain these other attributes. However, they will have to forgo the doctrine of divine simplicity because it is incompatible with ST. I conclude by bringing this discussion to bear on models of God and the divine attributes, arguing that the DERO-affirming social trinitarian only has one such model available to them.

This paper argues for the coherence of penal substitutionary theories of atonement (PSA) with presentism. After summarizing both the PSA and presentism, we address two major objections to the coherence of these two doctrines working together, namely that (1) there is no reality of the future sins that are atoned for, and (2) that since the past no longer exists, there no longer exists anything for which atonement is needed. We demonstrate that these objections are easily overcome by the PSA-affirming presentist. Lastly, we further argue that PSA seems to require presentism in order for such an atonement to obtain.

I argue that there is a discrepancy between the Thomistic doctrine of divine simplicity and affirming the immanent-economic distinctions in the Trinity. Since God is an absolutely simple essence whose essence it is to exist, and since the simple God exists as pure act—lacking all potential—there exist no real distinctions in God, such as physical or metaphysical parts, and there exist no divisions in the life of God, who exists in atemporal eternity. Per the immanent-economic distinctions in the Trinity, the Son is submissive to the will of the Father in the latter but not the former. This appears to be a distinction in the life of the Triune God, which is not acceptable per divine simplicity. After examining the Trinity doctrine and christology of Thomas along with possible solutions to the problem proposed, I conclude that said solutions fail to eliminate the discrepancy between Thomas’s account of simplicity and the immanent-economic distinctions in the life of the Trinity.

SummaryIn this paper, I aim to retrieve insights from the philosophy of the polymath Charles Sanders Peirce, which he referred to as pragmaticism. What Peirce is perhaps best known as is being the father of pragmatism. In order to differentiate his project from other thinkers such as William James and John Dewey, who likewise referred to their projects as pragmatism, he renamed his pragmatism to pragmaticism.Peirce’s pragmaticism has much to offer theologians, especially concerning theological method. I demonstrate this claim by showing the usefulness of three of Peirce’s pragmaticist concepts. The first section of this paper briefly explicates the foundational concepts of pragmaticism, which are the pragmatic maxim, the semiotic nature of understanding, and fallibilism. The second section of this paper provides a sketch of the benefits these three concepts have for theological method.

Part and parcel of the eschatology of the three Abrahamic faiths is the belief that sin and evil will be eliminated upon the consummation of God’s kingdom on earth. Not only do these beliefs affirm that God will ultimately “deal” with the problem of sin and evil, but that sin and evil will be no more. I refer to this eschatological belief as “the elimination of evil” (EOE). The EOE has important implications for how one understands the ontology of time. In this paper, I contribute to this discussion by arguing that ontologies of time that affirm the concrete existence of past moments are incompatible with the EOE. I also argue that solutions based on theories of hypertime, such as those posited by Tyron Goldschmidt and Samuel Lebens, also fail to solve the problems posed to those ontologies of time affirming the concrete existence of the past. I conclude that the ontology of time that best facilitates the EOE is presentism.

This paper aims to explore and critique Wolfhart Pannenberg’s use of semiotic concepts in his understanding and explanation of the church. He defines the church as “the fellowship of individual believers,” and a “sign of the future fellowship of humanity under God’s reign,” i. e. the future Kingdom of God. As he continues to articulate his doctrine of the church, Pannenberg employs semiotic concepts to articulate this notion of the church as a sign of the Kingdom of God. In this paper, I aim to explore Pannenberg’s use of semiotic concepts as they concern his understanding of the church and provide critique and a new way forward of understanding the church as a sign of the Kingdom of God. Though Pannenberg is right to employ semiotic concepts and terminology to expound upon and clarify this concept, he is wrong in the semiotic model of the sign and approach he chooses to employ. In what follows, I first summarize and explicate Pannenberg’s semiotic understanding of the church, and then I provide a critique and corrective of his semiotic preferences with the semiotic work of American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce.

In God in the Labyrinth, Andrew Hollingsworth uses Umberto Eco's semiotic concept of the model encyclopedia as the basis for a new model and approach to systematic theology. Following an in-depth analysis of the model encyclopedia in Eco's semiotics, he demonstrates the implications this model has for epistemology, hermeneutics, and doctrinal development. This work aims to bridge the unfortunate gap in research that exists between the fields of systematic theology and semiotics by demonstrating semiotic insights for theological method.