Andrew Nicholas Rowan

We attempt to bring the concepts of pain, suffering, and anxiety into sufficient focus to make them serviceable for empirical investigation. The common-sense view that many animals experience these phenomena is supported by empirical and philosophical arguments. We conclude, first, that pain, suffering, and anxiety are different conceptually and as phenomena, and should not be conflated. Second, suffering can be the result — or perhaps take the form — of a variety of states including pain, anxiety, fear, and boredom. Third, pain and nociception are not equivalent and should be carefully distinguished. Fourth, nociception can explain the behavior of insects and perhaps other invertebrates (except possibly the cephalopods). Fifth, a behavioral inhibition system associated with anxiety in humans seems to be present in mammals and most or all other vertebrates. Based on neurochemical and behavioral evidence, it seems parsimonious to claim that these animals are capable of experiencing anxious states.

Comments on a prior discussion of animal rights by Gordon G. Gallup, Jr. Gallup asserted that there are no inherent rights; they are inventions of the human mind. Thus, animals only have rights to the extent that we say they do. In this comment, Andrew N. Rowan posits that there is more universal agreement as to why some beings have certain rights than Gallup credits. However, even though philosophers have attempted to develop consistent arguments to underpin a "rights" theory, there are still many problems. Some of these problems are briefly touched upon here. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

Whether they realize it or not, most stakeholders in the debate about using animals for research agree on the common goal of seeking an end to research that causes animals harm. The central issues in the controversy are about how much effort should be devoted to that goal and when we might reasonably expect to achieve it. Some progress has already been made: The number of animals used for research is about half what it was in the 1970s, and biomedical research has reached the point where we can reasonably begin to envision a time when it could advance without causing harm to animals. With some effort and aggressive development of new biomedical research technologies, full replacement of animals in harmful research is within our grasp. The goal will not be reached all at once, however, and phasing out invasive research on all nonhuman primates should be the priority.

Ethical aspects of the use of animals in the safety testing and risk evaluation of the hundreds of thousands of industrial chemicals are briefly discussed. By and large, everybody agrees that such use of animals is ethically challenging, and that safety testing and risk evaluation should be carried out without animals wherever and whenever feasible. The trends in the use of animals in laboratories in Great Britain are described with particular focus on the use of animals by commercial laboratories in Great Britain (primarily by pharmaceutical and chemical companies). Animal use in laboratories stabilized during the years of the genetically modified (GMO) mouse “revolution” but is now again starting to decline as the hoped-for breakthroughs from GMO mouse research have not met expectations. In addition, new biomedical technologies (e.g., human organs-on-a-chip, human organoids, high-thruput test systems and sophisticated artificial intelligence algorithms) are beginning to dominate chemical safety assessments. The new technologies promise to replace animal safety testing within the next 10–20 years if regulatory inertia can be overcome. Ultimately, the ethical challenges are being overtaken by technological innovations that will lead to an end to most or all use of animals in safety testing and risk evaluation.