•  406
    The Problem of Perception
    Harvard University Press. 2002.
    The Problem of Perception offers two arguments against direct realism--one concerning illusion, and one concerning hallucination--that no current theory of ...
  •  10
    Color for Philosophers
    Philosophical Books 32 (1): 41-43. 1991.
  •  306
    Disjunctivism and illusion
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2): 384-410. 2010.
  •  36
    Perception and Belief
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2): 283-309. 2001.
    An attempt is made to pinpoint the way in which perception is related to belief. Although, for familiar reasons, it is not true to say that we necessarily believe in the existence of the objects we perceive, nor that they actually have their ostensible characteristics, it is argued that the relation between perception and belief is more than merely contingentThere are two main issues to address. the first is that ‘collateral’ beliefs may impede perceptual belief. It is argued that this still ass…Read more
  •  321
    Translucent experiences
    Philosophical Studies 140 (2): 197--212. 2008.
    This paper considers the claim that perceptual experience is “transparent”, in the sense that nothing other than the apparent public objects of perception are available to introspection by the subject of such experience. I revive and strengthen the objection that blurred vision constitutes an insuperable objection to the claim, and counter recent responses to the general objection. Finally the bearing of this issue on representationalist accounts of the mind is considered.
  •  233
    Space and sight
    Mind 109 (435): 481-518. 2000.
    This paper, which has both a historical and a polemical aspect, investigates the view, dominant throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, that the sense of sight is, originally, not phenomenally three-dimensional in character, and that we must come to interpret its properly two-dimensional data by reference to the sense of 'touch'. The principal argument for this claim, due to Berkeley, is examined and found wanting. The supposedly confirming findings concerning 'Molyneux subjects' are…Read more
  •  62
    Rethinking Responsibility, by K. E. Boxer
    Mind 123 (489): 189-194. 2014.
  •  289
    Perception and belief
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2): 283-309. 2001.
    An attempt is made to pinpoint the way in which perception is related to belief. Although, for familiar reasons, it is not true to say that we necessarily believe in the existence of the objects we perceive, nor that they actually have their ostensible characteristics, it is argued that the relation between perception and belief is more than merely contingent.There are two main issues to address. The first is that ‘collateral’ beliefs may impede perceptual belief. It is argued that this still as…Read more
  •  212
    In defence of direct realism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2): 411-424. 2006.
    In her careful consideration of my book, The Problem of Perception, Susanna Siegel highlights what she takes to be a number of shortcomings in the work. First, she suggests that a sense-datum theorist has two options—what she calls the “complex sense-data option” and the “two-factor option”—that survive the argument of my book unscathed. I consider these two options in the first two sections of this reply. Secondly, she criticizes my suggestion that there are three and only three basic and indep…Read more
  •  131
    Attitudes, Tracing, and Control
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 32 (2): 115-132. 2015.
    There is an apparent tension in our everyday moral responsibility practices. On the one hand, it is commonly assumed that moral responsibility requires voluntary control: an agent can be morally responsible only for those things that fall within the scope of her voluntary control. On the other hand, we regularly praise and blame individuals for mental states and conditions that appear to fall outside the scope of their voluntary control, such as desires, emotions, beliefs, and other attitudes. I…Read more
  •  2
    The Nature of Moral Responsibility (edited book)
    with Michael Mckenna Randolph Clarcke
    Oxford University Press. 2015.
  •  414
    On Being Responsible and Holding Responsible
    The Journal of Ethics 11 (4): 465-484. 2007.
    A number of philosophers have recently argued that we should interpret the debate over moral responsibility as a debate over the conditions under which it would be “fair” to blame a person for her attitudes or conduct. What is distinctive about these accounts is that they begin with the stance of the moral judge, rather than that of the agent who is judged, and make attributions of responsibility dependent upon whether it would be fair or appropriate for a moral judge to react to the agent in va…Read more
  •  124
    Who Knew? Responsibility Without Awareness (review)
    Social Theory and Practice 36 (3): 515-524. 2010.
  •  506
    In his recent book, In Praise of Blame, George Sher argues (among other things) that a bad act can reflect negatively on a person if that act results in an appropriate way from that person's "character," and defends a novel "two-tiered" account of what it is to blame someone. In these brief comments, I raise some questions and doubts about each of these aspects of his rich and thought-provoking account
  •  385
    Responsibility as Answerability
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (2): 99-126. 2015.
    ABSTRACTIt has recently become fashionable among those who write on questions of moral responsibility to distinguish two different concepts, or senses, of moral responsibility via the labels ‘responsibility as attributability’ and ‘responsibility as accountability’. Gary Watson was perhaps the first to introduce this distinction in his influential 1996 article ‘Two Faces of Responsibility’ , but it has since been taken up by many other philosophers. My aim in this study is to raise some question…Read more
  •  715
    Control, responsibility, and moral assessment
    Philosophical Studies 138 (3). 2008.
    Recently, a number of philosophers have begun to question the commonly held view that choice or voluntary control is a precondition of moral responsibility. According to these philosophers, what really matters in determining a person’s responsibility for some thing is whether that thing can be seen as indicative or expressive of her judgments, values, or normative commitments. Such accounts might therefore be understood as updated versions of what Susan Wolf has called “real self views,” insofar…Read more
  •  62
    Review of Nomy Arpaly, Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (1). 2007.