Angel Rodriguez

Contemporary literature distinguishes two ways to defend the claim that cognition is a matter of representations: one, cognition involves representation-hungry tasks; two, cognition involves a complex form of informational covariation between subcomponents of a system with an adaptive function. Each of these conceptions involves a different notion of representation, and promotes a particular view of the architecture of cognition. But despite the differences, each of them aims to support the claim that cognition is a matter of representations on architectural constraints. The objective of this article is twofold: one, it is argued that architectural constraints do not entail either of those two ways to defend the claim that cognition is a matter of representations; two, it is claimed that both notions of representation share an objectionable common element – namely, the idea of a model that grounds the representational reading– that must be abandoned, in favor of a more economical explanation in terms of causal relations, in order to get a clear view of cognition.

A central feature in contemporary discussions of selfknowledge concerns the epistemic status of mental selfascriptions, such as “I have toothache” or “I believe that p”. The overall project of such discussions is to provide an account of the special status of mental self-ascriptions vis-à-vis other knowledge-claims, including ascriptions of mental states to others. In this respect, two approaches have gained currency in contemporary philosophy. Some authors have focused on the notion of expression, stressing that self-ascriptions are expressions of one’s mental life; whereas others have singled out the notion of transparency as crucial, since self-knowledge involves self-beliefs, and the latter are transparent to one’s available evidence. This critical notice explores one instance of each approach, in order to assess their prospects of success. It concludes that both approaches fail to articulate an account that satisfactorily accommodates the first-person component in the notion of self-knowledge.

According to expressivism about avowals, the meaning of typical self-ascriptions of mental states is a matter of expressing an attitude, rather than describing a state of affairs. Traditionally, expressivism has been glossed as the view that, qua expressions, avowals are not truth-evaluable. Contemporary neoexpressivists like Finkelstein and Bar-On have argued that avowals are expressions, and truth-evaluable besides . In contrast, this paper provides a defence of the view that avowals are, qua expressions, truth-evaluable. This defence is based on an argument from disagreement, to the effect that an adequate explanation of the existence of disagreement involving both cases of avowals and cases of nonlinguistic expression (like winces) supports a view according to which genuine (sincere, truthful) expression is what truth amounts to in avowals

The objective of this paper is to discuss the nature of nonconceptual, as opposed to conceptual, states and their content, by exploring the suggestion that the distinction between the conceptual and the nonconceptual be mapped onto the distinction between the linguistic and the nonlinguistic. This approach gives special relevance to our intuitions about the cognitive relationship between small children and adults, especially regarding the acquisition of concepts, in the course of normal cognitive development. Assuming that there is a developmental challenge to be met, the paper considers both the conceptualist and nonconceptualist strategies used to meet it; and concludes that conceptualism is a more satisfying option

In the historical context of the ancient Roman Empire, especially in Southwestern Spain, this study employs fuzzy logic methodology to conduct a comprehensive comparative analysis of topographical measurement instruments. These instruments—specifically the groma, surveyor's square, dioptra, chorobate, and odometer—were instrumental in shaping the region's infrastructure and played a crucial role in ancient engineering projects. Fuzzy logic is strategically utilized to assign fuzzy values ranging between 0 and 1 to five pivotal characteristics: precision, complexity, versatility, durability, and ease of use. These attributes enable a nuanced evaluation of each instrument. For instance, an instrument known for its precision would be assigned a value closer to 1, while one with lower precision would receive a value closer to 0. The outcomes of this research provide a multifaceted perspective on the historical importance of these instruments in Southwestern Spain during the Roman era. By offering detailed assessments of their strengths and weaknesses through fuzzy logic-based comparisons, the study highlights the suitability of each tool for distinct measurement requirements. By illustrating the adaptability of fuzzy logic in evaluating historical instruments, this research introduces a novel approach that can be applied to various contexts. It not only reveals the pivotal role played by these instruments during the Roman Empire but also underscores their relevance to contemporary surveying and topography, providing a valuable bridge between ancient and modern practices.

The Farga Rossell mechanism, a hallmark of traditional engineering from the historic iron industry of Andorra, represents the confluence of craftsmanship and technological innovation of its time. During its operational years, significant advancements such as the use of water power, the integration of waterpowered bellows, and the automation of hammering processes revolutionized production efficiency. This study delves deep into the mechanical engineering principles underpinning the design of Farga Rossell, from its water management systems to its intricately crafted gears. A modern 3D representation of this mechanism offers a detailed visualization of its components, underscoring the precision and expertise that went into its creation. Beyond its operational significance, Farga Rossell's enduring legacy is evident in contemporary engineering practices, especially the shift from traditional water wheels to hydroelectric power generation. The comprehensive exploration of this mechanism, paired with its 3D design, stands as both an homage to historical engineering wonders and a testament to the timeless nature of innovation.

Peacocke's explanation of the first-person concept provides non-circu/ar possession conditions for such a concept, accommodating two different constraints: the noncircularity requirement and Evans's Thesis. In this paper, it is argued that Peacocke's explanation faces some difficulties: on the one hand, it appears unable to meet a serious objection facing the non-circularity requirement; on the other hand, it misunderstands the constitutive constraints imposed by Evans's Thesis on a correct account of the first person.

According to Ramsey (Representation reconsidered, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007 ), only classical cognitive science, with the related notions of input–output and structural representations, meets the job description challenge (the challenge to show that a certain structure or process serves a representational role at the subpersonal level). By contrast, connectionism and other nonclassical models, insofar as they exploit receptor and tacit notions of representation, are not genuinely representational. As a result, Ramsey submits, cognitive science is taking a U-turn from representationalism back to behaviourism, thus presupposing that (1) the emergence of cognitivism capitalized on the concept of representation, and that (2) the materialization of nonclassical cognitive science involves a return to some form of pre-cognitivist behaviourism. We argue against both (1) and (2), by questioning Ramsey’s divide between classical and representational, versus nonclassical and nonrepresentational, cognitive models. For, firstly, connectionist and other nonclassical accounts have the resources to exploit the notion of a structural isomorphism, like classical accounts (the beefing-up strategy); and, secondly, insofar as input–output and structural representations refer to a cognitive agent, classical explanations fail to meet the job description challenge (the deflationary strategy). Both strategies work independently of each other: if the deflationary strategy succeeds, contra (1), cognitivism has failed to capitalize on the relevant concept of representation; if the beefing-up strategy is sound, contra (2), the return to a pre-cognitivist era cancels out.

The objective of this paper is to discuss the nature of nonconceptual, as opposed to conceptual, states and their content, by exploring the suggestion that the distinction between the conceptual and the nonconceptual be mapped onto the distinction between the linguistic and the nonlinguistic. This approach gives special relevance to our intuitions about the cognitive relationship between small children and adults, especially regarding the acquisition of concepts, in the course of normal cognitive development. Assuming that there is a developmental challenge to be met, the paper considers both the conceptualist and nonconceptualist strategies used to meet it; and concludes that conceptualism is a more satisfying option.

Questions like “Do you believe that p?” can be meant deliberatively (i.e., the question whether to believe that p) or self‐ascriptively (i.e., the question whether the addressee already believes that p). Therefore, an utterance of “I believe that p” can be a proper answer either to a deliberative or to a self‐ascriptive question. In the latter case, an utterance of “I believe that p” is a self‐ascription of belief, but in the former case, it is not. Instead, it is an episode of the belief formed by deliberation. In failing to make these distinctions, contemporary discussions of the transparency of belief mistakenly assume that a proper answer to questions like “Do you believe that p?” is always a self‐ascription of belief. Adhering to the distinctions results in a better account of the transparency of belief.

It is sometimes claimed that we perceive people’s mental states in their expressive features. This paper clarifies the claim by contrasting two possible readings, depending on whether expression is conceived relationally or non-relationally. A crucial difference between both readings is that only a non-relational conception of expression ensures direct access to other minds. The paper offers an argument for a non-relational conception of expression, and therefore for the view that we directly perceive people’s mental states in their expressive features.

There is a recent popular reconstruction of Wittgenstein's thinking about animal minds, according to which animals and humans share a set of expressive abilities, prior to, and independent of, the onset of linguistic-cum-conceptual abilities; a reconstruction that in turn entails a duality of expression and linguistic-cum-conceptual abilities, in adult humans. This paper contends that the reconstruction is implausible and at odds with Wittgenstein's thinking, regarding both the developing minds of children and the minds of non-linguistic animals. Instead, it argues that Wittgenstein's thinking is shaped by an anthropological outlook, according to which linguistic abilities signal the existence of a distinctive human form of life, within which animals do not belong, but into which children are progressively introduced. As a result, there is neither a shared set of expressive abilities in animals, children and adult humans; nor a duality of expression and linguistic-cum-conceptual abilities in humans

An obstacle for the attribution of self-consciousness to animals is that they lack the linguistic ability to use the first-person pronoun. To overcome the obstacle, current tests rely on the availability of behavioural measures of self-consciousness in the absence of language. However, this is not sufficient, for unless a distinction is drawn between epistemic and expressive varieties of self-consciousness, further puzzles threaten the validity of the research. This paper defends the distinction and shows how to re-evaluate current research into animal self-consciousness in its light, so as to improve conceptual clarity in this area.