•  205
    Does sentience come in degrees?
    Animal Sentience 29 (20). 2020.
    I discuss whether "sentience" (i.e., phenomenal consciousness) comes in degrees.
  •  761
    Is consciousness intrinsically valuable?
    Philosophical Studies 175 (1). 2018.
    Is consciousness intrinsically valuable? Some theorists favor the positive view, according to which consciousness itself accrues intrinsic value, independent of the particular kind of experience instantiated. In contrast, I favor the neutral view, according to which consciousness is neither intrinsically valuable nor disvaluable. The primary purpose of this paper is to clarify what is at stake when we ask whether consciousness is intrinsically valuable, to carve out the theoretical space, and to…Read more
  •  572
    Modeling Mental Qualities
    Philosophical Review 130 (2): 263-209. 2021.
    Conscious experiences are characterized by mental qualities, such as those involved in seeing red, feeling pain, or smelling cinnamon. The standard framework for modeling mental qualities represents them via points in geometrical spaces, where distances between points inversely correspond to degrees of phenomenal similarity. This paper argues that the standard framework is structurally inadequate and develops a new framework that is more powerful and flexible. The core problem for the standard f…Read more
  •  472
    The Microstructure of Experience
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (3): 286-305. 2019.
    I argue that experiences can have microphenomenal structures, where the macrophenomenal properties we introspect are realized by non-introspectible microphenomenal properties. After explaining what it means to ascribe a microstructure to experience, I defend the thesis against its principal philosophical challenge, discuss how the thesis interacts with other philosophical issues about experience, and consider our prospects for investigating the microphenomenal realm.