Andy Mueller

I discuss the knowledge account of legal proof in Moss (2023) and develop an alternative. The unifying thread throughout this article are reflections on the beyond reasonable doubt (BRD) standard of proof. In Section 1, I will introduce the details of Moss’s account and how she motivates it via the BRD standard. In Section 2, I will argue that there are important disanalogies between BRD and knowledge that undermine Moss’s argument. There is however another motivation for the knowledge account: combined with auxiliary claims, that is probabilistic knowledge and moral encroachment, it can provide a general solution to the puzzle of statistical evidence. Section 3 spells out the details. In Section 4, I suggest to combine the knowledge account with pragmatic encroachment, instead of moral encroachment, in order to stay clear of the thorny issues whether corporations have moral rights. In Section 5, I argue that the verdicts of Moss’s account in cases of false justified beliefs and non-luminous knowledge conflict with the BRD standard and thus call for abandoning the account. Based on the social function of the BRD standard, I suggest a replacement for the knowledge account that is also just as potent as a general solution for the puzzle of statistical evidence. While I will grant that knowledge is neither always necessary nor always sufficient for convictions, I will argue that the concept of knowledge nonetheless plays a significant and ineliminable role in legal decision-making.

This discussion article replies to a challenge for potential perspectivism raised by Davide Fassio in this journal. Potential Perspectivism holds that what one ought to do depends on facts that are potentially accessible. Fassio argues against potential perspectivism based on cases of conjunction agglomeration failure of facts that are potentially accessible. I offer a refined account of potential perspectivism that handles cases of conjunction agglomeration failure by spelling out the notion of a potential perspective in terms of sets. This account of potential perspectivism comes to plausible verdicts about what one ought to do in a wide range of cases.