Angélique Thébert

Considering the persisting disagreement between the common sense philosophers and the sceptics, it seems that they are faced with a deep epistemic disagreement. Taking stock from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, one generally thinks that deep epistemic disagreements cannot be rationally resolved. Hinge epistemology, inherited from Wittgenstein, is also considered as an illuminating detour to understand common sense epistemology. But is there really a deep epistemic disagreement between the common sense philosophers and the sceptics? Could it not be considered that they share a common background? If so, is the rational resolution of their disagreement logically possible? What rational means can common sense use to convince someone of the privileged status of an epistemic principle? Relying on Reid’s, Alston’s and Lynch’s arguments, I show that common sense epistemology is a more promising approach than hinge epistemology, because it is driven by an optimism about reason in the solving of deep epistemic disagreements.

We generally consider that we should not believe on the basis of insufficient evidence. Yet there are many beliefs which are deprived of adequate epistemic evidence. In such cases, James recommends the “subjective method” which allows us to hold beliefs for practical reasons. This pragmatist move is rejected by evidentialists who think that beliefs must be grounded on adequate epistemic evidence. My contention is that Reid’s approach to irresistible beliefs we do not hold for epistemic reasons offers a persuasive means to escape the contemporary stalemate between evidentialism and pragmatism. Are we rational in holding beliefs for which we don’t possess sufficient epistemic evidence? Reid and James subscribe to a permissivist ethics of belief, according to which we are allowed to hold a belief even if we cannot show its epistemic credentials. Yet I show that the abandonment of the stringent evidentialist requirement (which is tied to a form of internalism) does not necessarily commit one to a pure form of pragmatism (which offers practical reasons instead of epistemic ones). If Reid proposes arguments built on a pragmatist line, he does not reject the evidentialist demand per se, only its internalist form. Moreover, in his view, immediate beliefs are carried by a kind of instinctive epistemic trust. On the whole, pragmatism and common sense do not defend the same kind of epistemic permissivism.

Locke is generally taken as promoting an ethics of belief. For him, we must apply a doxastic norm so that we properly conduct our understanding. Thus, he forcefully highlights one key epistemic norm, the norm of evidence, that prescribes that we adjust the strength of our assent to the available evidence. I shall argue that Of the Conduct of the Understanding constitutes the framework within which Locke’s remarks in the Essay must be inserted. Far from promoting a mere ethics of belief, Locke actually promotes a virtue epistemology, or an ethics of virtuous thinking. Contrary to doxastic anti-voluntarism, this new way of apprehending Locke’s remarks does not downplay the role of the will. But compared to doxastic voluntarism, it gives its due role to the will (it is not devoted to the control of our assent, but to the ordering the consideration of an idea, or the forbearing to consider it, which is at the bottom of the acquisition of intellectual habits). Moreover, it takes into account important aspects of our intellectual life, namely diachronic and social aspects.

Supposons un sceptique qui doute qu’il ait deux mains. Je montre tout d’abord que si on le compare au fou, cela coupe court à toute tentative de le comprendre. La raison en est non pas qu’il ne partage pas les mêmes croyances-charnières que nous, mais qu’il n’effectue aucun partage entre des croyances-charnières et des croyances susceptibles d’être révisées. Puis je propose un autre modèle à partir duquel le discours d’un sceptique peut apparaître comme intelligible : le modèle de la compréhension interculturelle. Dans ce cadre, un sceptique n’est intelligible que s’il adhère à un système partagé de distribution entre des croyances-charnières et des croyances révisables, quand bien même il n’a pas les mêmes croyances-charnières que nous.

Quiconque veut croire de manière appropriée devrait obéir à la règle de l’évidence qui veut que l’on croie que p si et seulement si l’on a des raisons suffisantes de croire qu’il est vrai que p. En tout autre cas, le doute s’impose. Pourtant, il existe des croyances qui ne respectent pas cette règle : les principes du sens commun. Même si nous croyons en eux sans disposer de raisons suffisantes pour attester de leur vérité, cette attitude n’est pas intellectuellement illégitime. Ainsi, nous sommes en droit de croire que nos pouvoirs intellectuels sont fiables, à défaut de disposer de raisons suffisantes, et même en dépit de raisons de douter. Nous n’avons pas à choisir entre la suspension du jugement et la thèse fidéiste selon laquelle les principes du sens commun relèvent de la foi, conçue comme étant distincte des croyances. L’idée de Reid que les principes du sens commun sont des croyances authentiques en lesquelles nous avons confiance ou foi permet d’échapper à ce dilemme : la foi n’est pas une réponse au doute, un saut qu’on décide de faire faute de mieux. C’est une foi primitive, sans laquelle on ne peut pas évaluer l’évidence. Il en résulte que 1) une telle foi peut être conservée en dépit de raisons de douter, car elle n’est pas acquise du fait de raisons et 2) la compatibilité avec les principes du sens commun est une règle doxastique qui a priorité sur la règle de l’évidence.

When Reid circumscribes the first principles of common sense, he encounters the epistemic circularity problem. The way he tackles it offers a means to reconsider the role of track-record arguments. Although fully aware of the epistemic circularity involved in this type of reasoning, Reid considers it as valid. To reconcile the fact that we immediately know the first principles with the fact that we may be compelled to justify them, this chapter takes these arguments as aiming neither at establishing the truth of the principles nor at convincing someone who doubts them, but as aiming at improving one’s knowledge of them. It implies that we distinguish the presupposed and practical knowledge of the principles, from the produced and reflective knowledge of them. Consequently, the epistemic circularity is neither complete nor vicious, and the justification, although useful to improve our knowledge, is not necessary to produce it in the first instance.