•  11343
    This article presents a critical reevaluation of the thesis—closely associated with H. L. A. Hart, and central to the views of most recent legal philosophers—that the idea of state coercion is not logically essential to the definition of law. The author argues that even laws governing contracts must ultimately be understood as “commands of the sovereign, backed by force.” This follows in part from recognition that the “sovereign,” defined rigorously, at the highest level of abstraction, is that …Read more
  •  16
    The Law is a Fractal: The Attempt to Anticipate Everything
    Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 44 649-681. 2013.
    Define an inappropriate rule as a rule that, if followed literally, would in at least some cases produce results that can be concluded with reasonable certainty to have been unintended by and unacceptable to even the rule’s author. Even under this definition, it is impossible for a rule writer to write an appropriate and objective rule to cover every situation in advance. Rule-writers nonetheless act today as though they were unaware of this long-acknowledged impossibility of perfect advance enu…Read more
  •  18
    The article presents a critical reassessment of the legal philosophical writings of Ronald Dworkin. Relying in part upon the author’s previous argument that law is – contra the recent near-consensus – best understood as “the command of the sovereign, backed by force,” the author identifies fundamental difficulties, and ultimately incoherency, in Dworkin’s work.
    Law