University of Antwerp
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2015
Göttingen, Lower Saxony, Germany
  •  57
    Animal Mental Action: Planning Among Chimpanzees
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4): 745-760. 2015.
    I offer an argument for what mental action may be like in nonhuman animals. Action planning is a type of mental action that involves a type of intention. Some intentions are the causal mental antecedents of proximal mental actions, and some intentions are the causal mental antecedents of distal mental actions. The distinction between these two types of “plan-states” is often spelled out in terms of mental content. The prominent view is that while proximal mental actions are caused by mental stat…Read more
  •  4
    Temporal representation and reasoning in non-human animals
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42. 2019.
    Hoerl & McCormack argue that comparative and developmental psychology teaches us that “neither animals nor infants can think and reason about time.” We argue that the authors neglect to take into account pivotal evidence from ethology that suggests that non-human animals do possess a capacity to represent and reason about time, namely, work done on Sumatran orangutans’ long travel calls.
  •  1
    Tomasello claims that we lack convincing evidence that nonhuman animals manifest a sense of moral obligation in their group activities. The philosophical analysis of distinctive evidence from ethology, namely group hunting practices among chimpanzees, can help the author appreciate the distinctive character of this behaviour as a display of fairness put into practice.