•  9
    Alexander Bird and James Ladyman: Arguing About Science (review)
    Science & Education 23 (5): 1223-1228. 2014.
  •  14
    Preface Bridging a Gulf (... or Perhaps Two!)
    European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (1): 4-13. 2012.
  •  125
    Looking for structure in all the wrong places: Ramsey sentences, multiple realisability, and structure
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (4): 633-655. 2006.
    ‘Epistemic structural realism’ (ESR) insists that all that we know of the world is its structure, and that the ‘nature’ of the underlying elements remains hidden. With structure represented via Ramsey sentences, the question arises as to how ‘hidden natures’ might also be represented. If the Ramsey sentence describes a class of realisers for the relevant theory, one way of answering this question is through the notion of multiple realisability. We explore this answer in the context of the work o…Read more
  •  158
    Structural Distinctions: Entities, Structures, and Changes in Science
    Philosophy of Science 72 (5): 1385-1396. 2005.
    Abstract. I argue that pessimistic meta-induction (PMI) seems to point an ontological priority of the relations over the objects of the scientific theories of the kind suggested by French and Ladyman (French and Ladyman 2003). My strategy will involve a critical examination of epistemic structural realism (ESR) and historical case-study: the prediction of Zeeman’s effect in Lorentz’s theory of electron.
  •  50
    Structural Realism as a Form of Humility
    In M. Rédei M. Dorato M. Suàrez (ed.), Epsa Epistemology and Methodology of Science, Springer. pp. 35--45. 2010.
  •  52
    Dispositionalist accounts of scientific laws are currently at the forefront of discussions in the metaphysics of science. However, Mumford has presented such accounts with the following dilemma: if laws are to have a governing role, then they cannot be grounded in the relevant dispositions; if on the other hand, they are so grounded, then they cannot perform such a role. Mumford’s solution is drastic: to do away with laws as metaphysically substantive entities altogether. Dispositionalist accoun…Read more