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470Two solutions to the problem of divine hiddennessAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 47 (2). 2010.J. L. Schellenberg's argument from hiddenness against the existence of God is simple. The primary argument is as follows.The Main Argument from Hiddenness If God exists, then no one would be epistemically rational for not believing in God. Some people are epistemically rational for not believing in God. Therefore, God does not exist.However, much of the issue concerning this argument surrounds the support for premise. As many have noted, Schellenberg's first premise does not demand an undeniable…Read more
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68Seemings and SemanticsIn Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, Oxford University Press Usa. pp. 33. 2013.
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Seeming and semanticsIn Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, Oxford University Press Usa. 2013.
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Seeming and semanticsIn Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, Oxford University Press Usa. 2013.
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25The Continuum Companion to Epistemology (edited book)Continuum. 2012.A one volume reference guide to the latest research and future directions in Epistemology, featuring chapters written by leading scholars in the field.
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14A Companion to Epistemology (edited book)Continuum Press. 2010.The Continuum Companion to Epistemology offers the definitive guide to a key area of contemporary philosophy. The book covers all the fundamental questions asked by epistemology - areas that have continued to attract interest historically as well as topics that have emerged more recently as active areas of research. Sixteen specially commissioned essays from an international team of experts reveal where important work continues to be done in the area and, most valuably, the exciting new directio…Read more
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224When does falsehood preclude knowledge?Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3): 283-304. 2011.Falsehood can preclude knowledge in many ways. A false proposition cannot be known. A false ground can prevent knowledge of a truth, or so we argue, but not every false ground deprives its subject of knowledge. A falsehood that is not a ground for belief can also prevent knowledge of a truth. This paper provides a systematic account of just when falsehood precludes knowledge, and hence when it does not. We present the paper as an approach to the Gettier problem and arrive at a relatively simple …Read more
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193What are seemings?Ratio 23 (3): 260-274. 2010.We are all familiar with the phenomenon of a proposition seeming true. Many think that these seeming states can yield justified beliefs. Very few have seriously explored what these seeming states are. I argue that seeming states are not plausibly analyzed in terms of beliefs, partial beliefs, attractions to believe, or inclinations to believe. Given that the main candidates for analyzing seeming states are unsatisfactory, I argue for a brute view of seemings that treats seeming states as irreduc…Read more
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151Privileged access, externalism, and ways of believingPhilosophical Studies 136 (3): 305-318. 2007.By exploiting a concept called ways of believing, I offer a plausible reformulation of the doctrine of privileged access. This reformulation will provide us with a defense of compatibilism, the view that content externalism and privileged access are compatible.
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67A defence of the no-minimum response to the problem of evil: Andrew cullisonReligious Studies 47 (1): 121-123. 2011.I defend Peter van Inwagen's no-minimum response to the problem of evil from a recent objection raised by Jeff Jordan
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161Three Millian Ways to Resolve Open QuestionsJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (1): 1-17. 2008.Millianism is a thesis in philosophy of language that the meaning of a proper name is simply its referent. Millianism faces certain puzzles called Frege's Puzzles. Some Millians defend the view by appealing to a metaphysics of belief that involves Ways of Believing. In the first part of this paper, I argue that ethical naturalists can adopt this Millian strategy to resist Moore’s Open Question argument. While this strategy of responding to the Open Question Argument has already appeared in the l…Read more
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187On the Nature of TestimonyEpisteme 7 (2): 114-127. 2010.This paper examines several recent positions on the nature of testimony and argues that all are unsatisfactory. The first section argues against narrow, broad, and moderate views. The second section argues against Jennifer Lackey's recent analysis of testimony. Her position is supposed to avoid the problems of the prior accounts, but still suffers from two problems. After discussing those problems, this paper offers and defends an alternative analysis of testimony
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95Moral PerceptionEuropean Journal of Philosophy 18 (2): 159-175. 2010.In this paper, I defend the view that we can have perceptual moral knowledge. First, I motivate the moral perception view by drawing on some examples involving perceptual knowledge of complex non‐moral properties. I argue that we have little reason to think that perception of moral properties couldn't operate in much the same way that our perception of these complex non‐moral properties operates. I then defend the moral perception view from two challenging objections that have yet to be adequate…Read more
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28Audi, Robert. Moral Perception.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013. Pp. 200. $35.00Ethics 125 (4): 1189-1194. 2015.
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407Descriptivism, scope, and apparently empty namesPhilosophical Studies 156 (2): 283-288. 2011.Some descriptivists reply to the modal argument by appealing to scope ambiguities. In this paper, we argue that those replies don’t work in the case of apparently empty names like ‘Sherlock Holmes’.
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